



SOCIAL DETERMINANTS AND HOW THEY INFLUENCE COUNCILLOR PERFORMANCE IN DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS IN UGANDA

**Fred Kasalirwe | Jonas M. Mbabazi
Phoebe Atukunda | Oscord M. Otile
Eugene G. Ssemakula | Rebecca N.
Mukwaya | Walter Akena**

ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No.107, 2022

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS AND HOW THEY INFLUENCE COUNCILLOR PERFORMANCE IN DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS IN UGANDA

**Fred Kasalirwe | Jonas M. Mbabazi
Phoebe Atukunda | Oscord M. Otile
Eugene G. Ssemakula | Rebecca N.
Mukwaya | Walter Akena**

ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No.107, 2022

Published by ACODE

P. O. Box 29836, Kampala

Email: library@acode-u.org; acode@acode-u.org

Website: <http://www.acode-u.org>

Citation

Kasalirwe, F., Mbabazi, M., J., Atukunda, P., Oscord M., O., Ssemakula, E., G., Nalwoga, M., R., and Akena, W. (2022). Social Determinants and how they Influence Councillor Performance in District Local Government Councils in Uganda, Kampala: ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No.107.

© **ACODE 2022**

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher. ACODE's work is supported by generous donations and grants from bilateral donors and charitable foundations. Reproduction or use of this publication for academic or charitable purposes or for purposes of informing public policy is excluded from this restriction.

ISBN 978 9970 56 729 4

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENT	III
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	V
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Decentralisation in Uganda.....	1
1.2 The Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative	5
1.3 Problem Statement	5
1.4 Objectives of the Analysis	6
1.5 Justification for the Analysis	6
2.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	8
3.0 METHODOLOGY.....	14
3.1 Description of the Data.....	14
3.2 Methods of Analysis	17
3.3 Limitations in Data and Analysis	18
4.0 THE ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS.....	21
4.1 Level of Education and Performance	21
4.2 Gender and Performance.	24
4.3 Political Party Affiliation and Performance.....	27
4.4 Electoral Terms Served/Experience and Performance	29
4.5 Geographical Location of the Constituency and Performance	30
4.6 Councillor Category and Performance.....	32
5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	35
5.1 Conclusion	35
5.2 Recommendations	36
REFERENCES	40
ANNEXES.....	43

List of Tables

Table 1: Powers Decentralised to Local Governments	3
Table 2: Variable Specification and Definition	15

List of Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework.....	8
Figure 2: The Kernel Density Estimate of Normality Tests	19
Figure 3: Further Tests for Normality of the Residuals	20
Figure 4: Education Level of Councillors and Performance	22
Figure 5: Gender of Councillor and Overall Performance.....	25
Figure 6: Political Party Affiliation of Councillors and Performance.....	28
Figure 7: Electoral Terms Served/Experience by Councillors and Performance ...	30
Figure 8: Geographical Location of Constituency and Performance.....	31
Figure 9: Overall Performance by Category of Councillor.....	32

Acknowledgment

ACODE extends gratitude to the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and contributing partners (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU)) for their generosity and support to the Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative (LGCSCI) from which this publication was generated. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the Hewlett Foundation, whose support of ACODE's Centre for Budget and Economic Governance (CBEG) enabled us to expand the geographical coverage of the LGCSCI interventions.

We would also like to appreciate the support from USAID and UKAID to this Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative (LGCSCI) under the Governance, Accountability, Participation, and Performance (GAPP) program that supported the project in 4 districts. ACODE is indebted to the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Local Government Finance Commission, the District Chairpersons, Speakers of Council, District Councils, Chief Administrative Officers, Resident District Commissioners, and the Clerks to Council for their continued support in the implementation of LGCSCI in all the 35 districts.

We appreciate the cooperation of the District Councillors that have been central in the implementation of the LGCSCI upon which this study was based. ACODE acknowledges the unreserved support of the Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA), a partner in the implementation of the LGCSCI. We also wish to acknowledge ACODE's network of district CSOs and researchers who are responsible for undertaking fieldwork in the 35 districts. We would like to acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha (PhD), Dr. Anthony Mugere (PhD), Dr. Sebastian Rwengabo (PhD), and Associate Professor Winstons Wilson Muhwezi who provided valuable feedback during the writing of this paper. We would finally like to acknowledge Mr. Robert Nsubuga for providing feedback during the drafting process, laying out and designing the final version of this research paper.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DCMs	Decentralisation Continuity Mechanisms
DLG	District Local Government
FY	Financial Year
ICT	Information Communication and Technology
ISER	Initiative for Social and Economic Rights
LC	Local Council
LGA	Local Governments Act
LGCSCI	Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative
LGs	Local Governments
LLG	Lower Local Governments
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MoLG	Ministry of Local Governments
NRA	National Resistance Army
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PPDA	Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
RC	Resistance Council
SDOH	Social Determinants of Health
UCE	Uganda Certificate of Education
UFA	Uganda Federal Alliance
ULGA	Uganda Local Governments' Association
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
VIFs	Variance of Inflation Factors
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

