

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

THE BIG SERVICE DELIVERY DIVIDE



Godber W. Tumushabe • Lillian M. Tamale • Eugene G. Ssemakula • Tony Muhumuza

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Cover illustration from top clockwise:

A ferry connecting Kamuli-Kayunga; a collapsed bridge connecting Rukungiri and Kanungu districts; a crowded classroom at Walela Primary School, Lira District; a new classroom block at Oguru Primary School in Awach Subcounty, Gulu District.

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ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 60, 2013



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ACRONYMS

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
CBTIC	Citizens' Budget Tracking and Information Centre
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DEC	District Executive Committee
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
DLB	District Land Board
DPAC	District Public Accounts Committee
DSC	District Service Commission
EU	European Union
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
LGCSCI	Local Government Councils' Score-card Initiative
LLG	Lower Local Governments
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
PWDs	Persons With Disabilities
TTI	Think Tank Initiative
ULGA	Uganda Local Government Association
URA	Uganda Revenue Authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Uganda Local Government Councils Scorecard 2012/13 presents the findings of the annual assessment of the performance of elected district political leaders. The Scorecard was launched in 2009 and is currently conducted in 26 districts across the country. The goal of the Scorecard is to assess how elected local political leaders perform their responsibilities and other mandates as stipulated under the Constitution, the Local Governments Act and other applicable laws. The assessment covers the following district elected leaders and institutions: district councilors; chairpersons; speakers; and the district council. These political leaders and institutions are assessed on the following mandates: legislation, accountability, contact with their electorates, participation in lower local government councils, and monitoring of service delivery in their local constituencies.

The Scorecard uses a methodology combining quantitative and qualitative techniques and approaches designed to increase the skills of elected leaders, raising the civic consciousness of the electorate while monitoring progress in the quality of public services. The expected outcome of the scorecard is that the provision of information about the performance of their elected political leaders will increase demand for accountability from the electorate which will inevitably make the public service delivery system more responsive to the needs of the citizens. The findings of the scorecard are presented in three different parts: the quality of public service delivery in the selected local governments; the scores obtained by each political leader for each of the areas assesses; and what needs to be done to improve performance and increase citizens' demand for accountability and better governance.

The 2012/13 Scorecard contains five key messages based on the results from the assessment. First, there is remarkable improvement in the performance of the elected political leaders since the scorecard was first introduced in 2009. Secondly, there is clearly no change in the external factors that have been consistently identified as major constrains to the performance of these leaders in their efforts to ensure effective delivery of public services in their jurisdiction. Thirdly, there is increased awareness about the accountability relationship that should exist between citizens and their elected leaders. However, the low levels of civic competence combined with increasing erosion of confidence in the electoral process means that the power and accountability relationships between them have not changed.

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The fourth message is that while the scorecard and associated interventions have engineered positive pressure on elected leaders to improve their performance, the tool has not made as much progress in stimulating citizen action in the demand-side model. On a positive note though, recent interventions on the outreach side, and in particular, intensive dissemination of the scorecard findings and the deployment of citizen-to-councilor direct SMS service are showing promise in increasing demand for accountability. Increase in the civic capacity of citizens to demand for accountability will need to be the focus of the scorecard and the associated outreach activities over the coming years. The final message is that a "big service delivery divide" exists in all the districts. This is the case in all the sectors that are covered by the assessment: education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, environment and natural resources, and roads.

Building on the conclusions from the previous assessments, the 2012/13 assessment identified five obstacles to the attainment of a fully functional local government system that is not only responsive but also accountable to the electorate in their respective jurisdictions. These are: multiple leadership conflicts; low levels of revenue collection and lack of financial autonomy; failed multi-party politics at the local government level; distortions inherent in the decentralization policy; and centralized control of the national budget resources.

Since 2009, a series of recommendations are made based on the findings from the scorecard. The 2012/13 Scorecard report provides a complete checklist of these recommendations and the status of the actions taken to implement them. The report further makes the following recommendations:


- (i) Establishing a local governments leadership training institute
- (ii) Reforming the laws governing local governments to establish a proper hierarchy of leadership and accountability relationships;
- (iii) Establishment and operationalization of independent quarterly citizens' accountability fora.
- (iv) Introducing the position of *leader of opposition* in the local government councils.

(v) Establishing and operationalizing a Local-Government - Parliamentary Leaders Forum.

In conclusion, it is important to point out that there is visible progress in the performance of elected political leaders. The evidence of how this improved performance relates to the quality of public service delivery and accountability to citizens remains anecdotal. Consequently, the scorecard methodology will be revised to further introduce indicators and scores that help establish the relationship between the performance of elected leaders, the quality of public services and the changes in citizens' demand for accountability and good governance.

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An innovative way of being accountable. But where are these children? Source: ACODE Digital Library

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1 INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda¹ declares in its statement of political objectives that 'the State shall be based on democratic principles which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance'. In the same spirit, it further provides that 'the State shall be guided by the principle of decentralisation and devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs'. These statements of objectives and principles are the fundamental premise of the policy of decentralisation, which remains the linchpin of governance over the years. At the heart of the decentralisation policy is the local governments system. Under the constitution, the local government system is framed as the primary vehicle for delivering on the promise of self-governance and effective delivery of public services in the country.² The local government system as established under the constitution and the Local Governments Act, therefore, provides the framework and mechanism for all forms of decentralisation at the various levels of government.

In 2009, the Local Government Councils Scorecard was initiated as an independent process to assess the performance of elected local leaders and representative organs at the local government level. Hitherto, the only consistent and official form of assessment was the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments (referred to elsewhere in this Report as the "Annual Assessment"). The Annual Assessment is conducted by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). The Local Government Councils Scorecard (also referred to as the "Local Councils Scorecard" was developed to complement the Annual Assessment. Unlike the Annual Assessment, which is biased towards the technical arm of the local government system, the Local Councils Scorecard focuses exclusively on how local elected political leaders and institutions perform their responsibilities and functions as stipulated under the existing legal regime. Under the Constitution, these leaders and institutions are vested with the mandate to ensure effective governance and delivery of public services at the local level. The underlying

¹ Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (As amended)

² The system of local governments in Uganda is established under Article 176 of the Constitution which prescribes the principles that apply to local governments.

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An extract from a councillor's diary showing a chronology of activities. Source: ACODE Digital Library

hypothesis of the Scorecard is that a combination of regular assessments of performance of elected leaders and provision of performance information to citizens will promote good governance and increase the focus on public service delivery by building demand for accountability through electoral and other processes.

The Local Councils Scorecard was first undertaken in 10 districts covering the Financial Year 2008/09. For the FY2009/10, the assessment was extended to cover 20 districts and subsequently expanded to 26 districts starting with the FY2011/12. This report provides a synthesis of the findings from the assessment for the 26 districts for the FY 2012/2013. Besides providing the assessment results for FY2012/13, the report also compares the trends in performance for the selected districts since the scorecard process was launched in 2009.

The report is presented in eight sections including this introduction. Sections two and three provide the scope, indicators and methodology as well as the theoretical framework for the assessment. In sections four and five, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current trends and status in public service delivery and link that discussion to the current architecture for financing local governments. Sections six and seven present the findings from the scorecard and the interpretation of these findings as they relate to governance, public service delivery and accountability. Section eight examines the key factors that affect the performance of local elected leaders, building on similar analysis ۲

from the previous assessments. The recommendations and conclusions are also presented in this section.

There are essentially five main messages from the 2012/13 scorecard assessment. The first message is that since 2009, there have been remarkable improvements in the performance of elected local political leaders and the local government institutions that are the focus of this assessment. This is mainly because the leaders have embraced the recommendations concerning the endogenous factors that were initially put forward as affecting both their performance as well as the assessment process. Consequently, there is more evidence of systematic documentation of the activities undertaken by the councillors; monitoring of service delivery has become more deliberate than previously undertaken; some district councils have been successful in reducing intra-leadership conflicts; and clearly, there are increased district councillor interactions with the lower-level local government councils. However, the fact that this improved performance has not translated into significant and substantive improvements in service delivery outcomes remains a key question for the assessment process.

The second message is that there are generally no major changes in the exogenous factors that affect performance. On a positive note, the imposition of the moratorium on the creation of new districts has created more stability and predictability both in the number of districts and the policy regime. However, the budget and revenue architecture for local governments has not changed in structural terms. Local government councils are still not able to exercise their powers to respond to service delivery deficiencies or invest in stimulating local economic activities largely because they do not control discretionary funds of their own.

The third message is that while there is increased awareness about the accountability relationship that should exist between citizens and elected leaders, the low levels of civic competence combined with increasing loss of citizens' confidence in the electoral process has not changed the power relations between the citizens and elected leaders. On the contrary, economic policies that tend to emphasize welfare programmes and handouts have created a clientelistic relationship between citizens and elected local leaders. A budget architecture that makes the central government the benefactor for local governments has created a power relationship in which local governments remain patronised and more accountable to national leaders. Information asymmetry remains a major problem, and the shift in the power relations between vote-seeking politicians and the voters that is required to increase the

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citizens' demand for accountability and better governance is only beginning to emerge.

The fourth message from this assessment is that while over the last three years results of the scorecard have engineered positive pressure on local leaders to improve own performance, it has not yet translated into civic consciousness and empowerment of the citizenry so that they are able to hold elected and other leaders accountable. In the coming years, more focus will need to be put on raising civic competence through increased dissemination of scorecard results to the electorate and the general citizenry.

Finally, there remains a "big service delivery divide" in all the districts across the country. The key observation is that both the law and the current budget architecture give power to the local government elected leaders, but without the authority to design and deliver investments that grow the local economic infrastructure and improve the stock of goods and services in the respective local governments. While islands of excellence in service delivery in education, health, agriculture, access to clean water and other sectors are emerging, there are still wide gaps in critical aspects of service delivery. Few instances of excellence and best practices are juxtaposed with crumbling infrastructure in the larger part of public service delivery centres. In the primary education sub-sector, performance rates in private schools are better than in most public schools while low primary completion rates and poor transition rates to postprimary training remain major policy challenges. In the health sector, it is more likely to find drugs and health personnel in a private clinic than in a public health facility. This "divide" has significant implications for access to public services, especially since the majority of the population do not have the means to access privately provided services which are costly and mainly located in urban areas of the country.

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
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2 METHODOLOGY, SCOPE AND INDICATORS

2.1 Scope of the assessment

Since 2011, the Local Government Councils Scorecard covers 26 districts local governments.³ The selection of the districts was based on five criteria. First and foremost, the selection takes into account the need to include districts from all the regions of Uganda. The objective of this criterion is to encourage cross-regional learning and a better understanding of whether there are any variations in performance due to the geopolitical location of the district. Figure 1 is a map of Uganda showing the distribution of participating districts by geographical location.

Figure 1: Distribution of the districts participating in the Scorecard Assessment



3 During the assessment for the FY 2013/14, at least 4 additional districts will be included in the assessment as additional funding commitment is fulfilled from the USAID/GAPP.

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The second criterion is the length of time the district has been in existence. Since 1986, Government has continued to create new districts out of the already existing district units. Districts are therefore categorised as old district if they were in existence prior to 1986⁴ and new if they were created after 1986.⁵ Figure 2 shows the timelines for creation of new districts over the last three decades. The primary justification of creating districts is the need to "bring services closer to the people". Consequently, the Scorecard seeks to examine whether there are considerable variations in performance between elected local leaders from old districts compared to those from the newly created districts.




Figure 2: Structure of local government councils in Uganda

Districts are also selected for inclusion in the Scorecard because they are perceived to be model districts according to the Annual Assessment. As shown in Table 1, Luwero, Wakiso and Mbale districts have a consistent positive rating under the Annual Assessment. It is therefore imperative to explore whether such

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⁴ For the purposes of the assessment, the following districts fall under this category: Moroto, Mbale, Kamuli, Nebbi, Hoima, Luwero, Mukono, Moyo, Mpigi, Rukungiri, Jinja, Soroti, Tororo, Mbarara, Kabarole and Lira.

⁵ This category of districts includes: Ntungamo, Amuria, Bududa, Buliisa, Amuru, Nakapiripirit, Agago and Kanungu.

rating may be linked to the record of performance of the political leadership or a combination of other factors.

					1	
District	2006	2007	2008	2010	2011	No. of Times Rewarded
Luwero	1	1	1	1	1	5
Wakiso	1	1	1	1	1	5
Mbale	-1	1	1	1	1	4
Mbarara	1	1	-1	1	1	4
Mpigi	1	1	-1	1	1	4
Tororo	0	-1	1	1	1	3
Jinja	1	1	-1	0	1	3
Kabarole	1	1	-1	0	1	3
Моуо	1	1	-1	1	0	3
Bududa	N/A	1	1	0	0	2
Agago	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1
Rukungiri	1	-1	1	-1	1	3
Nebbi	-1	1	-1	1	1	3
Kanungu	0	0	-1	1	1	2
Kamuli	0	1	-1	0	1	2
Hoima	0	1	-1	1	-1	2
Amuria	1	1	-1	0	-1	2
Soroti	1	1	-1	-1	-1	2
Ntungamo	-1	-1	-1	1	1	2
Gulu	0	-1	-1	0	1	1
Nakapiripiriti	-1	-1	-1	0	1	1
Moroto	-1	-1	-1	1	0	1
Buliisa	N/A	-1	-1	0	0	0
Lira	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
Mukono	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
Amuru	N/A	-1	-1	-1	-1	0

Table 1:Trends in performance of the Scorecard districts in
the Annual Assessment (2006-2011)⁶

Source: Ministry of Local Government Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011

The fourth criterion is the perceived marginalisation of a district on account of its geopolitical location. This criterion provides a basis for examining the performance of elected leaders in such districts *vis a vis* "non-marginalised districts" or whether the quality of service delivery is substantially different compared to the districts that are not considered marginalised. For purposes of this criterion, a district is considered marginalised if it is classified in the

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⁶ Scores: 1 for Reward, 0 for Static, -1 for Penalty, N/A for not applicable. At the time of completing the 2012/13 scorecard assessment, the report of the Annual Assessment for the financial year under review had not been published.

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"hard-to-reach" categorisation by the Ministry of Public Service or has suffered prolonged conflicts and instability.⁷

Finally, some of the districts were selected because of their perceived position of influence in a particular region. Given that the Scorecard cannot be conducted in all the districts due to the costs involved, the inclusion of such districts is intended to ensure the spillover effects of the assessment to other districts within the respective regions. A district is considered to be influential if it has a large population and has a municipality within its jurisdiction. Mbarara, Lira, Wakiso, Tororo, Moroto, Gulu, Soroti and Hoima fall under this category. It is important to emphasize that all the five criteria are complementary rather than being exclusive. Consequently, a district that meets multiple criteria is more likely to be selected for inclusion in the assessment.

2.2 Indicators and Scores


The indicators and scores that constitute the scorecard are a set of qualitative and quantitative measurements that seek to measure the extent to which local elected leaders and institutions composed of elected leaders discharge their functions and responsibilities. In this regard, the scorecard is constructed around two major building blocks: the first block comprises the organs of the local government system at the district level. The organs of the district council included in the assessment are those that are vested with legal, administrative or political mandate and responsibilities for the delivery of public services and promotion of good governance (Figure 3).

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⁷ The following districts fall under this category: Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Amuru, Lira, Soroti and Luwero.

Figure 3: Organs of the district council



The local government council is constructed around the institution of a councillor who is elected to represent a geographically defined area and a special constituency of citizens.⁸ The councillor is therefore the primary unit of the assessment. The other organs included in the assessment are: the district council, ⁹ the district chairperson, and the speaker.¹⁰ Besides the legal mandate vested in the holders of these offices, elected leaders also make electoral promises to the voters and citizens to improve service delivery in critical sectors such as education, health and transport infrastructure, and expansion of economic opportunity. The scorecard is designed to assess the efforts of these elected leaders and representative organs to deliver on their electoral promises to improve public service delivery, ensure accountability and promote good governance.

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⁸ Local Governments Act, 1997 (As amended), Section 10 (c),(d) and (e)


⁹ At the moment, the scorecard only focuses on the district council and its organs. Plans to include the municipalities and sub-counties have not materialized due to the human and financial resources required to expand the assessments to cover these institutions.

¹⁰ Although the District Executive Committee is one of the important organs, it is not included in the assessment because it is constituted through political appointment by the chairperson, and hence its performance is largely determined by the performance of the chairperson.

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The second building block is the principles and core responsibilities of local governments as set out in the Constitution¹¹ and the Local Governments Act.¹² For the purposes of the scorecard, these are classified into five categories: financial management and oversight; political functions and representation; legislation and related functions; development planning; and constituency servicing and monitoring service delivery (Figure 4). These are referred to in the scorecard as parameters. The parameters are broken down into a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators reflecting the statutory responsibilities and functions of the elected leader or institution being assessed.

Figure 4: The structure of the scorecard based on the District Chairperson's scorecard



The indicators are further broken down into measurable units referred to as scores. These scores are based on the specific tasks that are required of a particular organ to be able to discharge the function expressed in a given parameter. Each score is hence assigned points that can be allocated based on the assessment and the empirical evidence available. At the moment, the main weakness is that assignment of points to individual scores is based on the perceived importance of the task in ensuring service delivery and good governance.¹³ This assignment of the points is therefore fairly subjective although efforts have been made to mitigate the extent of the bias by subjecting the assignment process to rigorous reviews.

¹¹ Constitution, 1995 (As amended), Article 176

¹² Local Governments Act, 1997 (As amended), Section 30

¹³ For example, the highest points are allocated to monitoring of public service delivery since this is the single most important issue for voters and citizens.

2.3 The scorecard process and methodology

The Local Government Councils Scorecard is a five-step process pursued rigorously to ensure the involvement of citizens and the removal of potential bias from the assessment. Step 1 of the process focuses on the preliminary review of relevant documents and literature focusing on the respective district. The key documents included in this review are those relating to budgets. planning, and minutes of the councils and their committees. Step 2 focuses on administering the scorecard through interviews with the respective councillors and the collection of written evidence about the councillors' performance. At stage 3, the information collected is verified through field visits to specific service delivery units and unstructured interviews with service consumers at the respective units. The information is further verified through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) at stage four of the process. Stage 5 of the assessment involves analysis of the data and writing of the district scorecard reports. In order to mitigate potential bias by the district research teams, the scores assigned are further verified through a peer review process. The following are the most important elements of the methodology.