The decentralisation policy continues to be relevant for democratization and political participation in Uganda. Political leaders in the districts are at the centre of implementing the decentralisation policy through monitoring service delivery, accountability, lobbying, and passing ordinances and resolutions in Councils for the benefit of their constituencies. The extent to which elected local government leaders perform their roles is critical for the quality of social services delivered to citizens. This paper analyses how social determinants influence councillor role performance in the district local government in Uganda. In the analysis, social determinants are conceptualised as; the education level of councillors, political party affiliation, longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience, councillor category, gender, and geographical location of the constituency represented by a councillor. In the same analysis, councillors' roles were conceptualised to include; legislation, contact with electorate, participation in lower local governments, and monitoring service delivery. The overall objective of the analysis was to establish if there are any associations between social determinants conceptualised in this analysis and councillor role performance in Uganda. The specific objectives of the analysis were to;

- a. Explore the effect of level of education on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
- b. Explore the effect of gender on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
- c. Explore the effect of political party affiliation on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
- d. Explore the effect of longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
- e. Explore the effect of the geographical location of the constituency on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
- f. Explore the effect of councillor category on district councillor role performance in Uganda

The analysis was premised on four sets of data constituting all the districts covered by the LGCSCI assessments for financial years 2013/14; 2014/15; 2016/17; and 2018/19 that focus on the district Councillors. In the assessments, Councillors were assessed on their roles/mandate in Council which include; legislative roles, contact with the electorate, attendance of lower local government meetings as well as monitoring service delivery. Descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate Ordinary Least Square analyses

were adopted.

The analysis established that the level of education of Councillors is an essential factor in influencing the performance of district local government Councillors in Uganda. Educational attainment is seen to be positively and strongly associated with the overall performance of district Councillors. Specifically, the analysis shows that educational attainment is strong and positive in improving Councillors' performance in legislative role, participation in lower local government meetings, and monitoring service delivery. There are wide gender gaps in the performance of district Councillors; with male Councillors performing better than their female counterparts in overall performance, and specifically in their performance on legislation and monitoring service delivery.

The analysis further revealed that there is no association between Councillors' political party affiliation and overall performance or on any of the individual performance parameters. More so, the analysis shows that electoral terms served/experience is positively associated with the performance of the District Councillors, especially in the legislative role. The analysis, however, found no association between a councillor's longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience with performance on contact with the electorate, attending and participation in lower local government meetings, and monitoring service delivery. Regarding the location of the constituency, Councillors representing urban constituencies were more likely to contact their electorates than those representing the rural constituencies. The analysis also showed that Councillors representing groups on affirmative action were less likely to perform any better than their counterparts who were directly elected on overall performance.

In view of the findings from the analysis of how social determinants influence councillor role performance in local government in Uganda, the following recommendations are made:

- There is a need for the Ministry of Local Government to amend section 116 of the Local Governments Act to introduce the minimum education qualifications for elected political leaders in local governments.
- The Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) should design tailor-made capacity-building training interventions for elected women local government leaders.
- There is a need to rethink the application of affirmative action policies intended to boost the participation of women and special interest groups within local governments
- There is a need for the MoLG to enhance the functionality of multi-party politics in Local Governments.

- The MoLG should provide a circular for local governments to consider mileage-based logistical support for special interest group councillors to fulfil their mandate/roles.
- There is a need to prioritise orientation and continuous training for councillors on their roles and responsibilities.

This analysis has already established a strong relationship between certain social factors such as level of education, gender, and electoral terms served/experience and councillor role performance, especially in the overall performance. The analysis also revealed a weak relationship between social determinants such as political party affiliation, geographical local and councillors' category, and overall councillor role performance, although there was a noticeable relationship in performance of roles such as contact with electorates, participation in the lower local government and monitoring service delivery. The analysis has demonstrated that the effective functioning of local governments, and by extension, the success of the decentralisation policy is highly dependent on the ability of elected local government leaders to perform their roles.

1.0 Introduction

Uganda's decentralisation policy and programmes were designed to promote democratic governance, effective, responsive, and accountable local governments. From this perspective, decentralisation was for better services delivery and active citizen participation. It was also hoped that once decentralisation was undertaken by the government, the local population would own up to government programmes (ISER, 2018).

The decentralisation policy continues to be relevant in the democratization process and political participation. Political leaders including the District Chairpersons and Councillors under the decentralised government system in Uganda are meant to be the forerunners and mouthpieces for the citizens they represent. They are mandated to do this through monitoring service delivery, lobbying for transparency and accountability as well as passing ordinances and resolutions, and policies that benefit the citizens (Mushemeza, 2019). Therefore, the performance of local government leaders in executing their mandate/role is of great importance as representatives of the people. However, little has been explored on the key factors that influence the performance of district political leaders at the local government level in Uganda.

This analysis examined the social determinants that influence the performance of Councillors in their respective District Councils. It investigated how factors such as educational attainment, gender, electoral terms served/ experience, geographical location, category of a councillor, and political party affiliation are linked to the performance of the District Councillors. The analysis sought to provide empirical evidence to local government practitioners on some salient issues that have shaped the performance of political actors in the implementation of the decentralisation policy in Uganda. The paper draws heavily on data from the previous assessments conducted by ACODE in partnership with Uganda Local Governments Association under the Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative.