2.3.1 A multi-layered research team

A multi-layered research team involving over 70 researchers from the 26 districts undertakes the assessment. The first layer of the team involves research assistants who are responsible for collecting information and data that is needed to back up the scores assigned to each indicator. The majority of researchers are based in the respective districts and participate in organising FGDs, conducting interviews with councillors and validating the information provided by visiting service delivery units. The second layer involves the team of lead researchers who directly supervise the fieldwork and produce the district reports. The third layer comprises the ACODE research team who are responsible for the final validation of the data with the purpose of removing or mitigating potential bias in the scoring. This is done by reviewing and collating all information and data on which each score is based.

2.3.2 Methodology training and inception meetings

The methodology-training workshop is organized for all members of the research team. During the training, the research team members are equipped with research skills in data collection, conducting interviews and validation of

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information secured through interviews. The training also exposes the team to research ethics and how to address the problem of bias in the scoring process. Inception meetings are conducted throughout the districts to introduce the assessment exercise to the councillors and other stakeholders in the district. During the 2012/13 assessment, 1,922 people, comprising 1,323 males and 599 females, participated in the inception meetings.

2.3.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are conducted based on the criteria set out in the scorecard FGD guide. A total of 684 FGDs were organized in all the 342 sub-counties in the 26 districts. FGDs are platforms for civic education and empowerment about the roles of councillors and other political leaders. They are mainly organised to enable voters verify information provided by their respective councillors. At least 7,622 people, of whom 36 percent were women and the rest men, participated in the FGDs. Table 2 presents a summary of the FGD participants disaggregated by gender.

District	Sub-counties	No. of FGDs	Male	Female	Total No. of participants
Kabarole	22	44	296	167	463
Mbarara	20	40	255	143	398
Wakiso	20	40	269	152	421
Amuru	18	36	218	123	341
Ntungamo	18	36	212	120	332
Moroto	17	34	234	131	365
Agago	16	32	227	127	354
Gulu	16	32	251	141	392
Bududa	15	30	232	130	362
Hoima	15	30	243	136	379
Luweero	14	28	244	138	382
Mbale	14	28	214	121	335
Nebbi	14	28	205	115	320
Jinja	13	26	244	138	382
Kamuli	13	26	199	112	311
Lira	13	26	181	102	283

Table 2: Number of participants in FGD by sub-county

Rukungiri	11	22	162	91	253
Amuria	10	20	232	130	362
Kanungu	10	20	99	55	154
Soroti	10	20	106	60	166
Mpigi	9	18	122	69	191
Nakapiripit	8	16	74	41	115
Tororo	8	16	120	68	188
Mukono	7	14	71	40	111
Моуо	6	12	107	60	167
Buliisa	5	10	61	34	95
Total	342	684	4,878	2,744	7,622

2.3.4 Data collection and analysis

Since the inception of the scorecard in 2009, a significant set of data on each of the districts participating in the assessment has been collected. This includes administrative and local service delivery data. Building on the 2011/12 assessment, the collection of the data for 2012/13 took into account the fact that the current local government councils are serving a five-year term of office that commenced in July 2011. Consequently, the data collected is intended to monitor trends in service delivery and governance over the 2012-2016 period and show whether the organs being assessed will have improved over the period.

2.4 Limitations to the methodology

The methodology used to conduct the assessment as described above has been tested, updated and validated over the last three years. However, there are inherent weaknesses that may impact on the outcomes of the assessment, especially as they relate to the performance of individual councillors. The most serious of these weaknesses is the potential for bias. This arises mainly from the deployment of researchers based in the districts to conduct the assessment. While this approach is intended to build domestic capacity for conducting assessments and monitoring progress, local elected leaders perceive some of the scorecard researchers as biased and hence holding intentions of undermining their political careers.¹⁴ At the moment, such bias

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¹⁴ For example, during the 2012/13 assessment, a group of councillors in Kabarole District accused the district research team of being biased and threatened to decline from participating in the assessment. These incidents come up in a number of other cases, especially when councillors obtain low scores.

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Monitoring service delivery: Leaders visit a health centre in Gulu district. Source: ACODE Digital Library

is mitigated through the rigorous review and validation of the scores by the peer review team.

2.5 The relationship of the Local Councils Scorecard and the Annual Assessment

The Annual Assessment and the Local Councils Scorecard are complementary tools with a shared goal of improving public service delivery at the local level. They are related to each other in the sense that key aspects of both assessments focus entirely on the performance of districts in the delivery of public services.

However, the two assessments can also be distinguished from each other in a number of ways. First, the Annual Assessment is a government-led process managed by the Ministry of Local Government and targets mainly the performance of the district technical staff. There are few references made to the role of elected political leaders. On the other hand, the Local Councils

Scorecard is an independent assessment conducted by an independent thinktank.

Secondly, while the Annual Assessment focuses mainly on the technical aspects of service delivery, the Local Councils Scorecard brings together the technical and governance aspects relevant to public service delivery and accountability. In this regard, while the Annual Assessment puts more emphasis on the performance of the technical arm of the local governments, the Local Councils Scorecard focuses exclusively on the elected political leaders and institutions. Finally, the Local Councils Scorecard focuses more on the actions taken by elected leaders to ensure accountability in the processes they undertake to deliver public services while the Annual Assessment puts more emphasis on process actions and process outputs associated with budgeting, planning and capacity building. Because of these distinctions, it is possible to find a district that is rated well under the Annual Assessment obtaining low scores under the Local Councils Scorecard and vice versa.

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Who is accountable? The collapsed bridge linking Kanungu and Rukungiri districts. Source: ACODE Digital Library ۲

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ANALYTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE, VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The adoption of the decentralisation policy as the foundation for governance and public service delivery in Uganda at the beginning of the 1990s promised a new dispensation for citizens as beneficiaries of the public service delivery system. In 1995, the local government system was entrenched in the Constitution as the primary vehicle for ensuring effective delivery of public services and appropriate response whenever there were service delivery failures. As part of this new dispensation, Government also pursued wide-ranging macro-economic reforms that produced significant gains, translating into sustained national economic growth trends averaging 6% per annum. Today, the volume of Uganda's total wealth as measured by the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated at US\$17 billion. Major public and private investments in health and education have improved access to health care and increased enrolment for school-going children. Recent policy shift towards transport and energy infrastructure is beginning to show visible progress.

In spite of these remarkable achievements, there is widespread recognition that the delivery of public services is less than desirable at best or has malfunctioned at worst.¹⁵ Improvements in key service delivery indicators in the areas of health, education, agriculture and roads are not considered proportionate with the levels of public investment in these areas.¹⁶ Rundown health centres and makeshift classrooms exist side by side with emerging state-of-the-art public and private health centres and schools. In some cases, health facilities resemble "sleeping giants" with no sufficient health workers or regular supply of drugs. Out of approximately 1.6 million children that enroll in primary one, only about a third sit primary leaving examinations, with three

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¹⁵ World Bank (2013). Education and Health Services in Uganda: Data results and accountability. World Bank/African Economic Research Consortium/ African Development Bank.

¹⁶ World Bank (2012). Uganda: Promoting Inclusive Growth. Washington, D. C, February 2012.

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quarters of these children largely unaccounted for because they drop out over the seven years of primary schooling.

This lack of systematic progress in resolving the deficiencies in public service delivery continues to raise important research questions on the dynamics of governance, citizen voice and accountability of elected leaders. In general terms, the concept of governance is used to explain four interrelated elements that are fundamental for accountability and the effective delivery of public services. These are: *state capacity* which is related to a states' power and ability to enforce rules that are consistent and predictable; *rule of law* that establishes among other things, property rights and limits the state's discretion in manipulating those rules; *democratic institutions* that further limit exercise of state discretion by holding governments accountable to their citizens; and *an active citizenry* devoid of fear and manipulation that acts as frontline defenders of democracy and the sanctity of public policies and programmes.

The quality of public policy and the implementation of public policy programmes are significantly affected by the capacity of the state to implement "smart interventions" to address failures and distortions in public service delivery system resulting from market imperfections. However, state interventions without adhering to the rule of law and without limitations on discretionary authority may itself cause governance distortions that inevitably undermine the implementation of public policies and programmes.

Citizens' voice refers to the various ways in which citizens- either as individuals or in organised formations - can express their opinions and concerns and put pressure on service providers, policy makers and elected leaders in demanding better services or advocating them.¹⁷ On the other hand, accountability is the acknowledgement and assumption of responsibility for decisions taken by persons with power and authority to make decisions in a representative or delegated capacity at different levels.

In electoral democracies, the interplay of these three concepts- governance, citizens' voice and accountability - provides appropriate conceptual boundaries for understanding the interactions between citizens and politicians and the quality of public service delivery. Indeed, much of the scholarly literature on citizen-politician linkages, largely grounded in both the rational choice

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¹⁷ Adapted from S. Crawford, Voice and Accountability in the Health Service of Bangladesh. DFID How to Note, 2009.

theories¹⁸ and the historical comparative approaches,¹⁹ seek to explain politics as the result of interaction of citizens and voters as principals on the one hand, and candidates for electoral office or elected officials as agents on the other. In this model, citizens or voters exert the level of influence necessary to ensure that elected leaders will respond to the service delivery interests of the electorate and political parties may change their programmatic focus to reflect the changing preferences of the voters.

The fundamental question to ask therefore is why public service delivery systems fail in electoral democracies or how particular systems of governance may fail to create the necessary conditions for citizens to have *voice* and for duty bearers to be held accountable. Recent scholarship has advanced two important theories - *clientelism* and *programmatic* politics - that help to explain how voice and accountability may fail in an electoral democracy and lead to unmitigated failures in the public service delivery system.

Clientelism has been defined as a particular mode of "exchange" between electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in a democratic system. The concept of clientelism presupposes the existence of two key actors: a patron (the politician seeking votes) and a client (a citizen or voter) who seeks to extract as much mileage as possible from the politician especially during the electoral process or in anticipation of an electoral contest²⁰

Three distinct forms of clientelism can be identified and distinguished from each other: patronage, prebends, and tribute.²¹*Tribute* is a form of clientelism based on the traditional practice of gift exchange mainly in traditional peasant societies. In this system, the patron and the client are engaged in bonds of reciprocity and trust built around paternalistic relationships. The dominant practice of vote buying in Uganda and other quasi and emerging democracies fall under this form of clientelism. The more pervasive form of clientelism is *patronage*, which may be defined as the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clienteles. The third form of clientelism is what is referred to as *prebends* politics in which an individual is given a

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¹⁸ A. Downs (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

¹⁹ M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, (1967). "Cleavages, structures and voters' alignment: an introduction," in Party systems and voter alignments, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Eds. New York: Free Press.

²⁰ Robert H. Bates, (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy. University of California Press.

²¹ R. Lemarchand, (1988). "The state, the parallel economy and the changing structure of patronage systems," in The precarious balance: State and society in Africa, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, Eds. Boulder: Westview Press. 149-70.

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public office in order for the beneficiary to gain access to state resources.²² Unlike patronage, which is mediated through political parties, prebendalism is typically mediated through the executive branch of government since it is largely founded on executive appointments. This distinction, however, does not preclude the fact that the two forms of clientelism may exist side-by-side or even complement each other in setting the political economy that may determine the delivery of public services and the systems of accountability, or lack thereof.

Kitchelt and Wilkinson have observed that clientelistic politics persists only if one or both of the following conditions is in place. In some instances, politicians have good reasons to expect that the target constituencies for clientelistic bargains will behave in a predictable fashion and refrain from opportunism. Here, a *cognitive condition* – knowledge of the other side's motivations and payoffs from alternative courses of action – and a *motivational condition* – voluntary, spontaneous compliance of constituencies with clientelistic inducements – ensure the viability of clientelism. Absent these two conditions, politicians may develop ways to monitor defection from the bargain and capabilities to punish free-riding groups and individuals based on that knowledge. In order to do so, they have to build extensive organisational surveillance and enforcement structures.²³

The immediate distorting effect of clientelistic politics is obviously that it is an impediment to inclusion, and quite often, the under-provision of public goods and services is only one facet of the cost. In the majority of cases, professionalism in the public service delivery system is compromised through prebends. Patronage-based systems are also likely to distort public service delivery in favor of appeasing the patronised constituencies. The other cost of clientelistic politics is the almost complete inability of the electorate to hold politicians accountable when patron-client relationships are pervasive, which strengthens and defends dysfunctional politics.

Unlike clientelism, *programmatic* politics is based on a "responsible party government" model.²⁴ This model approaches politics as the result of interactions between principals and agents characterized by at least three essential elements: that voter-seeking politicians and political parties provide

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²² R. Joseph, (1987). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²³ H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson (2007). "Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction", in H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson., Eds, in Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ Downs, 1957

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issue-based electoral platforms or programme promises to deliver on once elected. Secondly, that voters have preferences for certain policy positions and they are capable of aligning their preferences to those offered by alternative electoral promises. This element also presupposes that voters will opt for the most compatible programmatic offering, weighted by strategic considerations such as electability of the party or politician and the credibility of its promises based on previous performance. Finally, that voters are able to monitor the performance of their elected leaders and can hold incumbents and opposition parties accountable for their performance during the electoral term, based upon their effort and performance.

In theory, the "programmatic politics" model presents what seems to be a coherent logic that potentially could explain why elected governments may invest in systematic and functional service delivery programmes since this should be the foundation for their electoral fortunes. Politicians whose future depends on the fulfilment of programmatic and policy-oriented promises are more likely to need the services of a well-functioning public service delivery system than politicians who depend on clientelistic constituencies. Likewise, local elected leaders whose political future depends on the support of the electorate are likely to be more prepared to be a voice for their electorate and mitigate against potential clientelism.

However, there is growing evidence to suggest that in most quasi and emerging democracies, not all parties compete for voters based on coherent party policy platforms and programmatic packages that can be sold to the voters. On the contrary, programmatic positions of parties are often diffuse, erratic and unpredictable and yet such parties are still able to attract solid support even when a past record of performance and competence in delivering public services is the unlikely source of politician citizen linkages. No matter the case, what is well established is that "man-made political and economic institutions underlie economic success or lack thereof²⁵ and is an essential determinant of the quality of public services to be delivered to the citizens. It is in this regard that the current failures in the public service delivery system in Uganda ought to be understood as a product of the quality of Uganda's democracy.

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²⁵ D. Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Profile Books, London.

The junction to Itojo, Ntungamo district's referral hospital. The hospital needs major renovations to offer quality health services Source: ACODE Digital Library

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TIDA

DISTRICT HOSPITAL

NTUNGAMO

4 BUDGET GOVERNANCE AND REVENUE ARCHITECTURE: POWER WITHOUT AUTHORITY

A budget is a statement of revenue and expenditure of any entity including governments. It is also a statement of revenues and expenditure projections outlining both the revenue sources and the spending priorities of the entity. For governments, including local governments, the budget is the most potent instrument that defines priority spending and the implementation of public policies and programmes. Therefore, the budget is one of the most effective instruments that can be deployed to meet agreed social and economic development commitments and targets as well as redistributive objectives. The concept of *budget governance* addresses the issue of power relations over the budget. It raises the fundamental question of who has the ultimate authority to determine budget discipline and the accountability mechanisms to ensure that budget resources are used for the right purposes. The concept of *revenue architecture* deals with the structure and sources of revenue to finance a budget and who has the authority over those sources.

In the absence of control of any coercive instruments of the state, control over the budget, which should include the ability to set local development priorities and respond to service delivery deficiencies, constitutes an important source of power and authority. However, as explained below, local governments are governments that are vested with extensive power but without authority. The system of collection of revenues and the central government's control over the budget creates one of the most significant policy distortions that have farreaching implications for spending priorities and therefore the performance of elected leaders or luck thereof.

4.1 Local government financing and limited control over the budget

The operational framework for local governments in Uganda is set out in the Local Governments Act of 1997.²⁶ Since 1997, the Act has been revised at

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²⁶ Cap. 243, Laws of Uganda (Revised Edition, 2000).

least 9 times.²⁷ which partly reflects a fairly evolving legal regime that requires continuous adjustments to ensure the functioning of the system. Read together with the Constitution, the totality of this legal regime is that in theory, local government councils are vested with extensive powers.

As planning authorities for districts,²⁸ district councillors are vested with powers to develop and pass local development plans, collect revenues, and set local public spending priorities. As legislative bodies,²⁹ local government councils are vested with powers to enact local legislation. Through such legislation, local government councils have the opportunity to address local governance and economic development challenges. Local governmental councils are also vested with wide-ranging administrative powers such as powers of appointment and promotion of staff, and generally monitoring the delivery of public services in their jurisdiction. In theory, local governments can effectively address the failures in the delivery of public services by ensuring that teachers are teaching, children are learning, the health service system is working, or the roads are regularly maintained.

However, the current budget and revenue architecture has greatly undermined the authority of local governments and local elected leaders, and hence they are unable to exercise the powers vested in them under the current legal regime. It is tenable to argue that, in theory, local governments and their elected leaders have power but do not have authority. For purposes of this report, power is defined as 'the totality of means, influences and pressures available for use to achieve the objectives of the power holder, especially the institutions of government, the state, and the groups opposing either of them.' It is the ability to influence flows of resources towards certain goals, for example the goal of improving public service delivery in priority sectors, as opposed to other goals that projects the level of authority that an entity holds.

The current budget and revenue architecture undermines the power and authority of local governments and blurs the lines of accountability in many ways. First and foremost, over the last decade, there have been major changes in both the taxation regime and the nature of taxes themselves. The changes in the taxation regime resulted into the abolition of direct taxes such as graduated tax. On the other hand, other direct tax charges, such as those covering the

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
²⁷ Act No. 13 of 2001; Act No. 17 of 2001; Act No. 20 of 2005; Act No. 2 of 2006; Act No. 27 of 2006; Act No. 10f 2008; Act No. 8 of 2008; Act No. 16 of 2010.

²⁸ Local Governments Act, 1997 (As amended), Section 30

²⁹ Ibid

boda-boda³⁰ industry and market rates, are consistently opposed by potential taxpayers, in most cases with the acquiescence of elected political leaders. Yet, payment of taxes that are fair and equitable establishes the primary accountability relationship between citizens and their government and there is nothing that can achieve this result than the payment of direct taxes. Payment of such taxes not only builds the confidence of citizens to demand better services from their government but also becomes a legitimate basis for demanding accountability.