1.1 Decentralisation in Uganda

Many scholars, commentators, and writers define decentralisation differently. Some define it in terms of institutional governance systems, others in terms of the power of relations while others define it in terms of the reorganisation of authority. Decentralisation has been defined in terms of institutional strengthening as "the strengthening of local institutions to play a more representative, responsive and constructive role in the everyday lives of local populations and the countries in which they live" (Crook & Manor, 1998). On the other hand, (Mawhood, 2002) defines decentralisation in

terms of power relations and opines that it is “any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. The UNDP views decentralisation as the reorganisation of authority and suggests that it is “the restructuring or reorganisation of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels” (UNDP, 1999).

Decentralisation is also defined as empowerment and looks at it; “more as a process of empowering and improving sub-national governance systems which involve the transfer of three major powers -- fiscal, political, and administrative - by moving them from the central government through varying degrees and various institutional and implementing mechanisms (Yosuff, 2006). The literature further reveals that Fiscal decentralisation is how much central government cedes fiscal space to non-central government entities while administrative decentralisation refers to how much autonomy non-central government entities possess relative to central control. Finally, political decentralisation denotes the degree to which central governments allow non-central government entities to undertake political functions of governance, epitomised in representation (World Bank, 2019).

Decentralisation gained prominence across developing countries in the 1970s after the realization that centralized systems of national planning and administration were leaving out many people in the planning and decision-making process. In fact, by 1990 the World Bank had started to view decentralisation as a necessary part of the structural adjustment reforms to promote efficient use of resources and to address the local needs of developing countries (Roberts, 2018). Over the last two decades, Uganda has implemented the decentralisation policy with the main objectives of; empowering local people to participate in the governance process, the democratisation of state powers, and facilitating the modernization process (Mushemeza, 2019). The first attempt at decentralisation was seen in the enactment of the Resistance Council (RC) Statute 9, which gave powers to the Resistance Councils over areas under their jurisdiction. It was later enshrined in the Local Government Act 1997 (Bashaasha, Mangheni, & Ephraim, 2011).

In 1992, the Uganda government adopted the decentralisation policy and devolved most of the management functions to elected local councils, which were granted legal powers to determine their priorities, collect local revenue, draw strategic plans, spend according to the budget, and

evaluate their performance. The elected representatives were mandated to perform oversight functions over the local managers, to be trustees of the people in the provision of public goods and services, and to ensure that timely, efficient, and quality services were rendered to their constituents; to whom they were accountable (Makara, 2009). The Constitution (1995 as amended) and Local Governments Act, (1997 as amended) provided for a district to be a unit of decentralisation. These cardinal documents spelt out the functions devolved to local governments and the applicable funding mechanisms (Mushemeza, 2019). Sections 4 and 5 of the Local Governments Act 1997, CAP 243 (as amended) provide for the structure of local governments. Districts are recognized as higher Local Governments while Municipalities, Town Councils, Sub-counties, and Divisions in towns are lower local governments. As of April 2022, Uganda had 135 district councils, 41 municipal councils, and 10 regional cities.¹ Table 1 illustrates the devolved functions of different structures of local governments and administrative structures.

Table 1: Powers Decentralised to Local Governments

Powers	Explanation
Political Powers	Councils headed by politically elected leaders
Fiscal (Financial) Powers	Councils collect and appropriate resources in their budget
Administrative Powers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Geographically gazette administrative units Councils manage staff in their districts.
Planning Powers	The district is the planning authority of the district
Legislative powers	Councils make bye-laws or ordinances
Judicial powers	Executive committees at the village and parish also double as local council courts. Local council courts also exist at Sub-County/Town Council

Source: Mushemeza, 2019

The implementation of Uganda's decentralisation policy is hinged on 6 objectives namely: i) transfer real power to districts and thus reduce the load of work on remote and under-resourced central officials; ii) bring political and administrative control over services to a point where they are actually delivered, thereby improving accountability and effectiveness, promoting

¹ See Ministry of Local Government Website at: <https://molg.go.ug/>

people's feeling of ownership of programmes and projects executed in their districts; iii) free local managers from central constraints and, as a long-term goal, allow them develop organizational structures tailored to local circumstances; iv) improve financial accountability and responsibility by establishing a clear link between the payment of taxes and the provision of services they finance; v) improve the capacities of the councils to plan, finance and manage the delivery of services of their finance and manage the delivery of services of their constituencies; and vi) enhance local economic development in order to increase local incomes.

This analysis particularly focused on the second objective that aims at Bringing political and administrative control over services to the point where they are delivered, thereby improving accountability and effectiveness, and promoting people's feeling of 'ownership' of programmes and projects executed in their localities. A review of this objective reveals that it has been achieved to a moderate degree. It has been noted that this has attained mixed results, depending on how firm and "aggressive" the political leaders are (Mushemeza, 2019). Political and administrative control over services has been brought to the point where they are delivered through decentralised structures with decisions taken and implemented through the elected Local Government councils (ULGA, 2020). In terms of accountability, there is evidence of improvement in upward and downward accountability. Central level accountability entities (such as the Office of the Auditor General, the PPDA, and the Parliamentary Committee on Local Government) regularly follow up on accountability issues in Local governments while at the LG level, Internal Audit Units and Local Government Public Accounts Committees are largely instituted and functional (ULGA, 2020).