Figure 5: Comparison between combined budget and releases for the Scorecard districts (2011/12 – 2012/13)



Approved Budget/ Releases

Besides distancing citizens from government, the abolition of graduated tax also eliminated the most important of the locally-collected revenues that local governments needed to boost their financial autonomy. The effect of this policy decision is that local governments, more than ever before, became heavily reliant on central government transfers, effected through a complex system of conditional grants, to finance their annual budgets. Figure 5 shows the composition of the budget and outturns for the 26 districts (2011/12-2012/13)

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
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³⁰ Boda-boda is a motorcycle taxi, originally from East Africa. The bicycle rider can also be called boda-boda. In Uganda, it is usually abbreviated as boda. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Boda-boda

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
Source: District Workplans, Fourth Quarter Local Government Performance reports 2012/13


The conditional grants system does not allow local governments the flexibility to design and prioritise public service delivery interventions and invest in local public service and economic development infrastructure and activities needed to grow the local government economies and create jobs. While there have been efforts at bottom-up and participatory planning, the system of national planning is fairly structured and top-down. In the absence of discretionary funding or locally-collected revenues, local governments operate in a "strait jacket" planning framework that emphasizes one-size-fits-all solutions. For example, it is common to find a local government that has competitive economic advantage in mining investing more in agriculture and spending more on National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) because it is considered a national priority.

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Source: District Workplans, Fourth Quarter Local Government Performance reports 2012/13

Further still, the current budget architecture undermines the very authority and autonomy of local governments that is enshrined in Article 176 of the Constitution. For example, there is no local government that has the capacity to collect revenue to pay its leaders at all levels. All elected district leaders including Local Council 1 officials are paid from the central government. In effect, it is this architecture that provides the primary building block for a fairly extensive clientelistic relationship between voters and vote-seeking elected leaders. The associated capture undermines the accountability relationships that should exist between citizens as beneficiaries of public service and elected leaders.


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Source: District Workplans, Fourth Quarter Local Government Performance reports 2012/13

Consequently, the failure by local governments to collect their own domestic revenues, the absence of information on revenues collected from individual districts by the central government, and the central government transfergrant system perpetuates a clientelistic relationship between the local and national political leaders. Without knowledge of their own contributions to the national revenues, local governments consider central government transfers as a form of donation that is dependent, not on the tax contributions by their electorate, but rather on the magnanimity of central government politicians. It is this clientelistic relationship between voters and local elected leaders on the one hand, and local governments and national elected leaders on the other that undermines the accountability relationships needed to improve service delivery and governance.

4.2 The current structure and the future of local government economies

Although local governments are conceived as fairly autonomous economic units, very little is known about the level of economic activity and output for each local government. At the moment, there is no coherent data on output

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trends for key economic sectors for the districts and tracking progress in the volume of output is also not possible. Most of the government agencies that monitor production and output such as the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) or ministries do not generate production and output data by district. Similarly, this information is not available from the production departments of the local governments.

However, it is tenable to point out that the dominant economic activity in most of the districts is subsistence agriculture characterised by low volumes of production. Table 3 shows production of major crops by scorecard districts for the Financial Year 2008/09.



Discretionary funding for local governments can empower local councils to invest in transformative agricultural enterprises.

Source: ACODE Digital Library

Table 3: Total production of major crops by district – UCA 2008/09 (Metric Tons)

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		Cereals				Root crops		
District	ntain bananas	Finger millet	Maize	Sorghum	Rice	Sweet potatoes	Irish Potatoes	Cassava
Amuria	143	1,897	1,353	6,963	775	7,400		10,870
Amuru		13,130	17,954	13,790	19,042	13,726		47,111
Bududa	60,138	60	11,259	0	0	857		11,498
Buliisa	114	4	12,952	147	0	837		27,748
Gulu	0	4,931	10,386	6,507	1,997	61,732	0	28,933
Hoima	9,846	1,328	38,372	229	10,911	26,838		60,932
Jinja	6,435	163	18,497	66	253	59,858		29,533
Kabale	32,649	06	6,587	18,605	0	35,986		214
Kabarole	234,183	3,053	91,318	976	140	29,917		51,486
Kamuli	17,296	8,418	81,969	427	2,481	151,725		108,863
Kanungu	132,431	8,141	5,046	2,047	854	26,024		5,674
Lira	215	4,441	17,156	13,831	8,009	10,871		13,821
Luwero	37,534	0	29,849	0	362	15,741		39,732
Mbale	99,011	1,472	42,644	427	1,066	1,076		32,222
Mbarara	542,348	1,517	806	232	0	3,761		3,538
Moroto	0	301	3,736	11,332	0	307		0
Moyo	58	265	6,697	3,313	15	15,200		4,996
Mpigi	114,653	3	19,578	76	12	21,478		39,219
Mukono	36,026	160	18,882	15	837	37,501		41,669
Nakapiripirit	423	0	1,730	7,368	0	1,105		565
Nebbi	10,132	351	19,335	2,306	98	5,272		194,456
Ntungamo	193,172	20,107	59,846	23,106	0	32,892		4,551
Rukungiri	158,725	9,635	2,863	823	751	22,595		3,013
Soroti	0	29,868	137,657	55,544	24,689	163,648		141,331
Tororo	1,001	26,582	75,673	37,086	16,176	39,453		174,962
Wakiso	28.884	0	5.287	149	447	23,200		21.712

Source: UBOS (2013). Statistical Abstract

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UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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The problem of absence of production and output data is compounded by the fact that the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) does not collect, or at least publish, revenue data by districts. The only district revenue data that is known is what is termed local revenue.³¹ The majority of revenues in the form of taxes from the local governments, including Pay as You Earn (PAYE), Value Added Tax (VAT) and many others are collected by the URA which is the official tax body of the central government. Accordingly, in the absence of production and output data, publication of revenue collections disaggregated by districts would be a good starting point to understand the volume of business in each of these districts. Availability of such data would also provide appropriate benchmarks for elected local leaders to set revenue performance targets for both locally-collected and the total revenues, including URA collections, raised from the respective local governments.

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³¹ The use of the term "local revenue" to refer to the revenues that are collected by local governments is a misnomer since the bulk of revenues are collected from these local governments.

Progress has been made in providing access to clean water but coverage and maintenance of water facilities remains a challenge. Source: ACODE Digital Library ۲

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SCORECARD PERFORMANCE AND TRENDS IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

There are three outstanding questions that need to be addressed with regard to local government revenue, scorecard performance and trends in public service delivery. The first question is whether the current trends provide the necessary evidence to show progress in service delivery or lack thereof. The second question is whether there is any correlation between the nature and level of funding received by a local government and the quality of public service delivery. The third is whether there is any direct or indirect correlation between the performance of a district council in the scorecard and the quality and level of service delivery. Resolving these three questions still pose methodological challenges for the Scorecard process and is still work in progress. The analysis in this section is therefore based on available limited data and is only exploratory rather than being conclusive.

5.1. Trends in public service delivery in the scorecard districts

The information and data on the delivery of public services across the country is fairly incomplete and in many cases present a mixed picture. In some cases, there is no credible baseline data against which to measure trends and progress. The analysis in this section is based on secondary analysis from Government agencies that collect trends data on selected indicators.


5.1.1 Access to clean water

Available data Figure 9(a-b) shows considerable progress in clean water coverage across the 26 scorecard districts. The bulk of the districts are reported to have clean water coverage of over 60 percent. However, it is notable that the data for 2012/13 shows some declining trends although no compelling explanations are provided to explain this apparent decline in access to clean water. Figure 9a and 9b show trends in access to clean water for the scorecard districts for the last three Financial Years.

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
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Figure 9 (a): Access to clean water for the 26 scorecard districts (2010-2013)



Source: Ministry of Water and Environment (2013)





Source: Ministry of Water and Environment (2013)

5.1.2 Access to education services

Investment in a nation's children is one of the most strategic policy actions since the quality of a country's labour force determines her competiveness in the global political economy. Currently, there is a wide-range of qualitative and quantitative indicators that are used to assess progress in the delivery of education services. These include: access and learning, completion rates, transition rates, pass rates, the learning environment and many others.

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


Figure 10: Completion rates for the 26 scorecard districts (2011-2013)





Figure 11: Rank in education performance by the Ministry of Education & Sports



Source: Author's Calculations based on Education and Sports Sector Annual Perfomance Report (ESSAPR) 2011-12, and 2012-13

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
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5.1.3 Service delivery in the health sector

According to the Ministry of Health ranking, there was a general decline in the performance in the scorecard districts between 2011/12 and 2012/13. Improvement in service delivery was registered in only 6 districts (figure 12 a-12b). Less than 10 districts performed consistently among the top 20 districts between 2010/11 and 2012/13. A comparison across regions indicates the districts in the northern region registered the worst performance during the same period. These results underscore the need for increased accountability in the health sector so that the citizens get a better return on their investment.

Figure 12a: Ranking of the Scorecard districts in the Annual Health Sector Performance Assessment (2010/11-2012/13)32



Source: Author's Calculations based on the Annual Health Sector Performance Reports (AHSPR) 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13

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³² District performance ranking takes into account the following: Total Population, DPT3 Coverage, Deliveries both PNFP and Government facilities. The ranking is from 1 out of the 111 local governments in their ascending order.

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


Figure 12b: Ranking of the Scorecard districts in the Annual Health Sector Performance Assessment (2010/11-2012/13)

Source: Author's Calculations based on the Annual Health Sector Performance Reports (AHSPR) 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13

This mixed record in performance and the absence of accountability is evident in other sectors including environment and natural resources and roads. In the roads sector, the recentralisation of major district roads had a major negative effect on the quality of the district roads network. In addition, it undermined the accountability relationships between the electorate and local elected leaders because they can shift responsibility to the mandated national agencies.

5.2. Relationship between Scorecard performance and the quality of public services

In order to examine the relationship between scorecard performance of local government councils and the quality of public services, the councils were divided into three bands based on their scores in the assessment. The performance data was then compared with selected service delivery indicators for the districts in accordance with their bands.

5.2.1 Comparison between scorecard performance and service delivery


Overall, the analysis shows that districts that obtained good scores in the council performance also had performed better on selected service delivery indicators. In the education sector local government councils that scored over 60 points under the Scorecard performed better in Primary Leaving Examinations (PLE) by Grade 1 results. This pattern is consistent with 2012 performance where local governments that had their councils score 0-30 points also performed poorly with a 5 percent performance in Grade 1.


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
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
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Similar trends were observable in the roads sub sector. These trends could mirror the importance of responsive leadership in responding to demand for service delivery in sectors that directly impact on development.







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5.2.2 Budget allocations and scorecard performance

The available data also shows that districts that performed well in the Scorecard assessment were more likely to have allocated more funding to there development budgets than those in band 1 (figures 16-17). This finding is consistently evident in the two financial years (2011/12 and 2012/13). The potential policy implication of this is that local government councils will need to pay more attention on the percentage of the budget that they dedicate to development activities as opposed to recurrent expenditures. Attention to development expenditure can offer an important response to key investments in critical sectors in local governments.

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Inspite of many years of investment in the education sector, overcrowded classrooms still persist in public schools. Source: ACODE Digital Library

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6 SCORECARD PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS

6.1 Sample Size and Description

The 2012/13 Scorecard was conducted in 26 districts spread across the country. As described in chapter 2, the assessment focuses on the performance of elected local political leaders at the district level: councillors; chairpersons and speakers, as well as the district council. Consequently, besides the 26 district chairpersons and 26 district speakers, the assessment covered 630 councillors³³ representing 27.1 percent of all district councillors in the country³⁴.

6.1.1 Gender representation

As shown in Figure 16, out of 630 councillors, 56 percent are men while 44 percent are female.




Figure 16: Gender Composition of Councillors

Local political leaders in Uganda are elected through a combination of universal adult suffrage and special constituency elections. Consequently, district councillors can be divided into two categories: directly elected councillors and special interest group councillors. Out of the 630 councillors, 388 (62%)

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³³ This number excludes district speakers who are also elected as councillors but are assessed in a separate category of speakers.

³⁴ Overall, there are 2,510 district councillors from 111 districts in Uganda, excluding Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA).

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are directly elected while the remaining 268 (38%) are elected through the special interest group category. Figure 17 shows the gender distribution of the councillors and by type of representation.





Figure 17: Composition of councillors by gender and category

The size of the district councils is largely based on administrative units and can vary considerably. For the 26 districts covered by the Scorecard, district council sizes vary from 15 councillors for Amuru and Moroto each to the big ones such as Mbale and Wakiso with 38 and 40 councillors respectively³⁵. **Figure 18** shows the number of councillors by district.

Figure 18: Size of District Councils



35 This includes the district chairpersons and speakers.


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6.1.2 Political Party Affiliation

District political leaders contest for elections either on political party platforms or as independents. The last elections were conducted in 2011 and the current leadership is expected to hold office until the next elections sometime in early 2016. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party dominates the membership of the district councils in the 26 districts with 73 percent of the councillors. This is followed by independents (10 percent) and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) with 9 percent (Figure 19).





6.1.3 Councillors' level of education


Evidence from the previous scorecards confirms that the level of education has a direct bearing on councillor participation and overall performance in council. As shown in Figure 20, the majority (204) of councillors had completed 'O' Level. Onother 161 councillors possessed diplomas in various professional fields. Only 112 councillors had a degree or its equivalent and 7 had a Master's degree. At least 13 of the councillors either had no education qualification or did not complete primary education.

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6.1.4 Number of terms served by the councillor

Understanding the number of terms served by a councillor may offer some insights into whether councillors serving repeat terms are more likely to represent the public service delivery interest of their voters or not. By investigating the number of terms served, it is also possible to determine the rate of turnover which may imply that voters could be using the elections to vote out non-performing councillors. Figure 21 shows councillor data available for the 2012/13 assessment and the number of terms each of them had served at the time of the assessment. At least 452 (71.7%) councillors were serving in council for their first term, while 119 councillors (18.9%) were serving their second term. There was also a smaller number of councillors serving their third (41 councillors), fourth (12 councillors) and fifth terms (6 councillors).

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


Figure 21: Number of Terms Served by Councillors

Although the best councillor was serving a second term, the data doesn't suggest any correlation between the terms served and the performance. On the contrary, the evidence shows that some of the first term councillors performed better than repeat councillors.

6.2 Performance of District Councils

The local government council is the highest authority within a district with executive, legislative, planning and administrative powers.³⁶ A district council is a body corporate comprising directly elected councillors and councillors representing special interest groups, including women, persons with disabilities (PWDs), and the youth. It is the platform where councillors can raise issues affecting their electorates and ensure that appropriate plans are put in place and the fiscal and other assets of the local government are channelled towards addressing those issues. The scorecard of a local government council is derived from the functions of the local government councils as stipulated under the Local Governments Act. The indicators and scores for assessing the local government councils are aimed at establishing the extent to which a council uses its political, legislative, administrative, and planning powers to address the issues that affect the electorate within its jurisdiction. The district councils were assessed on four parameters: legislative role; accountability to citizens;

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³⁶ According to the Local Governments Act, a district council is composed of a district chairperson, one councillor directly elected to represent an electoral area, two councillors representing the district's youths (one councillor of whom shall be female), two councillors with disabilities (one of whom shall be female), women councillors forming one third of the council, and two elderly persons above the age of 60 (a male and a female). During council sittings, the law provides for a member of parliament to attend meetings of the local council in his/her constituency.

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planning and budgeting; and, monitoring service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs).

6.2.1 Legislative representation

Legislation is perhaps the most important role of any district council. Councils have powers to pass motions and enact ordinances on all matters within their mandate. The nature, number and quality of legislative processes have a direct bearing on the quality of service delivery in the district. Legislative representation is performed through regular meetings that are conducted at least once every two months, at a time and place determined by the Speaker and guided by the rules of procedure.

The legislative performance of local government councils is assessed by applying a set of indicators that seek to measure how a council conducts its business and makes decisions relevant to governance and the delivery of public services. During the period covered by the assessment, district councils made considerable progress in discharging their legislative responsibilities. For example, 10 bills were discussed by the councils of Ntungamo, Bududa, Mukono, Jinja, Tororo, Mpigi, Wakiso, Kabarole and Amuria during the year under review.³⁷ As shown in Figure 22, the average score on the legislative representation role for the 26 districts is 16 points out of a total of 25 points.




Figure 22: Legislative representation

The average performance of the district councils was 63 points, which represents improvement from the 2011/12 scorecard where the average score was 59 points. The most notable improvement for most of the

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³⁷ These Bills cover; Banana Bacterial Wilt, PWDs, Bulungi Bwansi, Food Security, School Feeding, Child Protection and Environmental Protection

councils was in the area of accountability to citizens followed by planning and budgeting.

Overall, the best district council was Wakiso which scored 76 out of a maximum 100 points. This performance represents a general improvement of 7 percent change, compared to the previous assessment. Wakiso District was followed by Gulu and Mpigi district councils with 75 and 72 points respectively. Besides, there were also notable cases of exemplary performance based on the level of improvements from the 2011/12 assessment. In particular, Kamuli District Council, which had suffered from a long period of conflict, improved its performance from 40 points during the 2011/12 assessment to 67 points.

Finally, all district councils scored low points on political accountability. This indicator assesses the extent to which local councils debate and make decisions on issues of national importance such as policy formulation, constitutionalism, corruption and human rights.

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Table 4: Performance of Councils 2012/13

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6.3 Performance of District Chairpersons

The District Chairperson is the political head and chief executive of the district local government. Under section 13 of the Local Government Act, the Chairperson is vested with powers and authority to monitor the general administration of the district. Most importantly, the district chairperson is vested with powers to constitute the district executive committee which holds the executive authority in the district. Consequently, the leadership of the chairperson is central in ensuring the proper functioning of the local government and its ability to focus and ensure the effective delivery of public services. There were no major variations in the composition of chairpersons in terms of gender or political party affiliation. With the election of Salaam Musumba as Chairperson for Kamuli District in 2012, the number of women chairpersons increased to two including Josephine Kasya of Kanungu. With regard to political party affiliation, 23 out of the 26 chairpersons were elected on the NRM ticket.

District chairpersons are assessed on five performance parameters, namely: political leadership; legislative performance; the degree of contact with the electorate; participation in communal and development activities; and monitoring of service delivery on NPPAs.

6.3.1 Political Leadership

Since the inception of the Local Councils Scorecard in 2009, there has been marked improvement in the level of political leadership provided by the district chairpersons. Besides improved documentation of their activities, district chairpersons have become increasingly influential in forging working partnerships with all district leaders while providing important leadership of the executive committees. This improvement is also evident in the 2012/13 report. Evidence shows that chairpersons more systematically provided leadership in ensuring that the executive committees conducted their business as stipulated by the law. Indeed, at least 23 out of the 26 chairpersons were found to have convened and chaired meetings of the executive committees.

It was also apparent that the chairpersons were more involved in administering and monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the district council. The only exception was Buliisa and Agago where the assessment did not find empirical or other evidence to show that the chairpersons addressed some of the contentious issues highlighted in the previous year's scorecard report. In Mukono, Jinja, Amuru and Ntungamo, the assessment found that the District Service Commission and other statutory bodies were not fully constituted

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
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during the year under assessment. With the exception of Buliisa and Agago whose state of the district reports did not address contentious issues from the previous year's report, the rest of the district chairpersons paid attention to follow up actions on issues arising from the state of the district report.

6.3.2 Performance of Chairpersons on Legislative Role

Consistent with the performance of the district council, the legislative role was the worst performed parameter by all district chairpersons. The average score of 8 out of 15 possible points raises questions around chairpersons' supervision of the executive which is charged with the responsibility of presenting motions and passing bills in council. Mbarara and Luwero districts had the lowest scores. The Executive Committees from both districts had neither presented any motions for resolution on accountability nor presented bills of any nature. The Executive Committee from Kanungu District did not present any bill. The performance of these chairpersons may be contrasted with the Chairperson of Jinja District Council where the executive committee presented three motions and bills for resolutions on service delivery, accountability and financial autonomy to be considered by the district council. The comparative performance of the chairpersons with regard to their legislative functions and mandate is shown in Figure 23.





6.3.3 Contact with the electorate and initiation of development projects

By virtue of their offices, District Chairpersons are enjoined to maintain close contact with their electorate. In so doing, they are expected to initiate development projects within the districts. During the year under review, the

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two parameters were performed with excellence, with an average score of 9 out of 10 possible points for each of the indicators. The norm of unplanned meetings has since been replaced with well-laid-out programmes of meetings with the electorate. Overall, 25 out of 26 district chairpersons presented well-laid-out programmes that were followed with regular quarterly meetings at sub-county level. Figure 26 shows the performance of chairpersons' contact with the electorate.

BOX 1: The Exemplary Leadership of Chairperson Salaam Musumba of Kamuli District Local Government

The case of Salaam Musumba, the Chairperson of Kamuli District Local Government is a case of over performance in such a short time. Salaam Musumba was elected in a by-election in December 2012. By close of the Financial Year ending June 2013, she had already engineered a turn-around of a district that had been mainly associated with local political and other forms of conflicts.

Her exemplary leadership is evidenced by the following specific actions that she took within a space of about 6 months:

- a) Improved accountability:
- Monthly appearance of DEC on radio; this interface provides a platform for DEC members to communicate council decisions to citizens.
- Scheduled routine (weekly) Monitoring by DEC.
- Initiatives for enhancing local revenue collection: She is the brain behind the proposal to print new serialized books of accounts intended to improve tracking of revenue and accountability by officials at the LLGs. The bill for ordinance on local revenue was her idea.
- Chairperson's office is open to the citizens on Fridays.
- Payroll was cleaned up. Some new confirmed and recruited staff had already been included in the system.
- b) Improved documentation of district information, particularly council minutes and sector reports.
 - (i) An outstanding example is the latest publication of the State of the District Report. Council and committee minutes must be submitted to her office within 3 working days from the date of the meeting. Sector reports now communicate better.
 - (ii) Improvement of information management: The former Human Resource office is being renovated to be transformed into a one-stop District Information Centre. This is expected to double as the computer centre with internet and computer capacity building especially for technical staff.

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c) Improvement in Education sector performance:

- Proposed bursary scheme for disadvantaged children.
- Focus on the enforcement of the policy on feeding for pupils in UPE schools. Parents contribute 3-5kgs of maize seeds per term per pupil and average cash contribution of Shs3,000 per child towards milling charges and the cooking.
- d) The approval and operationalisation of district boards and commissions:
- The timely constitution of the DLB, DEC, DSC, DPAC, council standing committees, though mandated by law was a fruit of her leadership.
- All secretaries to council committees have been allocated offices within the district headquarters and are expected in office every working day.
- e) District political environment: internal squabbles within council as well as between the technical and political wings subsided.
- f) Improved time management: The confirmation of civil servants, who had for long served in acting positions; display of circulars on all office notice boards on official work hours. Time management was greatly improved with the majority of staff in office during working hours).
- g) Construction of the District Administration block: This had been long halted but the district secured Shs198 million waiver from the Ministry of Local Government under her leadership to complete the structure.





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6.3.4 Overall performance of district chairpersons

The performance of the district chairpersons in the 2012/13 assessment showed clear evidence of improvement in most performance areas, and more especially in political leadership and contact with the electorate. Generally, the average score of chairpersons increased from 67 per cent in the 2011/12 assessment to 77 percent in the 2012/13 scorecard. Overall, the best chairperson was Richard Rwabuhinga from Kabarole District with 89 out of 100 points.³⁸ Chairperson Proscovia Salaam Musumba of Kamuli District and Chairman Ojara Mapenduzi of Gulu District followed closely with 88 out of 100 points. Overall, 25 out of 26 district chairpersons scored more than 60 points as shown in Table 5

Equally important, there were chairpersons who registered significant improvement in their scores compared with the results of the 2011/12 Scorecard assessment. These are Chairman Alex Oremo Alot of Lira District whose performance changed by 90 percent followed by Chairman Charles K. Byabakama from Rukungiri with a percentage change of 82 per cent.

The current scorecard methodology is not designed to determine whether the political party affiliation of chairperson has a bearing on their overall performance. Indeed, the best chairperson is an independent while the two runners up subscribe to the Forum for Democratic Change. Out of the 5 best chairpersons, 4 subscribe to the opposition while one of them is a member of NRM. The fact that the best district councils – Wakiso and Gulu – are headed by speakers subscribing to the opposition may validate the argument that political party affiliation may not be a major factor in determining the performance of a local elected leader.

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³⁸ Chairman Richard Rwabuhinga exhibits unifying political leadership, has forged strategic partnerships with a wide range of actors including NGOs, and has taken advantage of multimedia platforms to inform, organise and sensitize communities about government programmes.

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2012/13
Chairpersons
Performance of (
Table 5:

Performance Political leadership

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Monitoring NPPAs

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Gender District		Kamuli	Gulu	Jinja	Wakiso	Tororo	Mpigi	Rukungiri		Moroto		Soroti
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Identifiers

Monitoring NPPAs

Legislative Electorate Dev't Role Projects

Performance Political leadership

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Motions Executive		\sim	9	0	4	4	4	4	2	\sim	9	\sim	9	0	4
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UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

6.4 Performance of district speakers

The Local Government Act provides for a speaker and deputy speaker of a district council.³⁹ The speaker is first elected as a councillor before being eligible to contest for the position. Once elected a speaker, the respective councillor assumes additional responsibilities assigned to the office as stipulated under the Local Governments Act. Consequently, councillors who are elected as speakers are first and foremost assessed on their performance as councillors with a mandate to represent specific constituencies. However, speakers are also assessed on an additional parameter focussing on their leadership in presiding over the business of the district council.

6.4.1 Presiding over and Preserving of order in Council

The performance of the speaker in presiding over and preserving order in the district council is assessed on the basis of how a speak chairs council meetings, ensuring that appropriate rules of procedure are followed and effective convening of the business committee of the council. Most importantly, the scorecard assessment looks for evidence that shows that issues brought by the electorate to the Speaker's attention as well as bills and motions are appropriately recorded. Overall, the conduct of business of the district councils has continued to improve tremendously. In particular, the record keeping of the Council proceedings has improved a great deal. This improvement is largely due to the improved vigilance and leadership of the speakers and the capacity training for key political leaders and clerks to council provided under the Scorecard. The performance of all the speakers with regard to the conduct of the district council business is shown in Figure 25.




Figure 25: Conduct of the district council business

39 See Section 11 of the Local Government Act CAP 243 (As Amended)

6.4.2 Contact with the electorate and participation in lower local governments

The Local Governments Act prescribes contact with the electorate as one of the duties of a councillor⁴⁰. Two types of indicators are used to measure whether a councillor maintains contact with the electorate during the year of assessment. These are: meetings with the electorate as evidenced by the programmes for such meetings; the number of meetings held with the communities; evidence of official communication on service delivery; and organising citizens to demand better services. At the commencement of the Scorecard in 2009, there were hardly any speakers who had coordinating or liaison offices in their constituencies. Since then, there has been consistent improvement. In the 2012/13 Local Councils Scorecard, 25 out of the 26 council speakers had established offices in their constituencies.⁴¹ It is important to recognize that the existence of a coordination or liaison office increases chances that citizens or voters who are not satisfied with the quality of public service delivery have access to their elected representative.

Generally, as shown in Figure 26, district speakers have improved their record on contact with the electorate and participation in lower local governments. The only exception was the district speakers of Moyo and Buliisa who had not met the threshold of four meetings, which is the required minimum to score points under this indicator.




Figure 26: Participation in Lower Local Governments

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⁴⁰ Local Governments Act, ss 7, 28,38,39,171. See also, Local Government Councils Regulations, Third Schedule, Regulation 8.

⁴¹ The only exception in this case was Speaker Jotham Loyor of Nakapiripirit district council.

6.4.3 Overall performance of district speakers

Overall, there was clear improvement in the performance of speakers across the 26 districts. This is also consistent with the better performance of all the elected leaders assessed in the 2012/13 scorecard. The average score for all the speakers increased from 55 points in 2011/12 to 68 points in the 2012/13 assessment. More than half of the district council speakers obtained scores above 70 points. According to the assessment results, out of the four parameters used to assess the performance of the speakers, they were more likely to have scored better on presiding over council business than all the other parameters.

At an individual level, Speaker Samuel Bamwole of Kamuli district council was the best performing speaker during the 2012/13 assessment, obtaining 87 points out of a maximum of 100 points. Until the by-elections of December 2012 when a new district chairperson was elected, Samuel Bamwole also acted as the district chairperson for six months. It may therefore be useful to explore whether his performance record as the speaker is in anyway related to or may be partly explained by holding an executive leadership position for that duration. The other four speakers with exemplary performance records are: Speaker Douglas Peter Okello (Gulu) with 84 points; Speaker James Kunobwa (Mukono) with 82 points; and Speaker Juliet Jemba (Mpigi) with 78 points, in the second, third and fourth positions respectively. All the four best performing speakers are members of the National Resistance Movement party.

Among the speakers' category, there were also notable improvements. For example, Speaker Martin Ocen Odyek of Lira improved his scores from 26 points in the 2011/12 Scorecard to 75 points in the 2012/13 assessment, representing an improvement of 188 per cent. Similarly, the speakers of Tororo, Buliisa and Hoima also registered considerable improvements in their performance.

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BOX 2: Why Lira District Speaker performed better

Improved Monitoring: Aside from the emphasis put on the production of monitoring reports, the speaker invested time to follow-up mainly in the sectors of agriculture, education, health, water and sanitation and roads. Under the monitoring function, the speaker was able to monitor most of the service delivery units in Railway Division.

Improvement in documentation: The speaker registered great improvement in generating and filing of monitoring reports, contrary to the previous year of assessment.

Improved record keeping: All the bills and petitions that were presented to council were recorded by the office of the speaker and filed. In addition, the speaker had a correspondence file with all correspondences made with the district technical and political officials and the central government.

Improved understanding of his roles: The speaker demonstrated improvement in understanding of his roles. During the previous assessment, the speaker only concentrated on executing his mandate as the speaker without paying due attention to his other roles particularly as the councillor representing Railway Division.

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UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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Performance of Speakers 2012/13

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6.5 Performance of District Councillors

In the current political landscape in Uganda, district councillors are one of the most important politicians in the country if only they recognized that their power and authority lie with the electorate they represent. As elected leaders, district councillors are required to represent all the citizens who live in the area they are elected to represent. Generally, this role of representation involves a number of responsibilities. For example, district councillors have the primary responsibility of ensuring good governance of their districts by holding the district political and technical leadership accountable. District councillors also have the primary responsibility to mobilize their electorate and citizens to participate in the governance of their areas and hold their leaders accountable for the delivery of public services.

The Local Councils Scorecard is therefore designed to assess whether the district councillors discharge these responsibilities, what factors determine their performance or non-performance, and then to determine the nature of interventions that may be necessary to enhance their performance. The district councillors are assessed on four parameters: legislation; contact with the electorate; participation in lower local government councils; and monitoring service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). The detailed scorecards of the individual councillors are presented in the respective district scorecards.⁴² **Figure 27** shows the overall performance of the district councillors by sex and groupings.

From the overall performance of the district councillors as per the 2012/13 Local Councils Scorecard as shown in **Figure 27**, a number of observations can be made. First, the evidence shows that more councillors were able to debate in the district council sessions in the FY2012/13 compared to the 2011/12 assessment. In the 2011/12 assessment, at least 228 out of 611 councillors were reported not to have debated at least four times. This number reduced to 2 councillors in the 2012/13 assessment. The implication of this trend is that councillors were more likely to raise service delivery concerns coming from their constituencies if they were participating in council debates than if they were not. This is validated by the evidence showing that in the 2012/13 assessment, there were more councillors (571 out of 630) who debated on issues of public service delivery compared to those (448 out of 611 councillors) who debated on the same issues in 2011/12.

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⁴² The district scorecard reports are published in the ACODE Public Service Delivery and Accountability Series Reports. The electronic version of these reports can be accessed at www.acode-u.org

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


Figure 27: Performance of Councilors by Sex

Secondly, the performance declines significantly when the scorecard questions shift to specific actions regarding presentation of motions and more so with regard to motions on service delivery. For example, at least 360 councillors did not move a single motion on any issue throughout the financial year. The number of councillors who did not move motions in council grows even higher to 448 (71.1%) when the motions are restricted to the NPPAs. A very limited number of councillors were also reported to have provided technical guidance⁴³ to the council (2 out of 630) or to committees (9 out of 630). The implication of this finding is that councillors may not be bringing the specific issues of service delivery affecting their constituencies, which may in turn affect the ability of the district councils to address the current deficiencies in the public service delivery system.

The 2012/13 assessment shows that councillors remained engaged in terms of their contact with the electorate as well as participating in the deliberations of the lower local government councils. This was identified as one of the major problems affecting voice, accountability and service delivery. The assessment found that at least 62 per cent of all the councillors had programmes for meetings with communities. At least 73.5 per cent had convened and held up to four meetings with communities on service delivery issues. The assessment also found that at least 49.8 per cent had convened community meetings to assist their electorate to demand better services. At least 94 per cent of all the

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⁴³ Technical guidance relates to documented technical notes on how to address emerging challenges presented on floor of Council

councillors had an office or liaison within the constituency and 471 councillors provided evidence showing that the electorate had visited their offices.

6.5.1 Councillors' performance in monitoring service delivery

One of the major responsibilities of councillors is to monitor the delivery of public services. Councillors can then take appropriate actions by reporting service delivery failures to the district council, the responsible technical staff of the district or other responsible agency of government. Evidence from the 2012/13 assessment shows that councillors increased their monitoring activities considerably. For example, 95.6 percent of the councillors were found to have undertaken monitoring visits to at least half of the health units in their constituencies. At least 91 percent had visited half of the government-aided primary schools in their constituencies. However, the challenge remains on preparing and submitting written reports and taking follow-up actions on the findings in these reports. For example, only 40.5 percent of the councillors reported to have prepared at least 2 written reports from their monitoring of health units. This is also true of the other sectors including education (42.4 per cent), agriculture (32.9 per cent), water sources (29.8 percent), road works (32.9 per cent), Functional Adult Literacy (FAL) centres (18.1 percent), and environment and natural resources sector (24.8 percent).



A feeder road in Agweng, Lira District. Source: ACODE Digital Library

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6.5.2 Comparative performance of district councillors

Figure 32 shows overall improvements in the performance of both male and female councillors in the 2012/13 Scorecard compared to the 2011/12 assessment. The improvement was mainly attributed to three important factors. First, councillors reported that they had become more aware of their roles as a result of the scorecard and the capacity building activities undertaken during and after the assessment. Secondly, councillors had become more systematic in documenting their activities and actions they undertake in representing their electorates. The best practice in documentation of a councillor's performance is the report by Councillor Alfred Okwonga (Gulu District Local Government). The third factor that explains the improvement in performance is the fact that the scorecard has become widely accepted as an accountability tool for elected local leaders. Elected leaders are increasingly more willing and interested in participating in the scorecard than when it was first introduced in 2009.




Figure 28: Average performance of councillors 2011/12-2012/13

At the time of launching the Local Councils Scorecard in 2009, the performance of the special interest groups category of councillors, particularly the youth and Persons with Disabilities (PWDs), had been problematic. These two categories of the electorate are represented by two councillors (male and female) each in the council. The poor performance was mainly attributed to the fact that the geographical mandate of these councillors covers the entire district. In the case of the special women councillors elected on the affirmative action considerations⁴⁴, their mandate is also narrower than the special interest group category. Evidence from the 2012/13 assessment shows some considerable improvement in the performance of this group of councillors (**Figure 29**)

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⁴⁴ Local Governments Act 1997 (As amended) Section 10 (e).

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


Figure 29: Average Performance for interest groups (2011/12-2012/13)

6.5.3 Overall Performance of district councillors

Overall, the best performing councillor in the 2012/13 Scorecard was Moses Muwangala (Independent) from Kamuli District Local Government who scored 89 points. In the 2011/12 assessment, Councillor Muwangala scored only 39 points. Councillors Add Ogwang Ayang (UPC, Lira), Abdul Kasule (NRM, Luwero) and Norman S. Kabogoza (NRM, Wakiso) tied in the position of second best performer with 88 points each. Significantly, Councillor Ogwang Ayang had scored 31 points in the 2011/12 assessment and therefore registered an overall improvement of 184 per cent. The best female councillor was Bernadette Plan (NRM, Hoima) who scored 87 points compared to 66 points she scored in the 2011/12 assessment. Overall, the councillor who improved most in performance was Medinah Akello Okeng (Lira) who improved from 10 points during the 2011/12 assessment to 71 points in the 2012/13 assessment, representing a percentage change of 610 percent.⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ The male councillor who improved most in the 2012/13 assessment (58 points) was councillor Geoffrey Bigambwamukama (PWD, Kanungu) who had scored 10 points in the 2011/12 scorecard.

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MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORK FOR CITIZENS: FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS

The introduction of the decentralisation policy in 1993, and the establishment of the local government system sought to bring government closer to the citizen. In a democracy, the primary and fundamental objective of bringing government closer to the citizen is to increase their ownership of government and governmental functions. An empowered citizenry is the foundation for building sustainable democracies and achieving socio-economic transformation. An empowered citizenry is also essential in mitigating the elite capture of power through patronage politics and the associated clientelistic networks. However, the position of local elected leaders in facilitating or sustaining such patronage networks cannot be underestimated. Indeed, the failure of governance and absence of accountability when the public service delivery system does not work as expected is directly related with the behaviours of local elected leaders.