The above achievements notwithstanding, some gaps still exist. First, political accountability remains weak largely due to the failure to harness laid down mechanisms such as the barazas, the public noticeboards, and reports. Secondly, Local elected leaders rarely go back to their communities to explain what the LGs are doing and what they are supposed to do. This is usually attributed to limited financing for such activities hence leading to a growing disconnect and at times mistrust between the citizens and their leaders. Thirdly, ownership of government programmes has eroded over time following the thin attention paid to the participatory planning process. This is in addition to failure by the LGs to share adequate information about projects, launch the projects, and involve the community in the monitoring of implementation and commissioning of these projects; Fourth, citizen technical capacity and civic competence are low, which comprises their ability to play a significant role in their governance. Their capacity for following up on their interests to ensure accountable that their LGs are transparent and accountable is still low. Lastly, key service delivery units/

structures like water user committees, school management committees and health unit management committees are largely dysfunctional due to a lack of orientation on their roles and responsibilities – arising mainly from poor prioritization of these key Decentralisation Continuity Mechanisms (DCMs) (ULGA, 2020).

1.2 The Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative

The Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative (LGCSCI) is a social accountability and capacity-building tool for local government leaders implemented by ACODE and ULGA. LGCSCI's main objective is to strengthen and encourage the political accountability mechanisms between citizens and elected local government leaders. It is premised on the understanding that weak political accountability prevents citizens from receiving excellent public services (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020). The LGCSCI is premised on a theory of change that posits that conducting targeted governance research; building the capacity of existing local governance structures; advocacy at national and local levels, and constructing issue-based partnerships with central and local government actors regularly led to strengthened and responsive local governance systems. The action research and community engagement aspects are aimed at empowering citizens at the local level to demand good governance upward from their elected local government leaders to the national level. The capacity building and advocacy are meant to trigger responsiveness of the governance structures that include elected leaders and the technical teams at the local and national levels. Thus, the theory of change emphasises both the demand side and supply side of local governance (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2017). Under LGCSCI, key organs of the Local Government are assessed to ascertain the extent to which they deliver on their mandate/role to meet the local service demands of their electorates. The assessment tools, developed from the statutory roles/mandate of the Local Government organs, are used to assess the performance of the Council, Chairpersons, Speakers of Councils, and individual councillors. This analysis focuses on the performance of councillors' roles that include legislation, contact with the electorate, participation in lower local government, and monitoring service delivery.

1.3 Problem Statement

Over the 10 years of implementing the LGCSCI, the performance of the district councillors has been fluctuating due to social factors (conceptualised in this paper as social determinants). The social determinants that are cited as affecting performance include the level of education, gender, political party affiliation, longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience,

councillor category, and geographical location of the constituency. However, the extent to which these individual characteristics affect performance remains a grey area since the scorecard assessments have not devolved into a deeper cause and effect analysis. This study, therefore, undertakes an analysis of the effect of social determinants on the performance of district councillors focusing on data sets for scorecard assessment for financial years 2013/14; 2014/15; 2016/17, and 2018/19.

1.4 Objectives of the Analysis

The overall objective of this analysis is to establish if there are any associations between certain social determinants and the performance of district councillors in Uganda.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

Specifically, this analysis intends to:

1. To explore the effect of level of education on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
2. To explore the effect of gender on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
3. To explore the effect of political party affiliation on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
4. To explore the effect of longevity in council/electoral terms served/ experience on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
5. To explore the effect of the geographical location of the constituency on district councillor role performance in Uganda.
6. To explore the effect of the councillor category on district councillor role performance in Uganda.

1.5 Justification for the Analysis

The LGCSCI assessments have over the years observed improvements in the performance of District Councils, District Chairpersons, Speakers of Council, and individual Councillors. Initially viewed with suspicion by most local leaders, the Initiative increasingly gained traction and acceptance and is now appreciated by elected leaders in the districts. As a result, ACODE has received numerous requests to introduce the Scorecard in other districts to boost their performance (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020).

Therefore, using the experience and data from LGCSCI, this analysis sought to investigate selected social factors (social determinants) associated with the performance of political leaders in the Local Governments of Uganda


with a focus on district Councillors. Social factors considered include; level of education, political party affiliation, number of terms served, category of Councillors, gender, and geographical location of the constituency served. ACODE while implementing LGCSCI for several years, has been publishing the performance of the Local Government Councils and their respective political leaders. The observed progressive improvement in performance has been heavily attributed to capacity development which is given during the induction of district Councillors and civic engagements of citizens. During these series of assessments, it has consistently been observed that the performance of leaders tends to vary from one political leader to another within the district and across all the 35 districts where the initiative is being implemented. Much as the LGCSCI has contributed to the observed performance of the local government leaders, there has been little empirical evidence that explores the influence of other external factors (other than capacity building and citizen engagement) on the performance of these leaders. Specifically, the association between individual-specific social factors (individual characteristics) and the performance of the district councillors had not yet been widely studied and explored.

These factors are critical in driving the policy direction of how local councils run the business of local governments in Uganda. It is on this premise that the Ministry of Local Government introduced a Bill that intended to amend Section 116 of the Local Governments Act in 2019 to introduce a minimum requirement of formal academic qualification for Mayors of Cities, Municipalities, Divisions, and Town Councils. Parliament noted that leaders carry out a supervisory role on highly qualified technocrats which makes it difficult for them to understand most of the information being transmitted from the central government. Unfortunately, this Bill was not assented to by the President on account that it would alienate potential leaders. Much as this Bill did not succeed, there is still a need for more evidence to inform policy-making in this area. Therefore, a deeper analysis on the level of education of district Councillors as well as other social factors influence their performance forms the thrust of this paper.