Consequently, any strategy and interventions to improve governance, accountability and public service delivery need to be premised on their ability to "liberate" local elected leaders from existing clientelistic networks and building effective alliances between them and their constituencies. Achieving this strategy requires a better understanding of three sets of issues. First is to identify what factors inhibit local elected leaders from better serving their electorates. The second set is the internal factors that affect the performance of the elected political leaders in the respective district. The third set is those factors that are external to the district council. While the local political leaders may influence the resolution of these factors through lobbying and advocacy pressure, the actual decision to address them lies outside the mandates of these leaders.

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Since the commencement of the Local Council Scorecard assessment, the district councils and elected local political leaders have improved tremendously in their performance in discharging their constitutional and statutory mandates. This improvement is also evident in the results of the 2012/13 Local Councils Scorecard shown in Chapter 6 of this report. The improvement in performance may be attributed to a number of actions based on the recommendations from the previous assessments (Table 4). The implementation of these recommendations has led to a number of outcomes. For example, elected political leaders are more aware of their roles, responsibilities and mandates than when the scorecard was first conducted. There is also evidence that the civic awareness and consciousness of the citizens in the scorecard districts is increasing. Elected leaders and councils have also improved in documenting their actions, recording of council proceedings and taking follow up actions.

However, there are internal and external factors that affect the performance of local government councils in delivering services to their constituencies and the electorate.

7.1 Internal factors inhibiting local elected leaders from serving their electorates better

There are at least 3 internal factors that severely inhibit political leaders from performance of their roles and service delivery to their electorate. These factors are considered internal to the councils because the district leadership can take appropriate actions to resolve them, without having recourse to external actors or authority.

7.1.1 Multiple leadership conflicts

There is a wide-range of leadership related conflicts, which draw a considerable amount of energy from the political leadership obstructing them from concentrating on the constituency work. The most common of these conflicts are between: chairpersons and Resident District Commissioners (Agago); chairpersons and Chief Administrative Officers (Agago and Mpigi); chairpersons and speaker (Mbarara, Jinja and Moroto); chairperson and councillors (Agago and Kabarole). In the majority of cases, a conflict between two top leaders in the district divides the councillors into factions and divert the efforts of both the leadership and the councils from focusing on the delivery of public services to their constituencies. Agago district local government is currently the most conflict prone in all the 26 districts.

In some cases, these local leadership conflicts are an extension of the different types of rivalries among national leaders or are simply a product of the clientelistic and other patronage networks that characterise Uganda's politics. However, even in such cases, an able and selfless leadership is what is needed to overcome these patronage networks.

7.1.2 Low levels of local revenue collection and lack of financial autonomy

The central government controls all the major revenue sources in the country. The local governments do not control any significant sources of revenue from which they can collect funds to address local service delivery deficiencies, investing in developing the local economic infrastructure, building local entrepreneurial capacity and creating jobs. Over 90% of the budgets for all the assessed districts (this is also true of all the districts across the country) is secured through a complex system of conditional transfers from the central government. This lack of fiscal autonomy not only inhibits the capacity of local governments to discharge their mandates but also makes them vulnerable to the patronage tendencies of the central government.

7.1.3 The failed functioning of multi-party politics at the local government level

Although multi-party politics was introduced in Uganda in 2005, the system of democracy built on strong political parties has not emerged, more especially at the local government level. As shown in Chapter 6 of this report, local government councils are dominated by the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. This affects public service delivery and governance in two fundamental ways. First, there is hardly any competition in terms of alternative policies and policy platforms. Strong political parties are important vehicles for increasing policy choices, stimulating alternative policy debates, and constructing an effective mechanism for transparency and accountability in the functioning of government at all levels. In all the districts participating in the 2012/13 Local Councils Scorecard, there was no evidence to show that district local governments, whether led by the opposition parties or the ruling party, took any deliberate action that could lead to the strengthening of political parties.

Secondly, where there are effectively same party district councils such as in Mbarara and Kanungu, there was a strong tendency for the emergence of opposition within the same party. It is also evident in these cases that intra-

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party opposition is more disruptive to service delivery and good governance since it is often not driven by differences in policy.

7.2 External factors affecting the performance of local government councils

External factors are those factors, which exist because of decisions or actions of others, and they can only be resolved with the intervention of other actors. These kinds of factors are essentially a product of the policy environment or legislation. There are at least two major external factors that impact on the ability of elected local leaders to ensure effective servicing of their constituencies.

7.2.1 Distortions in the decentralisation policy

Since decentralisation was introduced as the official policy of government more than two decades ago, its scope and content has become increasingly obscure. In a decentralized system of governance, the different spheres of government central and local) are supposed to be distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Most importantly, local governments are a sphere of government in their own right and cease to be mere functions or administrative implementing arms of government. The two spheres of government operate autonomously but coordinate together in decision-making, coordinate budgeting and budgets, policies and activities, and particularly those functions that cut across the two spheres. This cooperation must be driven by the shared goal of providing citizens with a comprehensive and effective package of public services and improving the quality of governance.



Amach Health Centre IV, Lira District. Source: ACODE Digital Library

However, at the moment, the local governments in Uganda operate more like administrative extensions of the central government. In the absence of discretionary budget resources, the councils concentrate on implementing the programmes of central government by focusing on monitoring. Government has over the years engaged a re-centralization gear assuming major responsibilities that reside in the sphere of the local governments. For example, the central government pays the emoluments of all local elected leaders⁴⁶ with the potential effect of co-opting them in an elaborate patronage system but more so, breaking the accountability relationship that should exist between the elected leaders and the voters. In other cases such as with education and health services, the central government pays teachers directly but still expect the local governments to monitor and supervise the delivery of services in these sectors. Indeed, during the 2012/13 assessment, it was found that the roads that had essentially become unusable in most of the districts are those that were recentralized and placed under the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), albeit recent improvements.

7.2.2 The centralised control of budget resources

The biggest factor inhibiting the efforts of local government councils to deliver better services to their constituencies and ensure effective delivery of public services is their inability to access and control part of the public funds, including those collected from their jurisdiction. At the moment, the bulk of the national budget resources are controlled by the central government. Local governments only receive funds in form of conditional transfers from the central government. In most cases, these funds are already committed through sectoral allocations. A local government council therefore has no adequate flexibility to set its own priorities that are specific to local needs and address the peculiar concerns of their electorates. But central government politicians also use the control over the budget resources to build political patronage networks through clientelistic relationships and prebends. These relationships cause major distortions in public policy and undermine the service delivery. For example, the challenges of the NAADS experiment is in itself a product of shortfalls of this budget architecture. There is a general feeling that government has been decentralized but not the resources.


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⁴⁶ See Background to the Budget 2005/06 and 2010/2011



Amach Health Centre IV, Lira District and Alivu Primary School (Below) in Arua District: Increased demand for accountability by citizens promises improved infrastructure and better services. Source: ACODE Digital Library





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8 POLICY OPTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Policy options and recommendations

The Uganda Constitution of 1995 promises human dignity, unfettered enjoyment of freedoms, and opportunity for every Ugandan citizen. These promises are reiterated in a number of official government documents such as the National Development Plan, the Uganda Vision 2040 and numerous other policy documents. Equally important, most of Uganda's political parties including the ruling NRM and the dominant opposition party - the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) reiterate these promises in their party platforms and campaign manifestos. Each of these instruments recognize that the effective delivery of public services and strengthening accountability through the deepening of democratic culture and participation are the essential building blocks for achieving socio-economic transformation and expanding economic opportunity. However, it is tenable to assert that neither the Government nor the political parties will achieve their policy and political agenda's and the promise of the 1995 constitution unless they support the evolution of a strong local government system as stipulated under the Constitution.

This report provides a detailed assessment of the performance of elected local political leaders during the Financial Year 2012/13. It is observed that local elected leaders have improved tremendously in their performance. There is increased focus on the monitoring of delivery of services while improved contact with the electorate is expanding opportunities for participation, feedback and accountability. The report also provides specific factors that constrain local government councils in ensuring effective service delivery and monitoring in their areas.

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Since 2009, the local council scorecard reports provide a set of recommended actions needed to increase citizens' demand for accountability and to ensure the ability of local governments to deliver services and improve governance as per their mandates. These recommendations from the last 3 assessments and the status of their implementation are shown in Table 4 Based on the 2012/13 scorecard and the recommendations already made in the previous assessments, the following additional recommendations and policy options will need to be pursued to improve the delivery of public services and increase citizens' demand for accountability and good governance.

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Table 7: Recommendations from the previous scorecards and the status of implementation.

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	Year of Assessment				
	2008/09	2009/10	2011/12	Implemented by Who	Status of action
Proposals to Improve the Performance of Councillors and	Orientation of councillors on their roles and their accountability obligations to the citizens	Invest in strategic Building training of local leadershi government capabilit council officials	Building leadership capabilities	MoLG ULGA ACODE	Annual Capacity building workshops by ACODE and ULGA
	Documentation and keeping of records			ACODE/ULGA MoLG	Annual Publication and dissemination of Councillors' Diary
	Non-Resident Councillors: Part III of the Local Government Act which provides for the eligibility for council membership be amended to include a requirement on residence			MoLG Parliament Electoral Commission	No Action
	Minimum Academic Qualification Requirements			Parliament Electoral Commission	No Action
	Establishing a Leadership Awards for Local Government Leaders			MoLG ULGA ACODE	No Action Annual Recognition Awards by ACODE and ULGA

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	Year of Assessment				
	2008/09	2009/10	2011/12	Implemented by Who	Status of action
Proposals to Re-establish Accountability Relationship between Citizens and	Building the demand side infrastructure of civil society, citizens' groups and other civic agencies.	Invest in promoting civic awareness through civic education		MoLG ACODE/ULGA	Over 1000 FGDs organized by ACODE at parish level. ACODE sponsored radio talk shows on the roles and responsibilities of district leaders.
		Re-introduce some form of direct taxation		MoFPED MoLG	
		Ensure a comprehensive and sustained dissemination of the local government councils scorecard reports.		ACODE ULGA	Annual District Dissemination Workshops and meetings organized in all the 26 districts by ACODE and ULGA
		Uganda Revenue Authority should publicize disaggregated data on revenue collection from each local government.		URA	No action

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	Year of Assessment				
	2008/09	2009/10	2011/12	Implemented by Who	Status of action
Proposals for Strengthening Local Decentralisation	Changing the current budget architecture	Provide discretionary funding for local Governments directly from the Consolidated Fund Link provision of discretionary funding to specific output and performance targets	Introduce a budget amendment to enable equitable sharing of the national resource envelop between the local governments and the central	MoFPED	
	Formulate and adopt medium and long- term strategic development plans				ACODE support towards Strategic Plan Development to selected district (Moroto District, 2011)
		Impose a moratorium on the creation of new districts and other administrative unit	Establish a parliament- local government forum	Parliament	Moratorium imposed by the president in February 2013.

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8.1.1 Establish a Local Governments Leadership Training Institute

In order to ensure effective leadership of local governments and mitigate the current problem of conflicts, it is recommended that a leadership-training institute for local governments be established. Unlike the existing training institutes, such an Institute should be operated as an independent entity with a curriculum that, among other things, combines theory and practical training in leadership, conflict management, financial oversight, multi-party politics and governance skills. Any local government leader whether elected or not who assumes a senior leadership position should be required to attend the institute as a precondition within a year of taking up such a position of leadership.

8.1.2 Review the relevant laws to establish an effective hierarchy of local government leadership

The absence of a clear hierarchy of leadership at the local government levels is not only a source of conflict but also blurs the lines of responsibility and accountability. At the moment, there are district leaders that can all be considered principals: the chairperson, Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and the district speaker. Each one of these officials is an alternative power centre. There are no clear lines of responsibility and accountability amongst each other. For example, when there is a failure in the delivery of public services, it's not clear to the voters who should be held accountable. Is it the Chairperson who is the political head of the district? Is it the CAO who controls the budget and the authority to spend? Or is it the RDC who is a central government representative?. Provision of clarity within the law would go a long way in creating a functional accountability structure and system of governance.

8.1.3 Establish and operate quarterly sub-county accountability forums

Unlike the Barazas, which are government supply-side accountability forums, the establishment of an active quarterly forum, where citizens can meet and independently discuss issues affecting their constituencies, can serve the purpose of improving service delivery, promoting accountability and achieving good governance. The accountability platforms ought to emanate from the citizenry itself, which requires rise in civic competence. Such forums should be established through partnerships with local civil society organizations and should be operated independently as citizens' accountability forums.

8.1.4 Introduce the position of leader of opposition in the district council

In order to elevate the profile of multi-party politics as a mechanism for accountability, the position of leader of opposition should be introduced in the district councils and provided official facilitation. In district councils where an opposition party is in the majority, the ruling party should take up the position. Besides providing an opportunity for civic awareness about the functioning of multi-party politics, the introduction of such a position would ensure the enfranchisement of the electorate that voted for the opposition. The local council leader of opposition would also be given a special slot to present the alternative development policy agenda for the district. This can be achieved through an amendment to the Local Governments Act.

8.1.5 Establish and operationalise a Local Governments Parliament Platform

The evidence from the scorecard shows that local governments are not fully engaged in debating issues of national importance. For example, there is no record of the district councils debating any major constitutional issues such as the ongoing debate on electoral reforms, restoration of presidential term limits, or denial of bail to suspects accused of capital offences like murder, defilement or treason. There are also major policy and legal issues where local governments are often conspicuously silent. For example, besides not engaging in any debates on corruption, there is no record of a council that sought to debate or debated the botched procurement of bicycles for Local Council 1 chairpersons. In addition, district councils have not engaged in any debate on the failed process of Local Council 1 elections. A more structured interaction between elected local political leaders and Members of Parliament can increase the potential for such leaders to bring issues affecting their voters to parliament.

8.2 Conclusion

This 2012/13 Local Councils Scorecard is the second for local political leaders elected in 2011. They are therefore serving their second year of office. The scorecard presents an opportunity for these leaders to assess their progress, identify major gaps in performance, and take remedial actions in preparation for any future electoral context in 2016. While the scorecard is not designed to bolster the campaigns of incumbent political leaders, it nevertheless provides such incumbents with an empirical basis for tracking performance and taking remedial actions where necessary. In the process, the electorate in the

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respective constituency is expected to benefit from the vigilance of councillors seeking to monitor the delivery of public services. By building the demandside of public service delivery and good governance, the scorecard remains the most robust, independent and evidence-based instruments to support the efforts of Government and local governments in their efforts to deliver services, improve accountability and strengthen good governance.

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	əmsN	Edward Bukoma	Simon Peter Walibwa	Francis Namwokoyi	Richard Nekoye	Elizabeth Zaale	Geoffrey Matubu	Moses Wambette	Stephen Musuto	Patrick Meru	Elia Wesira	Kezia Wakhata	Buteme	David Mayeku	Robert Wangusi	Mwenyi P. Lubango	Michael Mutinye	Vincent Kuloba	James Masika	Annet Namono	Catherine Kakai	Sarah Nandutu	Samali Nakhayenze	Benna Namono	Zurah Kuloba	John Moses Londi	Mereth Namwenya	George Wanetosi	Rose Nomono	Aidah Katisi	Average

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amsN	Costituency	Party	Gender	Terms	2011/12		әвивнэ %	Plenary	Committee	Special skill	Sub total	Meeting electorate	Office		Sub county	Health	Education	Agriculture Water	Roads	LAT	ENR	IstoT duS
Simon Agaba Kinene	Buliisa TC	NRM	Σ			71				0		9	ი	15	_		7	~	~	~	~	25
Moses Wandera	Buliisa	NRM	Σ	~								7	ი					-	З	ო	2	26
Lydia Amanya	Buliisa	NRM	ш	~		61						1	ი				з З	3	~	S	2	20
Joyce Kafua	Biiso/Kihungya	NRM	ш	2								ი	ი				з З	-	~	ო	~	19
Joyce Mbabazi Kadogori	Buliisa TC	Ind	ш			56			8 2			1	2			с С		-	0	ო	-	22
Alice Atimango	Youth	NRM	ш	~						0		6	ი			с, С	33		0	S	~	16
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Betty Katusabe	Butiaba	NRM	ш	~								7	ß		~	~	а 3	~	-	ო	~	13
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Faith Mugume	PWD	NRM	ш									ი	ი		0	~	з З	0	e	~	~	12
Solomon Kahuma	Kihungya	NRM	Σ	~						0		0	2		0	` _	ო _	~	~	ო	~	7
Moses B. Businge	Kigwera	NRM	Σ	2								0	2		0	` ~	_	-	-	~	~	7
Katusiime Muhereza	Kigwera	NRM	ш	~			7	-				0	ი		0	÷	ო _	~	~	~	~	б
Geofrey Openjitho	Butiaba	NRM	Σ				-34	-		0		7	ი		0	` ~	_	-	-	~	~	7
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	Çonstituency	Bungatira	Awach	Pece	Bungatira	Bardege/Layibi	Patiko	Odek	Lakwana	Youth	Awac/Patiko/Palaro	Paicho/Unyama	Koch-Ongako	PWD	Odek/Lalogi	Pece	Unyama	Bardege Division	Koro	Layibi	PWD	Pacho	Laroo	Youth	Bobi/Lakwana	Bobi	Koro	Ongako	Palaro	Laroo	
	əmsN	Ballingtone P. Olweny	Christopher A. Opiyo	Alfred Okwonga	Rose Abili Amono	Santa Oketa	Patrick Komakech	Billy Graham Olanya	Damasco Odongo	John Chris A. Mugisha	Lillian Stella Lalam	Betty Atim	Rose Nyapolo	Caroline Rose Adong	Margaret Langol	Christine Arach	John Okwonga	Anne Sabiti	Grace Ouma Akello	Wilson Chagga Oyat	Tonny Akena	Frederick Aliker	Justine P'Kello Okwir	Joyce Reeni Alima	Ketty GiriGiri Lamunu	Isaac Newton Ojok	Francisco Watdok	Kenneth Nyeko	Owen Chris Okoya	Betty Atim	