2.0 Conceptual Framework

This analysis hypothesises that a set of social factors influence the performance of councillors as illustrated in figure 1. The social factors are conceptualised as social determinants (box 1) and include gender, education, geographical location/residence pattern of the constituency, political party affiliation, electoral terms served/experience, and category of councillor. Local council leaders' functional mandate/roles in box 2 include the legislative role, contact with the electorate, participation in lower local governments, and monitoring service delivery. The interaction between the social determinants and councillor mandate/role influences the scores of the political leaders which is conceptualised as councillor performance in box 3. Figure 1 illustrates our hypotheses for the linkage between social determinants as the independent variable and the performance of District Councillors in Uganda as the dependent variable.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



The concept of social determinants is commonly used in health and quality of life research write-ups.² The Social Determinants of Health (SDOH)

2 WHO (2010). A conceptual framework for action on the social determinants of health: Social Determinants of Health Discussion Paper 2, Debates, Policy & Practice, Case Studies. World Health Organization, Geneva 2010. https://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/ConceptualframeworkforactiononSDH_eng.pdf

that have a major impact on people's health, well-being, and quality of life include: i) safe housing, transportation, and neighbourhoods; ii) racism, discrimination, and violence; iii) education, job opportunities, and income; iv) access to nutritious foods and physical activity opportunities; v) polluted air and water, and vi) language and literacy skills. This concept, therefore, tends to focus on social factors that are associated with health outcomes and quality of health. This paper borrows a leaf from the 'determinants of health' perspective to conceptualize some social determinants that include socio-demographic characteristics which are associated with the observed performance outcomes of district councillors in Uganda. In this paper they are conceptualised as factors or characteristics that have a bearing on the performance of councillors' roles. A wide range of literature has explored the association of various factors with the performance of political leaders. In Uganda's political context the qualification for one to be elected as a district or city councillor is being a citizen and a registered voter. The implication herein is several factors influence the ability of these elected councillors to perform their constitutionally mandated roles. For purposes of this paper, these factors include; education level, political party affiliation, longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience, councillor category, gender, and geographical location of the constituency represented by a councillor.

- **Education level** means the formal education qualification attained by the councillor (in the context of Uganda's education system and the data analysed) and these include; Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, and University education. Education in every sense is one of the fundamental factors of development. It enriches people's understanding of themselves and the world, improves the quality of their lives, leads to broad social benefits to individuals, and society (Ilhan, 2001). Furthermore, the planning documents such as capacity building plans, revenue enhancement plans, annual work plans, and District budgets are prepared and written in the technical language by the technical staff. Being the highest decision-making organ in a district, the district council makes critical resolutions regarding the provision of public services prescribed in Part 2 of the Second Schedule of the LGA. The Local Governments Act (1997 as amended) and the Electoral Commission Act (1997 as amended) regulate the conduct of elections and provide the requirements for those aspiring to ascend to political offices at both national and local levels. Some of the salient features of the eligibility of potential candidates for electoral offices include; the age, nationality, and educational level of the aspiring candidates. For instance, candidates aspiring to occupy political offices both at national and local levels are required to have attained the age of eighteen years. Meanwhile, Section 12(2) of the Local Governments Act (1997 as

amended) requires that for a person to qualify as a district chairperson, that person must; a) be qualified to be a Member of Parliament, and b) be ordinarily a resident of the district among others. Whereas there is a requirement for a minimum education qualification for a person aspiring to be a Member of Parliament and Local Government Chairperson, there is no such requirement for those aspiring to be Councillors and Chairpersons of lower local governments. Therefore, this analysis is intended to establish whether there is a significant relationship between the level of education and the performance of elected leaders. The analysis explores with empiricism the association of some of these factors with the performance of district councillors in their roles within the council, their constituencies as well as on overall performance.

- **Political party affiliation** means the state of belonging to or endorsing any political party. This paper focuses on the registered political parties to which the elected councillors subscribe. Political parties have safely become an indispensable determinant of the nature of political interaction in most countries of the world (Kakuba, 2010). They have been recognised variably by different scholars and governance practitioners as being critical for democracy. Norm Kelly and Sefakor Ashiagbor (2011) for example noted that political parties provide a structure for political participation but also act as a vanguard for political leaders. Political parties are vital political institutions for the functioning of modern democracy. They are essential for the organisation of the modern democratic polity and are crucial for the expression and manifestation of political pluralism. Political parties play a critical role in the democratisation process of any country. They mobilize their supporters to take up leadership roles. Political parties are further viewed as platforms for providing alternative policy platforms, ideological direction, and redefining the agenda of government. Therefore, in Uganda, political parties influence political processes or sponsor a political agenda. They sponsor or offer a platform to candidates for election to political offices or to participate in governance at any level (Makara, 2009). In a liberal democracy, political parties perform the function of integrating individuals and groups in society into the political system (Republic of Uganda, 2005).
- **Electoral terms served/experience** focuses on the number of terms served by a councillor. In Uganda's context councillors are elected for a 5-year term of office. As provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda political leaders are supposed to hold office for five years before they are subjected to another election. There is, however, no limit to the number of five-year terms that an individual

can serve (Republic of Uganda, 1995). There is very scanty literature on the relationship between longevity in council/ electoral terms served and performance. Indeed, some scholars have noted that long terms of service are detrimental. For instance, Fredrik Bynander and Paul't Hart noted that; "regardless of how good or powerful a leader may be, they all have limited "sell by" date. They get out of tune with times and are anaesthetised by their power" (Fredrik & Paul't, 2006). This implies that every elected leader reaches such a time when they can longer be appealing to their electorate.