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Bernadette Plan	Kahoora	NRM	ш	2									ດ		10	~	~			~	2	4	42
Fredrick B. Kakoraki	Bugahya	NRM	Σ	2									ດ		10	ო	~			~	ო	сı	33
Joab Akiiki Kunihira	Mparo Division	NRM	Σ	-									တ		9	S	ო			~	ო	2	35
Lawrence K. Bigirwa	Buhimba	NRM	Σ	e									0		9	~	~			~	0	4	33
Deo B. Kiiza	Bugambe	NRM	Σ										ດ		9	ო	~			ო	~	Ŋ	31
Vincent Muhumuza	Kahoora Division	NRM	Σ	~									ດ		10	~	~			Ŋ	0	ഹ	24
Darlson Kusiima	Bugambe	NRM	ш	ო									9		10	~	~			ო	Ŋ	0	30
Doreen Muhairwe K.	Kyabugambire/ Buhanika	NRM	ш	~									ი		9	~	~			ო	ო	2	28
Vincent A. Opio	Kabwoya/ Buhaguzi	NRM	Σ	.							4		ი	16	4	ß	Ŋ	Ŋ	0	Ŋ	ო	4	27
Daniel M. Muheirwe	Kiziranfumbi	NRM	Σ								6		9	13	9	~	~	~	ო	~	0	2	27
Peter Ayesiga	Buhanika	NRM	Σ	-	54	61 1	13	8	0	0	16	~ <	o	16	9	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	Q	23
Naome Koojo	Kitoba/Buseruka	NRM	ш	.							2		ດ	16	9	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	2	20
Resty K. Byaruhanga	Kiziranfumbi	NRM	ш								6		9	5	9	~	ო	0	-	~	Ŋ	2	25
Ashah Kabaramagi	Mparo Division	NRM	ш	2							6		ດ	16	9	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	ო	2	20
Edward Kusiima	PWD	NRM	Σ	.							6		ດ	16	9	2	4	~	4	4	Ŋ	0	20
George Bushaija	Kyangwali	NRM	Σ								5		0	16	9	~	S	ო	e	4	ო	~	20
Philemon B. Ruganju	Kyabigambire	NRM	Σ	-							0		ດ	16	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	9
Daphne Kobusinge	Kyangwali	NRM	ш								6		9	13	9	e	0	က	с С	~	0	2	12
Sarah Atagwirweho	Buhimba	NRM	ш	-							თ		ດ	16	9	ო	ო	~	ო	-	ო	-	15
Geoffrey Komakech	Buseruka	Ind	Σ								0		9	13	9	~	~	~	-	~	~	~	7
Richard Katusiime	Kigorobya	NRM	Σ	2		Ť	ω				ę	-	9	9	9	S	0	~	-	~	0	~	თ
James M. Mulindambura	Kigorobya	NRM	Σ	ო	4	່. ດີ	£ ∞				2		Ω	ъ	9	~	~	~	~	-	0	~	12
Jane Mugenyi Tuhaise	Bujumbura & Busisi	NRM	Σ	-							6		ດ	16	0	~	~	~	0	~	~	-	9
Francis Kazini	Youth	NRM	Σ								6		S	Q	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	-	2
Judith Namakula	Youth	lnd	ш	-	8	27 -:	-21 8	8	0	0	16	0	S	Q	0	~	~	~	-	~	0	~	9
Doreen Bitagasi	Kigorobya/Kigorobya TC	NRM	ш	~							Ω		2	13	2	~	-	~	~	-	~	-	~
Flossy Ayesiga	PWD	NRM	ш	2	43	27	-37 8	8 8	0	0	16	0	S	S	0	~	~	~	~	~	0	~	9
Edward Isingoma	Bujumbura North	NRM	Σ	~							4		2 2	വ	0	~	~	~	-	-	0	-	9
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Annet Musika	Budondo	NRM	ш	2							16	11	ი	20	10								~
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Paul Balidawa	Kakira	NRM	Σ	~							21	1	ი	20	10								10
Mohammed Katuntubiru	Youth	FDC	Σ	2							19	1	6	20	10								-
Peter Kamwami Muwaya	Buwenge TC	FDC	Σ	-							18	7	ი	20	9								10
Peter Muwanika	Walukuba/Masese	FDC	Σ			57 68			0	0	16	1	6	20	9	ო		` m	_			÷	
Rose Mukama	Mafubira A & B	NRM	ш						2	0	18	1	ი	20	10	-						ი	
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Grace Luya	Butagaya	NRM	Σ						0	0	16	1	6	20	9	ß						,	
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Sarah Kodoko Balidawa	Buwenge Rural	NRM	ш						0	0	16	6	6	18	9	~						÷	~
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Jane Lilly Obwoyo	Jinja West	NRM	ш	~	49 4	49 0	ω	∞	0	0	16	1	ი	20	9	-	~	÷		-	~	~	
Florence Asio	Youth	NRM	ш						0	0	16	ი	9	15	10							ω	
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Juliet Mutesi	Bugembe TC	NRM	ш						0	0	16	б	ი	18	9	-						Ŋ	
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Loy Kabanda Kyalo	Mpumudde Kimaka	NRM	ш	-	58				0	0	16	£	6	20	2	-	.	, —	_			Ω	
Samuel Kauta	Busedde	NRM	Σ		38 4	43 13	00	വ	2	0	15	6	6	18	4	~	_	È	~	0	~	9	
Monica Christine Abuze	Jinja Municipality East	FDC	ш	-					0	0	16	7	2	13	2		ന	-	5		-	÷	
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Esther Matsipa	Kateebwa/Karagura						∞	∞	0			6	18	4	ო	ო	~	ო	с С	-		5
Joseph Mashuruko	Karambi		Σ	6	7 53		∞	∞	2			2	4	6	~	~	~	. 	2	-		~
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Sylvia Rwabwogo	East Division						ω	ω	2			S	7	6	~	~	-	~	-			
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Ambrose Katabazi	Rwimi	NRM	Σ				2	∞	0			0	<u>4</u>	9	~	~	2	. 	- -	-		e
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Rose Kajubu Ahabyona	Mugusu/Karambi	NRM	ш	- -	30 31	ო	œ	-	0			Ŋ	വ	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	~	
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James K. Niringiyimana	Kihiihi TC	NRM N			83				0	21 8				~					S	35
Mariam Asiimwe	Kanyantorogo	NRM F			80				0					~					4	38
Jacenta Kataba	Kambuga	NRM F		59	76	29			0	21 7				~					S	33
Christopher Kamora	Kanyantorogo	NRM N			74				2					ო					4	34
Frank Byaruhanga	Mpungu	NRM N		72	73	~			2					~					2	33
John Muhima	Kayonza	NRM M			71	о 0	8		0	18 9				~					~	32
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Emmy Byarugaba Magezi	Kanungu TC	NRM M	9 1	64	65	2	ω ω			22 9		4	9	ო	2	с, D	с С	0	4	23
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Geoffrey Bigabwamukama	DWD	NRM M		10	58	-	80 4	Ω	0					~	0	~			S	26
Ferista Nyiraguhirwa	Kihihi	NRM F		40	54	35 ,	4		0	14 7				~	ო	ຕ	с -		~	18
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Identifiers	əmɛN	Abdul Kasule	Dithan Kikabi Mayanja	Abdul Kalemeera	Patrick Kisekwa Ssonko	Richard Bwabye	Victor N. Nabukenya	Sarah. N. Namuyanja	Deborah Nalubega	Rosette Katende	Scholar Nabakalu	David Mulindwa	George Balwana	Shaban M.Tebasingwa	Christine Nakabugo	John Kawesa	Jacob Kitaka	Erasto Kibirango	Zenar Nassur A.	Rose Mayega	Muhamadi Kadala	Samuel Mulwana	Hellen Nsereko	Luliika H. Nakazzi	Muhammed Matovu

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lisla	Sommittee																ω	ω	ω	ω	ω
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	Accontit 200		ш		2	_	_			ш	2	_					шш			>	ш
			Ja	Fred Mike Maumbe			Jonathan Nagwere				_		Wolayo Idat Kumasi	asi		Barbara Lumoonya Kooba		~		<u>e</u>	
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ntifie		Martin Walela	Robert Mabonga	ΪM	Henry Manana	Sam Wojega	atha	Aaron Siu	Abdallah Boola	Alfred Namasa	Nasur Mabanja	Michael Kisolo	ayo	ert	Michael Mafabi	oara ba	Feddy Khaitsa	Ahmed Bisigwa	Alex Napokoli	Adul Zak Mubaje	Sula Mumeya
Identifiers	Aame	Mar	Rob	Free	Hen	San	Jon	Aarc	Abd	Alfre	Nas	Mich	Wol	Rob	Mich	Barbar; Kooba	Ted	Ahn	Alex	Adu	Sula
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	Party	<u>_</u>			Z	Z	Ē	Z	Ē	Ż	Z	_	Z	Ż	Z	⊆	z	
	γon9utiteoΟ	Wanale	Busiu/Bamusukye	Bunghokho Mutoto	Bukiende/ Lukhonge	Busano	Nakatoke/ Namanyonyi	Budwale/Wanele	Northern Division	Bufumbo/ Bubyangu	Nyondo	Industrial Division	PWD	Northern Youth	Municipality	Busano	PWD	
Identifiers	əmsN	Tom Shisabale	Sarah Nambuya	Emmanuel Natseli	Betty Nabukyabo	Karim Wang Muliro	Aisha Mwanakaro	Kulusumu Khisa	Prossy Nadunga	Kainza Batuuru	Joseph Wasike	Fazil Nambozo	Peninah Namasa	Sylvia Baluka	Honny Wegosasa	Josephine Lunyolo	Absolom Nabende	Average

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Identifiers				-	Pertormance	nance		Legislative Kole	lativ	е К	ole	Contact with Electorate	act v orat	e vith	LL LL	3	<u>ح</u> رو	llon	LLG Monitoring		NPPAS	As
əmsV	ÇonətitenoQ	Party	Gender	Terms	2012/13	% cµsnge 2012/13	Plenary	Committee	noitoM	Special skill	Sub total	electorate Bectorate	Office	Subtotal	Sub county	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads	ENK FAL	Sub Total
Tom Karuhanga	Bukiiro	NRM	Σ							0	16	£	ი	20	10	ო	ო	ო				
Jennipher Tumuhairwe	Rwanyamahembe/ Bubaare	NRM	ш							0	16	2	თ	16	2	5	2	~				
Juliet Kamushana	Kamukuzi	NRM	ш					ω	Ŋ	0	21	£	ი	20	10	~	~	~	-	~ ~		
Jean Kirimani Tumusiime	Rugando	NRM	ш			66		∞	0	0	16	ŧ	ი	20	ω	ო	ო	ო	e	~ ~		
Didas TabaroTumwesigye	_	NRM	Σ	2	58 5	57 -2	ω	ω	0	0	16	ŧ	ი	20	10	ო	ო	-	-	-	-	1
Godfrey Baryomunsi	Kakiika	NRM	Σ			6 17		ω	ო	0	19	6	ი	18	10	~	ო	-				
Annet Arinaitwe	Rubindi	NRM	ш					ω	0	0	16	£	ი	20	10	-	~	-				
Grace Kabunanukye	Ndeija	NRM	ш					ω	0	0	16	ი	ი	18	9	ß	~	. 				
Asaph Muhangi	Ndeija	NRM	Σ					ω	0	0	16	7	2	ი	10	4	0	-			-	
Venance Munanukye	Kagongi	NRM	Σ			4 10		ω	ო	0	19	7	ი	16	0	S	~	-	ß	2 2		
David Muhairwe	Nyakayonjo	NRM	Σ	-	ß	ς Ω	00	ω	0	0	16	£	ი	20	10	-	-	-				
Steven Natukunda Barebire	Rubaya	NRM	Σ		32 5	53 66		œ	0	0	16	4	თ	13	2	~	2 2	-			-	
John Patrick Byaruhanga	Bubaare	NRM	Σ					ω	0	0	16	5	ი	4	2	Ŋ	~	-	ŝ	-	4	₽
Evaristo K. Mucunguzi	PWD	NRM	Σ	~	29 4	49 69	8	ω	0	0	16	4	ი	13	2	~	Ŋ	ß		-	4	18
Bernard Mugume Mukuru	Kashare	NRM	≥			8 14		ω	0	0	16	6	9	15	10	~	~	~	-	-	-	~
Felly Tumwesigye Bebuuze	Mwizi	NRM	ш	ო	4	P.	8	ω	0	0	16	7	വ	12	0	ო	ო	-	с С		~	÷
Joseline Kemirembe	Kakiika/Rubaya/Biharwe	NRM	ш			47 124		ω	0	0	16	б	ი	18	9	~	~	~	-		-	~
Jeninah Kobusingye	Youth	NRM	ш					ω	0	0	16	6	ი	18	0	ო	~	ო	~		-	÷
Annah Tirwakunda	Kamukizi/Nyamutanga	NRM	ட					ω	0	0	16	2	9	7	2	വ	Ŋ	~			-	₩
Hajji Jumba	Nyamitanga	NRM	Σ			47 38		ω	0	0	16	5	ဖ	7	2	~	~	ß				₩ ₩
Robert Arinanye	Bugambe	NRM	Σ		42 4	46 10		ω	0	0	16	£	9	17	9	~	~	~			-	2
Prisca Muganzi Mulongo	Nyakayonjo	lnd	ш					ω	0	0	16	7	თ	16	2	S	~	-				÷
Jolly Kabwizi	PWD	NRM	ш					ω	0	0	16	6	ი	18	0	ო	ო	-				÷
Apollo Rwakarimanga	Mwizi	NRM	≥					ω	0	0	16	5	2	2	0	Ŋ	~	4			-	3
Norah Kamugisha	Kakoba Division	NRM	ш					ω	0	0	16	5	9	7	2	S	-	ß			-	4
Mohammed Nyombi	Kakoba	NRM	Σ	2	-			∞	0	0	16	5	2	2	2	~	-	-				5
Loy Mpumwire	Kagongi	NRM	ш		31 3	38 23	8	∞	0	0	16	0	ი	ი	9	~	-	-	-	- -	-	~
								∞	0	0	16	ω	∞	15	S	ი	2	2			2	4

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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	γວnອuវitɛnoϽ	Раңу	Gender	S011/12	2015/13 2011/15	% cµsuge	Plenary	Committee	noitoM	Special skill	lstot duS	Meeting electorate	Office	Subtotal Subtotal	ຮູດເງອອເມ	Education Education	Agriculture	Vater	Roads	ENR FAL	Sub Total	
Grace Adume	Youth	NRM	ш		6 70	0 338			2	0		4										0
Zubeda Teko	South & North Division	NRM	ш		59 68	8 15			2	0		ო		12 6								N
Clementina Lochoro	Rupa	NRM	ш	1 3		8 84		∞	0	0	16	4					~	ო	~	ω –		~
Joseph Otita	Rupa	NRM	Σ	1 7	0.66			∞	2	0	18	5						2		-		œ
Aichael Langat L.	Tapac	pul	Σ					∞	2	0	18	e e						2				e
Calisto Iriama	South Division	NRM	Σ	3 5				∞	2	0	18	5						Ŋ		-		0
Cosmas Ayepa	North Division	NRM	Σ		67 59	9 -12	8	∞	2	0	18	5	6	14 0		55	Ŋ	~	ო	1	27	~
Regina Kuri	Tapac	FDC	ш					∞	2	0	18	5						~				ი
Abdallah L. Mazio	PWD	NRM	Σ					∞	2	0	18	0						~		-		œ
	PWD	NRM	ш	1	-			∞	2	0	18	0					S	0				m
Andrew Pulkol Lochugae	Nadunget	NRM	Σ		-	5 150	~	œ	0	0	16	с						~	ŝ	-		-
o Loki	Nadunget	NRM	ш			3 -20		∞	2	0	18					-	S	ն				
John Baptist Lotee	Katikekile	NRM		1 2	20 40	0 100	0 8	∞	2	0	18	5	2 7	0	·	-	ო	-	2 2	0	15	10
				-		9 79		ω	4	0	20			-	N	4 5	4	4				0

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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Identifiers					Performance	Jance		egisl	Legislative Role	Rol	۵	Contact with Electorate	Contact with Electorat		LLG	LLO	M M	LLG Monitoring	ling		NPPAs	S
əmsN	Constituency	Party	Gender	Terms	2013/13	% Change	Blenary % change	Committee	Motion	Special skill	Sub total	Meeting electorate	Office	Subtotal	Sub county	Health	Education	Agriculture Water	Roads	FAL	ENR	IstoT duS
Terry Silton Anyanzo	Dufile	NRM		4								£	ი		6						2	28
Zubair A. Asiku	Aliba	FDC		~								6	S		0						~	39
Martin Izaruku	West Moyo	Ind		~								7	S		10						0	30
Paul Maiku Didi	PWD	NRM		~								2	S		10						2	28
Martina Azireo	Moyo	NRM	ш	~								2	S		10						~	27
Nusura Odea	West Moyo	NRM	ш	~								2	2		6						2	30
Paul Gia Drami	Itula	NRM	Σ	-								7	S		10						-	31
Patrick Tiodibaku	Laropi	Ind	Σ	~								7	S		6						2	33
James Draciri	Youth	NRM	Σ	-								7	2								2	40
Lily Kareo Duku	Itula	NRM	ш	~								7	ß		10						~	23
Mubarak H. Yunusaleh	Gimara	UFA	Σ	~								~	Ŋ		0						-	37
Margaret Asienzo	MTC	NRM	ш	-						0	12	~	Ŋ					~	~	~	2	38
Sam JB Asusi	Metu	NRM	Σ	2						0	18	7	S		6	-				~	-	25
Lulua Kanta Leri	Metu	NRM	ш	~						0	18	2	ß		6					~	~	23
Mary Mazapkwe	Dufile/Laropi	NRM	ш	~						0	12	2	S		9					~	~	27
Beatrice Eleo	PWD	NRM	ш	~	48 6	61 2	27 8	8	0	0	16	7	ß	12	9	ŝ	55	5	2 2	~	~	27
Zamurah Maneno	Youth	NRM	ш	~						0	12	ო	2		N					ო	-	15
Apolonia Baako	Alibai Gimara	Ind	ш	~						0	12	2	2		0					~	~	ი
Andrew Kajoingi	MTC	NRM	Σ	2	(1)	0	œ			0	16	0	ß			- -	-		-	~	~	7
Average				-	47 6		37 8			0	16	7	S		10	9	5	5	4	~	~	27

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rinç	Roads	~	2	~	Ŋ	Ŋ	~	Ŋ	S	Ŋ	S	-	S	~	~	0	-	4
nito	Water													~	0	~	-	4
Μ	Agriculture																~	2
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LLG	Sub count y Bub county	9	0	9	10	9	10	9	9	4	0	10	4	9	10	10	9	ω
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ole	Sub total	3	16	16	16	18	16	18	18	21	2	16	16	16	16	16	16	17
a N	Special skill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ativ	noitoM																	
gisl	Committee	ω	ω	ω	ω	∞	ω	∞	ω	∞	ω	∞	ω	ω	ω	∞	ω	ω
Le	Plenary	ω	ω	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	ω
Performance Legislative Role	ອຽດຣາງ %	27	280	7	46	44	32	25	51	38	34	13	78	17	51	15	100	53
orm	2012/13	79	76	76	73	69	99	65	65	65	63	60	57	56	56	55	54	65
Perl	21/1102	62	20	1	50	48	50	52	43	47	47	53	32	48	37	48	27	46
	Terms	~	~	~	~	. 	~	~	4	ო	~	~	~	. 	~	~	4	2
	Gender	Σ	Σ	Σ	ட	Σ	Σ	Σ	ш	ш	ш	Σ	ш	Σ	ட	Σ	ш	
	Раңу	pu	pu	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	pu	NRM	NRM	FDC	pu	NRM	DP	NRM	NRM	NRM	
	γɔnəutitɛnoϽ	Kiringente	Youth	Mudduma	Nkozi	Kamengo	Mpigi Town Council	Kituntu	PWD	Buwama	Kituntu	Nkozi	Youth	Buwama	Mpigi Town Council	PWD	Kammengo	
Identifiers	əmsM	Eddie Nkolo Mpagi	Mac-Bannis Baingana	Abubaker Kikambi	Phionah Nabadda	Joseph Mutabazi	Badru Kaggwa Katerega	Godfrey Nalima	Betty Nalubowa Kinene	Noeline Nagadya	Catherine Ddembe	Abdul Sserubidde	Anita Birabwa Nalwoga	Benon Nsamba	Edith Ssempala	Mansoon Kiyemba	Resty Nantongo	Average