- **Councillor category** means the constituency the councillor was elected to represent in council. Section 10 of the Local Governments Act, Cap. 243 (as amended) provides for directly elected councillors and affirmative actions for the representation of marginalised groups like youth, women, workers' representatives, older persons, and persons with disabilities. The adequacy of both the legal, institutional, and policy provisions for affirmative action in Uganda has been questioned by various practitioners particularly on representation for the women and youth at the local council level. Furthermore, while the affirmative action for the Women, Youth, Persons with Disabilities, Workers and Older Persons was and is still considered very innovative and inclusive, it has been noted that this scheme has remained seen as tokenism (ULGA, 2020).
- **Gender** in this paper is narrowed down to mean being either male or female. Concerning gender as a determinant of performance, women are more likely to implement policies and invest in public interventions linked to women's and households' concerns (Braga & Scervini, 2017). However, there are reported gender gaps in the performance of political leaders. Women political leaders perform better in independent roles like contacts with electorates while men perform better in more collaborative roles like discussions in the plenary and committees which require collaboration with other politicians. Indeed, the biggest gender gaps existed in roles that required the most form of collaboration with other politicians (Garcia-Hernandez, Grossman, & Michelitch, 2018).
- **The geographical location** in this analysis refers to the location of the electoral area represented by the councillor. These are categorised into urban and rural constituencies. Concerning the category or nature of the constituency and performance, they are prescribed under Section 10 of the Local Governments Act which states that; district councils shall consist of—(a) the district chairperson, elected under Part X of this Act; (b) one councillor directly elected to represent an electoral area of a district; (c) two councillors, one of whom shall be a female

youth, representing the youths in the district; (d) two councillors with disabilities, one of whom shall be a female, representing persons with disabilities; and (e) women councillors forming one-third of the council such that the councillors elected under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall form two-thirds of the council (Republic of Uganda, 1997). However, there is very scanty if no literature on the relationship between the geographical location of these constituencies and the performance of councillors elected to represent the constituencies.

- **Councillor roles/mandate** means the parameters assessed in the local government council scorecard and derived from a councillor's statutory duties prescribed in the Third Schedule (Regulation 8) of the Local Governments Act, Cap 243 amended. These duties include; legislation, contact with electorates, participation in lower local government, and monitoring service delivery.
- **Legislative role** constitutes of representation of electorate in council; participation in discussions in council and standing committees of council; discussion of service delivery issues in their constituency; and providing special skills/knowledge to the Council or committees.
- **Contact with electorates entails** a councillor organising community meetings to provide and solicit feedback from the electorate, organising electorate to demand better services, and having a coordinating office or coordinating centre in their constituency.
- **Participation in lower local governments** involves attendance of council meetings at the Sub-County/Town Council/Division represented by the councillor, providing official information to the Sub-County/Town Council/Division, and forwarding to the district issues raised from the Sub-County/Town Council/Division.
- **Monitoring Service Delivery** includes conducting monitoring of devolved services such as primary education, health care, agriculture, environment, and natural resources, functional adult literacy, water and sanitation, and road works. It also includes preparing monitoring reports for respective standing committees of the council and following up to cause the necessary changes in service delivery (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020).
- **Councillor performance** is conceptualised as the score measuring the extent to which a councillor fulfilled their mandated roles (legislation, contact with the electorate, participation in lower local governments, and monitoring service delivery). Under the scorecard methodology, Scores are attached to the tasks undertaken by the councillors along with five parameters of legislative role, contact with the electorate,

participation in LLG, and monitoring service delivery. The scores in this analysis are allocated with different weights for these functions to constitute performance on each domain which totals up to 100 per cent. Refer to the District Councillor scorecard in the annexe.

3.0 Methodology

This section presents the methodology and procedures that were used in the analysis.

3.1 Description of the Data

3.1.1 Scorecard Data

This analysis used secondary data from the Local Government Councils Scorecard Initiative. Four sets of data constituting all the districts covered by the programme from the years of the scorecard assessment for the financial years 2013/14³; 2014/15⁴; 2016/17⁵ and 2018/19⁶ are used. The paper focuses on these four years because they have homogeneous data sets that are easily comparable. Analysis in this paper specifically focuses on the district councillors. The detailed design of the Local Government Councils Scorecard Assessment is elaborated in (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020). This scorecard assessment design expounds on the performance of councillors based on their statutory roles/mandate and functions as stipulated in the Constitution (1995 as amended), the Local Governments Act (1997 as amended), and the Standard Rules of Procedure (2019), and other statutory instruments. These roles are categorised into parameters and indicators that include legislation (representation in council, participation in council debates, discussion on service delivery issues); contact with the electorate; attending council meetings at the lower local government level and monitoring service delivery in their constituency. Scores are attached to each indicator and these are weighted to add up to 100 points. The scores are generally based on the importance attached to a particular responsibility or function. The weighting is tested and validated through a series of focus group meetings organised during the scorecard development process. Every indicator is assigned an absolute score that is awarded using a threshold to create a cumulative total of 100 points for the overall performance (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020).