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əmsV	ÇonstitenoQ	եզկչ	Gender	Terms	21/112	2012/13	% cµsnge	Plenary Committee	Motion	Special skill	Sub total	BnitəəM	electorate	Office	Subtotal	Sub county	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads	ENR FAL		Sub Total
Leyton Nabukenya	Youth	NRM	ш			99	_									~								8
Godfrey K. Musanje	Kasawo	NRM	Σ	ო		65	_																	2
Ssemakula Ddamulira	Mukono Central Division	Ы	Σ	-		64																		9
Jane Ssozi Mukasa	NakisUnga/Ntenieru	NRM	ш	2	36	64					2						ო	ß						2
Mubarak Ssekikubo		NRM	Σ	-	49	64	31 8	8	Ω Ω	0	2	~	2 2		12	9	-	ß	ц	ŝ	5	4		25
Musa Kiggundu	Kyampisi	NRM	Σ	2	81	64		_			(0	വ	ß						8
Lukema Ssegayi	Goma	Ч	Σ	.		83					10					~	ß	2						S
Roy Grace Namayania	Nakisunga	NRM	ш	2	43	62	44 8				16					~	~	4						N
Hajara Nakiguli	Kasawo	NRM	ш	~	48	61	27 8	8	0	0	16	о	6		18	10		~		2 2	5	0		17
Evaristo Kaluma	Seeta Namuganga	Ind	Σ	2	60	59					-					~		2	-					2
Anuciata Nambi	Koome/Mpunge	NRM	ш	.	2	58					ი					~		S						6
Hudson Kiyaga	Ntenjeru	NRM	Σ	.	39	56					თ					0		ო						2
Annet Nakanwagi	PWD	NRM	ш	2	45	55					16							ო						n
Samuel Okoth	Mpunge	NRM	Σ	-	24	55	-				-					_		ß						
John Bosco Isabirye	Nama	NRM	Σ	~	43	55		00 00			16					~	-	~	ß		0			e C
Emmanuel Mbonye	Mpata	NRM	2	, 	1 <u>0</u>	23					10					~								<u>თ</u>
Asuman Muwumuza	Koome	NRM	Σı	ი ი	54	23					÷							S.						4
Annah Lubulwa	Nagojje/ Ntunda	NRM	ш:	2	67	51					,							- I						ო უ
Hussein Mubiru	Kimenyedde		≥ı		19	40					∞ 0					~		<u>م</u>						
Kose Babirye	Mukono Central Division	r D	L	~	τ.	45					Q					0		. –						2
Florence Kaate	Seeta Namuganya	NRM	ш	.	60	45					0					0	ß	ო	~					-
Alice Namande	Kimenyedde	NRM	ш	. 	37	44					16					~ .	ო	~						0
Teopista Galabuzi	Goma	Ind	ш	2	27	4	52 8				16					~ .	ო	ო						-
Kaweesa Kaweesa	Ntunda	Ind	Σ	2	53	4					16					~		~						
Godfrey Nsubuga	PWD	NRM	Σ	-		4					16					~	-	~						
Noeline Nabuyange	Kyampisi/Nama	NRM	ш	2	4	40					()					0	~	0						~
Joachim Mukasa	Youth	NRM	Σ	. -	33	6	218	00 00	0	0	16	ග	2		1	0	ო	ო	~	ო	` ~			13
Jamil Kawoya	Nabbale	NRM	Σ	.	33	27		-			-			-		_	.	ß						~
Average					40	23					15						4	e C						œ

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	Sub Total	2	ღ	ы С	n	27	o,	ი	~	28	2	ი	2	16		2
As	ENR ENR					5 2				2				4		
NPPAs	FAL					-								7 -		
	Roads	2	2	~	~	-	~	~	~	~		~	5	e	ო	4
LLG Monitoring	Nater				~	ß	-	~	~	ო	-	~	~	-	-	4
onit	Agriculture				ß	ß	ო	S	~	-	വ	Ω	ო	-	ო	4
∑ (')	Education	~	~	~	ო	S	S	~	~	~	~	-	0	ო	~	4
Ľ	Health	~	~	~	~	Ŋ	2	ო	~	~	~	ო	~	ო	~	က
LLG	Sub county	10	10	10	10	10	9	4	10	0	2	9	9	10	10	7
ith	Subtotal				18	12	4	14		13			16	7	ი	14
act w orate	Office	ი	ი	~	ი	<mark>о</mark>	ი	თ	ი	ი	ი	თ	ი	ი	ი	<mark>တ</mark>
Contact with Electorate	electorate Bectorate	7	6	7	6	e	5	5	6	4	0	2	7	2	0	5
	letot duS				®	18	2	<u>∞</u>	8	16	∞	<u>o</u>	8	17	4	2
lole	Special skill					` O				ò				ò		
Legislative Role	Motion					2				0				2		
lisla	Committee	ω	4	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ъ	ω	2	4	2
Leg	Plenary					ω				ω				ω		
lce	ອຽດຣາວ %				ထု	76	22	Ņ	21	ω	133	9	4	œ	110	45
Performance	2012/13	80	78	75	69	67	99	65	57	57	56	56	55	5	44	63
Perf	2011/12	33	5	45	75	38	54	66	47	53	24	53	53	50	21	48
	Terms	ო	2	~	2	2	2	~	~	2	. 	2	-	2	4	2
	Gender	Σ	Σ	ш	Σ	ш	ш	Σ	ш	Σ	ш	ш	ш	Σ	ш	
													Σ	Σ	Σ	
	Раңу	ЛЛ	Ē	NR	RN	NRM	RN	lnd	RN	NRM	RN	R	RN	NRM	RN	
	Constituency	Moruita SC	Namalu	Nabilatuk/ Lolachat	Lorengedwat	Kakomongole	Loregea	Nabilatuk	Loregea SC	Nakapiripirit TC	Pian	Lorengedwat	Nakapiripirit TC	Lolachat	Namalu	
	əmsN	John Loonye	Richard Lochoto	Agnes Lokuda Aleper	Paul Lorukale	Sofia Jane Kodet	Hellen Pulkol	John Marco Longelech	Erina Longole	William Sagal	Scholar Chero	Maria Loryang Longole	Lucy Aluka	Abraham Nanyima	Lucy Lopuwa	Average

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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	Party	Gender	Terms	21/112	% CP3006	ելերձւչ Տերձոցե	Committee	noitoM	Special skill	Sub total	Meeting electorate	Office	Subtotal	Sub county Sub county	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads FAL	ENR	lstoT duS
Pakwach T/C	NRM									21		ດ	17			ß					
Alwi Jonam	NRM									21	7	ß	16	9	S	2					
Parombo	NRM									21	1	2	13	10	~	2					
Akworo	pul									16	7	တ	20	10	ო	~					
PWD		Σ		37 6		73 8	ω	Ŋ	0	2	7	~	18	9	S	ß	S			-	÷
Youth		Σ	~	9	<i>с</i>	00	00	0	0	16	2	0	S	10	~	2	2			4	č
Erussi	NRM	Σ	7 7		62 3	8 28 8	∞	0	0	16	ი	2	7	9	~	2	. 		7 1	-	25
Nyaravur		Σ					~	0	0	ω	4	თ	13	9	~	~	e			S	ñ
Erussi		ш					ω	0	0	16	ი	2	7	9	-	ო	~			-	'n
Nebbi TC/SC		ш					ω	0	0	16	4	თ	13	9	~	ო	ß			-	÷
Wadelai		Σ					∞	S	0	21	7	თ	16	9	~	ო	-			-	÷
Parombo/Akworo		ш					ω	0	0	16	2	2	2	9	ო	ო	.			-	ù
Pakwach		Σ					ω	2	0	18	8	თ	17	9	-	-	ო			-	÷
Panyango		ш					∞	0	0	16	ω	~	15	9	-	2	~			~	÷
Ndhew		ш		39 4		26 1	ω	0	0	ი	2	2	~	6	-	-	~			Ŋ	ò
Kucwiny		Σ					0	0	0	S	0	თ	ი	10	~	2	ო			2	Ň
Wadelai		ш					4	0	0	ω	6	ი	18	9	ഹ	-	0			-	÷
Pakwach TC		ட					4	0	0	ი	7	თ	20	9	~	. 	~			-	ი
Panyimur		Σ					∞	S	0	2	0	2	2	2	ო	ო	ო			-	÷
^{>} anyimur		ட				-	2	0	0	9	4	4	ω	9	~	വ	-			-	÷
Atego		Σ					4	0	0	ი	0	ი	ი	9	ო	ო	~			-	÷
Kucwiny		ш					ω	0	0	16	0	თ	ი	10	~	~	~			~	~
Ndhew		Σ		23 4		78 1	ω	0	0	ი	2	2	~	9	ო	~	-			-	÷
DWD		ш					ω	0	0	16	0	თ	ი	2	-	.	~			-	~
Nebbi TC		Σ					ω	0	0	16	0	თ	ი	0	~	~	~			-	~
Nebbi	NRM	Σ	- -	31 3	32 3	3 8	ω	0	0	16	0	ი	ი	0	~	-	-	÷	1	-	~
Youth		ш					ω	0	0	12	0	თ	ი	0	-	-	-			-	~
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Identifiers					erfor	Performance		Legislative	live	Role		Contact with Electorate	witl ate	רוב רוב		LLG Monitoring	Mon	itori		NPPAs	As	
əmsN	Constituency	Раңу	Gender	Terms	2013/15	% cµsnge 2012/13	Plenary	Committee	Motion	Sub total Sub total		Office	Subtotal Subtotal	Sub county	meetings Health	Education	Agriculture	Nater	Roads	ENB FAL		Sub Total
Cosmas Kakuru	Ruhaama	NRM										ი			~		~					4
Sam K. Mugabi	Ntungamo	NRM										ග			~		~					80
Shakirah Karyija	Ruhaama/Rweikiniro	NRM										ი			~		~					0
Elijah Aruhaire		NRM										ი			~		ო					0
Alex Twebuze	Rubaare SC & TC	NRM										S			ß		ഹ					2
Dinnah N. Nuwabaine	Kibatsi	NRM										ດ			ო		~					4
Denis S. Muhumuza	Itojo	NRM										9			S		ഹ					6
Peace Kaconco	Rubaare/Rugarama	NRM										ດ			ო		ഹ					<u>л</u>
Aidah Nturanabo	Itojo	NRM										ი			S		ഹ					ณ
Richard Kwehayo	Rukoni East	NRM										о			2		~					ŝ
Darlison Barugahare	Municipality	NRM										ი			S		ო					9
Augustine Kasheija	Nyakyera	NRM										2			2 2		Ŋ					2
Grace Twinomugisha	Rukoni East/West/ Kitwe TC	NRM										2			S		0					9
Dan Buteera	Ngoma	NRM										S			~		-					ល
Plaxeda Hamanya	Ntungamo	NRM										S			-		~					2
Emmanuel Binyerere	Western Division	NRM										9			-		Q					ი
Miriam Muhanguzi	Nyabihoko, Rwashamaire	NRM										2			7		~					4
Siraje Baguma Tuqume	Rweikiniro	NRM	Σ	-	89	58 -15	2	ω	0	0	13 11	9	17	7 10	2 2	-	~		5 1	4		18
Paddy Mugvema	lhunga	NRM	Σ				∞	ω				S			က	ß	ഹ	~				ი
Patrick Rwakabare	PWD	NRM	Σ	7	46 5	56 22	∞	ω	0	0 16	6 11	2	13	0	ß	~	ß	4	5 3	4		27
Gorette Maria Maguru	Bwongyera	NRM	ш				ω	œ				Ŋ			Ω	0	~	2 2				Σ
umwesiqve	Central Division	NRM	Σ									2	о		2	2	-	-				7
_	Eastern Division	NRM	Σ									ດ	÷		-	S	~	-				e
	Kavonza/Ngoma	NRM	ш									о	10		2	S	0	2				7
gye	NRM	NRM	ш									9	÷		ß	~	Ŋ	~				2
Benon Rutogogo	Youth	NRM	Σ									S	ę		ო	Ŋ	Ŋ	0				ω
Jenifer Kabeije	Youth	NRM	ш									б О	7		~	S	-	0				ω
Peace Tusiime	Nyakyera	MRM	ш.	7 -	41	44 7	4	4	0	0		6	16	9	~	0	-	~ ·	5	- ·		2
Benon Musinguzi	Bwongyera	NRM	Σ									2	4		ı Ω	പ	- 0	- 0				2
Average												9	2		5	4	с С	с С				33

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(0	IstoT duS	35	34	28	36	23	21	27	28	18	18	16	18	13	0	15	17	15	2	7	7	20
NPPAs	ENR		2	2		2 2					N N		N								~	
ЧZ	FAL	e	e	с	0	-	ß	ო	~	ო	~	~	ო	-	~	-	~	0	~	~	~	2
ing	sbsoA	~	7	~	2	~	ო	~	~	~	ო	~	ო	2	-	ო	~	2	~	~	-	2
LLG Monitoring	Nater	ო	7	. 	2	ო	ო	ო	-	-	ო	~	-	-	-	-	-	~	~	ო	-	2
Non	Agriculture	ო	~	~	ო	~	0	ო	~	ი	ი	വ	ო	~	~	~	ო	ო	.	~	~	2
5	Education	~	2	~	~	ო	ო	ო	~	-	ი	ო	ო	~	ო	~	ო	ო	~	ო	~	4
	Health	~	2	~	2	ო	Ŋ	ო	~	-	ო	ო	ო	~	~	~	-	~	~	~	~	4
ILG	Sub county	10	10	10	9	9	10	2	9	9	10	9	9	9	9	2	2	0	10	9	0	7
e vith	Subtotal	20	16	18	10	18	16	20	ი	16	4	4	4	18	4	<u>4</u>	2	13	თ	ი	5	14
ct v orate	Office	თ	ი	თ	S	ი	S	ი	ი	ი	ი	വ	ი	ი	ი	ß	വ	വ	ი	ი	S	∞
Contact with Electorate	Meeting electorate	7	7	0	S	6	1	7	0	7	2	6	5	б	ъ С	6	2	ω	0	0	0	9
0	Sub total	16	17	21	19	18	21	17	18	21	18	21	18	16	5	16	21	18	18	17	21	19
Role	Special skill	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ve F	Motion	0	2	2J	2	2	ß	ß	2	S	2	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	വ	2	e
Legislative Role	Committee	ω	4	ω	ω	ω	ω	∞	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	4	ω	∞
Ľéć	Plenary	ω	ω	ω	4	∞	∞	4	∞	ω	ω	∞	∞	ω	ω	∞	ω	∞	ω	ω	∞	∞
Performance	ອິດມຣກ່ວ %	4	ი	35	6	64	7	φ	4	7	173	ω	167	99	2	68	68	15	29	34	120	47
orm	2012/13	8	77	77	75	69	68	99	65	61	60	57	56	53	50	47	47	46	44	43	33	59
Perf	21/112	2	75	57	60	42	2	0	9	22	22	33	21	22	61	8	8	40	34	22	15	5
	Terms					7 -					.		-								` ~	-
	Gender		ш	Σ		ш					Σ		Σ								Σ	
	Party	NRN	NRM	NRM	FDC	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	FDC	FDC	NRM	FDC	NRN	NRN	FDC	D D D	NRN	NRM	NRN	NRM	
	γວnອutitznoϽ	Buyanja/Kebisoni	Buhunga/Ruhinda	Ruhinda	Western Division	Nyarushanje	Bwambara	PWD	Nyarushanje	Southern/Eastern Div	Youth	Nyakagyeme	Southern Division	Nyakagyeme	Nyakishenyi	Youth	Western Division	PWD	Bugangari/ Bwambara	Eastern Division	Nyakishenyi	
	əmsN	Macklean Sabiiti	Helen Kabajungu	Benson Karyamarwaki	Peter Tuheirwe	Emily Bebwa Kiiza	Chris Kagayano	David Matsiko	Fidel Begumisa	Pheonah Natukunda	Amon K. Kanywanisa	Alex Tumuramye	Frank Bwesigwa	Grace Kaino	Juliet Kaboyo	Phyllis Ariho	Jenifer Kiconco	Agnes Kenyangi	Tedy Tumushabe	Christopher Gomwe	Innocent K. Ninsiima	Average

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

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Soroti																						
Identifiers					Perfo	Performance Legislative Role	Leç	gisla	tive	Role		Contact with Electora	Contact with Electorate		LLG LLG Monitoring NPPAs	20	lon	itori	_ ور	ЧЧ	As	
əmsN	γoneutiteoϽ	Party	Gender	Terms	2011/12	% cµsnge 2012/13	Plenary	Sommittee	noitoM	Special skill	Sub total	Meeting electorate Office	Subtotal	Sub county meetings	Health	Education	Agriculture	Nater	sbeoЯ	ЕИВ FAL	Sub Total	
Kevinah Akello	Kamuda/Katine	lnd	ш	-	52										~	~	2					~
Michael Eucu	Soroti	NRM	Σ	-	50										2	~	2					_
Ruth Kulume	Soroti & Asuret	FDC	ш	-	32										2	Q	~					~
Hellen Akiya	Gweri	FDC	ш	2	55										~	~	ო					-
David Ejoku Ademo	Asuret	FDC	Σ	2	29										ო	~	e					
Agnes Alubo	Arapai	FDC	ш	2	55										S	~	-					
Mohammed Nasur	Eastern Division	FDC	Σ	2	33										~	2	~					~
Richard Ongodia	Gweri	NRM	Σ	ო	68										~	~	-					~
David Erwau	Northern Division	FDC	Σ	~											~	~	-					
Leonard Opucho	Arapai	NRM	Σ	2	37										S	ო	~			` ~		
Peter Oringo	Kamuda	UPC	Σ	2	63										~	~	-					
Betty Anyakot	Northern Division	FDC	ш	2	33										~	~	-					~
Simon Otija Opado	Katine	FDC	Σ	~	36										~	~	~					
Margaret Amongin	Eastern/Western Division	NRM	ш	2	25										~	~	-			Ì	17	
Rhoda Apeduno	Youth	NRM	ш	. 	46										ო	-	~			Ì	10	-
Rose Akello	Tubur/Katine	NRM	Σ	-	52										~	~	~			Ì	7	
Average				2	4										4	2	2				21	