3.1.2 Variable Specification and Measurement

For purposes of our analysis, the choice of variables was based on literature and the data that was collected during the scorecard assessment.

- a. **The dependent variable** is the overall performance resulting from performance in the legislative role, contact with the electorate,

3 See <http://www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/PRS64.pdf>

4 See <http://www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/PRS70.pdf>

5 See <http://www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/PRS83.pdf>

6 See <https://www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/PRSg6.pdf>

participation in the lower local government meetings, and monitoring service delivery.

- **Performance of the Councillor on the legislative role.** The councillors were scored based on their ability to attend the council, participate in the council debates, and deliberate on service delivery issues relating to their constituencies.
 - **Performance of the Councillor on contact with the electorate.** This relates to the councillors' ability to regularly follow their schedule of meetings with the electorate and ability to report feedback from those meetings and have a common address where the electorate can find them.
 - **Performance of the Councillor on participation in Lower Local Government Council meetings.** This relates to the attendance of council meetings at the sub-county and town councils. The councillors are expected to provide feedback in these councils from the district and vice-versa.
 - **Performance of the Councillor on monitoring service delivery.** This assesses the councillors' ability to monitor, write reports, follow-up on identified issues, and cause changes in the areas of health, education, agriculture, water, roads, functional adult literacy, and environment and natural resources.
 - **Overall Performance of the Councillor.** Overall councillor performance is the cumulative performance of councillors in the areas of legislation in council, contact with the electorate, attending council meetings at the lower local government level, and monitoring service delivery across the various sectors health, education, agriculture, water, roads, functional adult literacy, and environment and natural resources.
- b. **The independent variables** include councillors' category, geographical location of the constituency, political party affiliation, level of education of the councillor, gender of the councillor, and longevity in council/ electoral terms served in council by the councillor.

Table 2: Variable Specification and Definition

Data Name	Variable name	Measure	Specification
Dependent Variables			
Overall performance	Overall Performance of the Councillor	Continuous variable	-

Data Name	Variable name	Measure	Specification
Legislation	Performance of councillor on legislative role in the council	Continuous variable	-
Contact with electorate	Performance of councillor on the role of contact with the electorate	Continuous variable	-
Lower Local Government	Performance of councillor on participating in the lower local government meetings	Continuous variable	-
Monitoring Service Delivery	Performance of councillor on monitoring service delivery and causing a change in selected sectors	Continuous variable	-
Independent Variables			
Councillor Category	Different types of representatives in council as defined by the LG Act 1997(as amended)	Categorical Variable	Coded as: 1=Directly elected 2=Women 3=Older Persons 4=PWDs 5=Youth 6=Workers
Geographical Location	The geographical location of the electoral constituency of the councillor	Binary	Coded as: 1=Rural 2=Urban
Political Party	Political party affiliation of the Councillor	Binary	Coded as: 1=Independent 2=Affiliated with a Political Party
Education	Level of education of the Councillor	Categorical	Coded as: 1=Primary 2=Secondary 3=Tertiary 4=University and above
Gender	Gender of the Councillor	Binary	Coded as: 1=Male 2=Female
Termsq (Electoral Terms Served/ Experience)	Number of electoral terms served in council by the councillor	Continuous and squared to capture the cumulative effect of the terms served in the council	

3.2 Methods of Analysis

To address the objectives underlying this analysis, 4 data sets were combined to explore the cumulative association of the selected factors with the performance of the local government political leaders. These spanned from the FY2013/2014 assessment to the FY2018/19 assessment. This period was considered for this analysis because the data sets were relatively homogeneous and easily comparable. This implies that some of the councillors who participated in all four LGCSCI assessments are included in this combined analysis, which made us analyse the data as cross-section survey data. Therefore, the information on councillors who participated in the local government councils throughout that period was considered for analysis.

3.2.1 Descriptive Analysis

Information on the performance, gender, political party affiliation, geographical location of the constituencies, the education levels of the participants, and the category of the Councillor was used in the analysis. Since most of the participants varied across the assessment years, data was merged as a single cross-section data set because panel or pseudo-panel analysis would not easily be matched and balanced. Descriptive statistics were conducted through cross-tabulations to understand preliminarily the underlying relationship between performance and the selected factors as mentioned above.

3.2.2 Regression Analysis and Ordinary Least Square

Using simple Robust Ordinary Least Squares (Adedia, 2016)⁷, multivariable regression analysis was undertaken to estimate the relationship between the selected co-founders and the performance of the District Local Government Councillors. Further analysis to test for significant differences between the mean values was undertaken to avoid bias in the reported results involving two outcomes. The multivariable econometric model developed by the authors of this analysis for councillors that was estimated across the parameters took the form of:

$$(\text{Performance}_i) = (\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Councillors' Category}_i + \beta_2 \text{Geographical Location}_i + \beta_3 \text{Political Party}_i + \beta_4 \text{Educ}_i + \beta_5 \text{Termssq} + \beta_6 \text{Gender}_i + \epsilon_i$$

Where, **performance** is a continuous dependent variable that consists of the **overall scores of councillors, scores on legislation, scores on contact**

⁷ This model was preferred because of its ability to handle the analysis of data with selection biases with regard to participants and variables of interest. Given the gaps highlighted across the datasets, it was unlikely for the authors to adopt the panel analysis. The analysis using the robust OLS model took care of the core assumptions of the model.