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JS		Sub Total	34	29	28	34	27	29	29	23	25	24	22	18	22	25	23	25	24	ω	ω	25	22
LLG Monitoring NPPAs		ENR	4	~	0	ß	Ŋ	4	4	S	4	0	0	~	0	4	~	~	Ŋ	0	~	4	~
Z		FAL				0	0	0	0	~	0	ო	ß	0	0	0	0	~	0	0	0	0	0
ring		sbsoA				S	0	~	2	~	~	2	~	2	~	2	Ŋ	ო	2	0	~	2	S
Jito		Water				S	S	~	2	2	2	~	~	2	~	~	~	S	2	2	2	2	S
Mor		Agriculture				~	ო	5	S	~	2	S	ო	~	0	0	0	ო	~	~	0	S	-
ц С		Education				~	~	2	2	~	2	2	ო	2	~	~	ო	~	ო	~	0	2	S
		Health	~	5	ъ	S	~	~	S	e	2	S	ო	~	-	S	~	S	S	~	~	~	S
DLLG		Sub county	10	10	10	ω	10	0	9	10	10	10	0	4	4	4	0	0	9	2	4	0	9
	fe	I stotdu2	17	17	20	13	20	18	5	17	13	6	20	20	20	6	20	16	9	16	16	10	£
act	ora	Office	ဖ	9	თ	9	ი	ი	Ŋ	ဖ	ဖ	S	ი	ი	ი	2	ი	ი	2	ი	ი	2	თ
Contact	Electorate	electorate Bectorate	7	7	7	7	7	6	9	7	7	4	7	7	4	7	÷	7	4	7	7	ω	2
		Sub total	2	2	8	6	10	®	6	0	~	3	4	3	~	4	~	~	3	2	8	0	6
tole		Special skill					0																
Legislative Role																							
lativ		Motion				က	0	2	က	0	0	0	2	0	2	Ŋ	0	0	0	Ŋ	2	0	0
egis		Committee				∞	S	∞	∞	2	∞	∞	4	ω	~	4	0	4	2	ω	ω	2	~
Ľ		Plenary	ω	ω	ø	ω	S	ω	ω	S	~	S	ω	S	S	S	ω	4	ω	ω	ω	S	2
Performance		әбиечэ %	49	97	375	174	81	20	210	114	43	180	115	189	93	136	143	63		42	100	36	32
form		2012/13	82	77	76	74	67	65	65	60	57	56	56	55	54	52	51	49	49	47	46	45	45
Per		21/1102	55	39	16	27	37	54	3	28	40	20	26	19	28	22	3	30		33	23	33	34
		Terms	~	2	ო	~	2	~	~	2	2	~	2	~	ი	~	~	~	~	2	-	~	-
		Gender	Σ	Σ	Σ	Σ	Σ	ш	Σ	ш	Σ	ш	ш	Σ	Σ	Σ	ш	ш	Σ	Σ	Σ	Σ	Σ
		Party	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	NRM	pul	NRM	UPC	NRM	NRM	NRM	Ind	NRM	NRM	NRM	FDC	NRM
		ζουətitu	Rubongi	Petta	Western Division	SopSop	Nabuyoga	Mukuju/Kwapa	Kwapa	Nabuyoga	Nagongera	Westen Division	Kisoko/Petta	Mella	Kisoko	Iyolwa	Mella/Malaba	Mulanda	Magoola	PWD	Youth	Merikit	Mulanda
Tororo		9msN Y2ngutit2noO	Simon P. Opio	Alex Okoth Owor F	Joseph Okware	Moses Ofwono Ojara	Michael Mijasy	Betty Akicoth	Jimmy A. Alia K	Jackline Ayaa	James Onyango	Iren Rutayisire	Lydia Nyaketeho	Samuel K. Omaset		John M. Odongo		Jenifer Akoth Onyango	Samuel Odong	John Okea	Jacob Opio Y	Gabriel Onyango	

Tororo

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Tororo				-	Perfo	Performance		gisla	tive	Legislative Role		Contact	t		LLG	LL	S	LLG Monitoring	orin		NPPAs	As
												Electorate	rate									
əmsV	γວnອutitznoϽ	Раңу	Gender	Terms	21/113	% cµsnge 2012/13	Plenary	Committee	Motion	Special skill	letot du2	Meeting electorate	Office	Subtotal	meetings	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads FAL	ENR	IstoT duS
Dan Okware	Molo	NRM		7 7		45 0	4		2												4	24
Stepher Odwar	Nagongera TC	NRM			24 4	42 75	∞		0			1	9			~				0	0	7
Zebedayo Omoit	Mukusu	Ind	Σ			39 -7	2J		2								2	05		0	~	21
Rose C. Adikin	PWD	NRM	ш	0 ന	с о	39 333	4	4	2				4				~	,-	S	0	~	<u>4</u>
Juliet Nyawere	Merikit/Molo	NRM	ш	~	ო	39	4	4	0		m	, 7	4	11 0		2	~	э Э	~	0	~	20
Joan Olowo	Nagogera TC & SC	NRM	ш	7	19 3	32 68	ω	ω	0	0	16	2	9	11 0		-	-	, -	-	0	0	ъ
Verusa Amachi Ochwo	Paya/Sop Sop	NRM	ш	2	19 3	32 68	∞	5	2							2 L	0	0	-	0	0	7
Donatos Okumu	Kirewa	NRM	Σ	-	e	31	2	2	0	` O	9	5		0		2	-	~-	ß	0	0	13
Loy Wandwasi	Eastern Division	NRM	ш	~				-	0							S		55		~	~	17
Florence Owora	lyolwa/Magola	NRM	ш	~		29 -3		-	0								~		-	Э	0	19
Stella Okoth	Tororo	NRM	ш	~	33 2	29 -12		ω	0	` 0			2 2			0		10		-	4	15
Margaret Nyaburu	Kirewa	NRM	ш				~	ω	0							-	~	ŝ	0	0	0	12
Michael Omara Oburu	Paya	NRM	Σ	~	34 2	27 -21	2	ω	ო	` 0			2			-	-	0	~	0	~	S
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Performance Legislative Role	Wakiso Identifiers
Contact with LLG LLG Monitoring NPPAs Electorate	Legislative Role Contact with LLG LLG Monitoring I Electorate

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əmɛN	Norman S. Kabogoza	Hamidu Kizito Nsubuga	Bashir Kayondo	Rashid K. Sebyeya	Allen Ssentongo	Sarah Namugga	Immaculate Nakimbugwe	Herbert Wassajja	Margaret P. Namagembe	Sarah Najjemba	Nuruh Namuli	Michael Bulumba	Annah Nsubuga Mugerwa	Abdul Gamal	Cyrus Kasaato	Peter J. Balikuddembe	Leonard K. Settimba	Abubaker K. Senfuka	Deborah Mazzi

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District	Prote	ected s	Protected springs		low wells	sl	Deep	Deep boreholes	loles	RWH tanks	tanks		Dams	(0	>	Valley tanks	inks	PSP/ K stands	PSP/ Kiosk, Tap stands	0
	ш	ЦZ	Tot	ш	ЦZ	Tot	ш	ЦZ	Tot	ш	ЦN	Tot			ot	ЧZ		ш	ЦN	Tot
Agago	17	2	19	78	4	122	461	92	553	23	60	83			1	0		44	23	67
Amuria	4	18	32	70	49	119	599	24	623	~	4	5			0	0		4	2	9
Amuru	115	£	126	32	20	52	246	20	316	ო	26	29	0	0	0	0	0	∞	48	56
Bududa	405	36	441	7	0	2	ω	2	10	24	5	29						158	45	203
Buliisa	30	2	32	82	19	101	73	19	92	14	4	18						79	7	86
Gulu	160	27	187	135	20	155	543	68	611	52	48	100						4	7	5
Hoima	569	47	616	425	5	479	306	57	363	92	45	137			0			51	~	52
Jinja	346	9	352	277	69	346	275	49	324	41	10	51						9	0	9
Kabarole	448	51	499	539	147	686	43	20	63	141	38	179						294	80	374
Kamuli	17	0	17	356	53	409	559	42	601	52	18	70						33	ო	36
Kanungu	864	148	1012	37	6	46	19	58	77	92	21	113						453	64	517
Lira	383	75	458	265	126	391	244	86	330	28	30	58						21	1	32
Luwero	15	-	16	330	106	436	428	96	524	101	32	133						50	9	56
Mbale	417	12	429	39	ო	42	210	21	231	20	5	25						320	81	401
Mbarara	373	60	433	62	21	83	80	49	129	2348	42	2390						679	69	748
Moroto	0	-	~	2	-	ო	202	25	227	12	0	12						0	0	0
Moyo	31	2	33	27	-	28	356	50	406	49	28	77						135	8	143
Mpigi	226	45	271	351	119	470	51	29	80	78	7	89						12	13	25
Mukono	579	68	647	227	82	309	314	99	380	142	25	167					0	111	7	113
Nakapiripirit	ო	ო	9	28	2J	33	209	28	237	ω	-	б						20		21
Nebbi	127	64	191	58	55	113	484	142	626	31	49	80	4				Ŋ	23	9	29
Ntungamo	707	96	803	248	102	350	130	83	213	105	28	133					4	278	92	370
Rukungiri	1029	222	1251	56	29	85	27	37	64	239	99	305	-	0	0	0	0	350	110	460
Soroti	85	ω	93	121	17	138	447	40	487	49	24	73	~	0	~	0	-	6	0	б
Tororo	229	-	230	24	2	26	670	36	706	37	27	64	-	0	0	0	0	ო	0	e
Wakiso	815	156	971	809	407	1216	227	56	283	509	45	554	2	0	0	0	0	773	92	865

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORECARD 2012/13

Annex 2: Access to Water 2012/13

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Annex 3: Trends in PLE Performance (%)

		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Agago	Div 1				4.3	3.8
	Div 2				47.5	48.4
	Div 3				23.1	23.4
	Div 4				11.7	13.0
Amuria	U Div 1	0.2	0.6	1.5	11.4 3.3	8.8 2.4
Amana	Div 2	26.4	37.0	47.8	48.3	52.1
	Div 3	44.6	34.2	28.6	27.7	22.7
	Div 4	16.0	16.8	14.0	12.7	14.6
	U	12.8	11.5	5.6	5.6	6.0
Amuru	Div 1	0.1	0.8	1.3	1.6	1.5
	Div 2	13.2	33.4	33.7	37.6	39.7
	Div 3	30.2	27	23.8	25.3	26.1
	Div 4 U	21.0 35.0	21.1 17.7	20.5 15.9	17.5 14.4	16.2 13.5
Bududa	Div 1	0.9	1.8	1.8	3.2	4.2
200000	Div 2	12.4	27.0	31.5	27.8	34.5
	Div 3	27.2	29.0	24.9	20.2	18.3
	Div 4	16.2	17.0	14.8	18.1	16.2
	U	43.3	25.2	21.4	25.7	20.9
Bulisa	Div 1	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.1	3.0
	Div 2	48.5	45.5	50.9	46.7	53.0
	Div 3	31.5	28.0	23.2	24.2	22.6
	Div 4	9.6	14.6	10.8	12.8	12.5
	U	8.8	10.1	11.0	12.6	7.9
Gulu	Div 1	0.6	2.7	1.0	1.8	8.0
	Div 2	17.4	47.5	33.2	37.7	53.1
	Div 3	34.2	32.3	24.5	24.0	19.1
	Div 4	22.0	14	20.1	17.7	10.7
	U	25.8	3.6	17.9	15.3	7.3
Hoima	Div 1	3.7	5.8	7.1	2.4	9.5
	Div 2	35.1	44.7	40.7	34.6	42.0
	Div 3	31.7	25.2	22.5	23.4	18.6
	Div 4	12.3	11.8	11.8	15.6	12.3
	U	17.1	12.5	14.4	19.2	13.7
Jinja	Div 1	3.0	4.8	6.1	7.1	10.4
	Div 2	35.8	37.3	40.3	37.8	42.8
	Div 3	27.5	26.2	23.6	20.5	16.8
	Div 4	11.3	14	11.3	14.1	11.5
	U	18.8	17.7	14.5	16.7	14.7

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		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Kabarole	Div 1	7.1	8.8	8.4	11.4	23.7
	Div 2	54.1	56.6	57.2	56.7	57.4
	Div 3	24.4	18.4	17.5	15.2	8.9
	Div 4	7.9	9.7	8.5	9.0	4.1
	U	6.6	6.5	4.2	4.3	1.9
Kamuli	Div 1	1.0	2.4	3.9	4.4	5.7
	Div 2	23.3	27.1	31.9	25.7	31.1
	Div 3	32.1	29.4	25.8	20.0	21.0
	Div 4	17.5	17.5	13.6	19.5	14.8
	U	26	23.6	19.6	26.1	23.2
Kanungu	Div 1	4.0	8.3	11.5	13.6	12.8
•	Div 2	48.4	54.7	57.2	51.7	54.5
	Div 3	33.0	25.6	19.7	20.1	18.8
	Div 4	9.4	8.0	5.4	7.4	7.3
	U	5.2	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.9
Lira	Div 1	3.0	1.4	2.0	4.5	14.2
	Div 2	27.0	30.3	39.1	43.9	48.6
	Div 3	25.9	24.9	22.8	21.1	15.8
	Div 4	15.5	19.5	17.1	12.5	10.1
	U	28.5	23.9	15.7	15.0	8.6
Luwero	Div 1	3.1	7.4	8.5	8.6	10.0
	Div 2	33.7	43.1	45.0	43.1	42.9
	Div 3	29	22.8	20.8	17.9	17.9
	Div 4	13.4	14.8	11.4	16.3	13.0
	U	20.8	12.0	10.6	10.4	11.9
Mbale	Div 1	4.3	3.2	3.5	4.0	11.2
insulo	Div 2	37.9	34.7	35.3	35.0	40.4
	Div 3	25.9	26.9	23.2	19.8	16.7
	Div 4	11.7	15.8	14.4	17.0	14.1
	U	16.5	19.4	16.6	20.3	13.9
Mbarara	Div 1	10.4	9.2	14.2	14.2	26.8
in barara	Div 2	56.1	58.7	60.2	58.0	54.8
	Div 2 Div 3	22.0	21.7	14.7	14.0	9.4
	Div 3	6.2	5.6	4.4	6.7	3.9
	U	5.4	4.7	3.3	4.5	2.8
Moroto	Div 1	2.4	4.5	4.9	5.5	4.0
	Div 1 Div 2	59	58.9	60.2	53.3	61.5
	Div 2 Div 3	25.3	21.6	19.0	21.3	18.4
	Div 3	7.8	8.4	7.9	13.3	9.8
	U U	5.4	6.6	3.0	3.9	9.0 3.1
Моуо	Div 1	0.6	2.7	4.5	4.7	3. 7.2
WOYO	Div 1 Div 2	17.4	47.5	4.5 59.2	61.2	67.5
	Div 2 Div 3	34.2	32.3	24.3	21.6	16.3
	Div 3 Div 4	34.2 22.0	32.3 14	24.3	7.2	6.0
Mojai	U Div 1	25.8	3.6	1.3	3.9	1.7
Mpigi	Div 1	1.2	3.3	5.5	7.9	10.3
	Div 2	21.6	31.7	34.8	39.7	47.5
	Div 3	25.4	23.7	22.9	17.3	17.4
	Div 4	17.5	18.4	14.3	15.6	11.7
	U	34.2	22.9	17.0	15.5	8.8

		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Mukono	Div 1	6.6	10.3	15.3	9.1	18.2
	Div 2	37.7	41.4	42.3	39.4	43.8
	Div 3	27.9	22.9	17.8	18.1	14.3
	Div 4	11.6	11.5	9.1	14.7	9.8
	U	16.2	13.9	11.0	13.5	9.6
Nakapiripirit	Div 1	0.0	2	3.0	4.8	4.5
	Div 2	38.1	51.1	51.7	45.6	52.0
	Div 3	33.3	28.7	21.2	20.6	21.6
	Div 4	16.7	11	11.7	16.5	9.1
	U	11.9	7.2	6.5	9.3	7.5
Nebbi	Div 1	0.3	1.5	1.8	1.5	2.1
	Div 2	20.9	30.2	40.4	37.6	43.6
	Div 3	36.9	32.3	26.1	30.3	27.2
	Div 4	19.5	19.5	17.2	16.0	14.7
	U	22.4	16.4	9.5	9.7	7.8
Ntungamo	Div 1	4.6	8.9	13.4	13.6	16.8
	Div 2	38.1	50.0	50.6	49.9	52.9
	Div 3	33.0	23.5	20.0	19.3	15.8
	Div 4	12.8	10.9	7.6	9.1	7.1
Rukungiri	U	11.4	6.8	5.7	5.2	4.4
Rukungiri	Div 1	5.1	10.0	15.3	12.0	20.5
	Div 2	38.4	44.7	56.7	51.5	56.1
	Div 3	39.7	29.9	19.2	21.2	15.5
	Div 4	11.1	10.5	4.4	9.8	4.6
	U	5.8	4.9	1.7	2.7	1.1
Soroti	Div 1	1.2	1.0	1.4	3.0	7.0
	Div 2	25.3	25.3	36.7	27.2	41.2
	Div 3	33.3	33.1	28.8	29.1	23.4
	Div 4	15.3	18.9	16.7	19.6	14.9
	U	21.3	21.7	12.8	17.9	11.2
Tororo	Div 1	1.3	2.0	2.1	2.6	4.7
	Div 2	24.2	26.5	29.0	24.5	36.5
	Div 3	34.6	30.9	29.5	26.7	23.2
	Div 4	17.6	20.6	19.1	21.9	18.1
	U	22.4	20.0	16.6	20.6	14.1
Wakiso	Div 1	8.9	15.6	17.7	20.4	22.1
	Div 2	50.1	51.1	51.4	49.3	51.6
	Div 3	21.0	16.8	14.5	12.2	11.1
	Div 4	8.5	7.8	6.9	8.3	7.2
	U	11.5	8.7	6.6	7.0	5.2

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