with the electorate, scores on participating in the lower local government meetings, and scores on monitoring service delivery. The independent variables (social determinants) include the **category of the councillors, geographical location of the constituency, political party affiliation, education levels of councillors, electoral terms served/ experience, and the gender of the councillor.**


3.3 Limitations in Data and Analysis

This analysis explores the relationship between social determinants and councillor role performance. The analysis limited itself to only those factors which were readily available in the data sets. Factors such as age, the wealth of political leaders, and many other socio-demographics were not captured. Also, whereas the LGCSCI had existed more than a decade, datasets used for this paper's analysis were only four due to improvements that the initiative had undergone over the time of its implementation. This necessitated alteration in the weights of the performance indicators and thus could not ensure homogeneity in terms of estimates. Furthermore, given that political leaders are elected every after five years, several political leaders were not voted back. This implies that whereas four datasets were used, it was impossible to use a panel or pseudo panel analysis in light of insufficient number of observations at the point of setting data for panel analysis because data could not be balanced. Another limitation was the missing values for some key variables where the number of observations tended to be small thus affecting the regression analysis. The conceptualisation of the analysis was based on already existing datasets whose coverage in terms of social determinants was limited. Therefore, this implied a limitation in the scope of this analysis. Also, a simplistic analysis model was adopted when the data set was combined on a cumulative basis to consider cross-sectional survey data.

To address the above limitations, a simple OLS model was used in data analysis cognisant of its underlying assumptions. To test for any possible presence of multicollinearity, the association between the dependent and explanatory variables was examined preliminarily, to checkout for bivariate correlations. The Spearman correlation coefficients revealed no bivariate correlation coefficient that was above 0.7 across all the explanatory variables that enter this model. Therefore, it was likely that the multicollinearity problem would lead to biased coefficients for these variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Further, the test for the presence of multicollinearity by computing the Variance of Inflation Factors (VIFs) for each of the explanatory variables is also conducted (Hair et al, 2006). The largest VIF is 7.38 which is far below the threshold of 10. Similarly, the analysis tested for the normal distribution of the error terms. Much as there


were some deviations from the mean levels, the deviation is not too wide as reflected in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The Kernel Density Estimate of Normality Tests



When another normality test is carried out, there are no observed deviations from the mean levels and thus the model is unlikely to lead to biased results as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Further Tests for Normality of the Residuals



The test for the model specification revealed that the model is well specified. This is reflected in the fact that there is an observed significant “hat” at 0.06, and that hatsqr is not significant and this leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. While testing for the missing variable, the result was negative since the probability is not significant at 95 per cent.

4.0 The Analysis of Findings and Discussions

This section is a presentation and discussion of the findings. The social determinants as conceptualised in this paper including councillors' education, gender, political party affiliation, electoral terms served/ experience, geographical location of constituency, and councillors' category are analysed in relation to their performance in legislation, contact with electorate, participation in the lower local government and monitoring service delivery. The data used in the analysis of this paper is drawn from the Local Government Council Scorecard Assessments conducted in Financial Years 2013/14; 2014/15; 2016/17 and 2018/19.

Cumulatively across the years of analysis, a total count of 2,880 observations were considered. The delineation of the data with regard to the social determinants is as follows: In terms of gender, 56 per cent were male while 44 per cent were female; political party affiliation data revealed 90 per cent of councillors are affiliated with a political party while 10 per cent are independent (that means they do not belong to any political party); location of constituency reveals 78 and 22 per cent representation for rural-based and urban-based constituencies respectively. Concerning longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience, 68 per cent of the councillors were serving their first term, 21 per cent serving for the second term while 7 per cent were serving either for the third or the fourth term. The data also presents 87 per cent of the councillors as being (directly elected) represented one sub-county in the district council compared to 13 per cent who represent two or more constituencies. The councillors who represented more than one Sub- County were women. Also, the summary of the data revealed that on average, councillors scored 46 per cent and 5 per cent of them scored in the range of 0-25 per cent while 9 per cent scored in the range of 76-100 per cent.

4.1 Level of Education and Performance


Education is one of the fundamental factors of human capital development. It enriches people's understanding of themselves, the world improves the quality of their lives, and leads to broad social benefits to individuals and society (Ilhan, 2001). Currently, to be elected as a district or city councillor in Uganda, one does not require any academic qualification.⁸ Yet, as members of the councils, they play a critical role in the planning and budgeting process. These processes entail scrutiny and approval of district planning

8 See Section 116, LGA CAP 243 (1997).

documents such as the District Development Plans, Capacity Building Plans, Revenue Mobilisation Plans, District Annual Work plans, and Budgets⁹ among others. Furthermore, the planning documents in districts are still prepared and written in English where most of the members of the council have limited proficiency. Being the highest decision-making organ in a district, the council makes fundamental decisions on the provision of public services. Therefore, this analysis was intended to establish whether there was a significant relationship between the education level and the performance of elected leaders.

Descriptive statistics revealed that councillors who had attained higher education levels tended to perform slightly better than their counterparts with low levels of education. The data revealed that 32 per cent of councillors whose highest level of education was primary school attainment scored in the lowest range of overall performance (0-25 per cent), and only 19 of their counterparts with university education scored in this range. Whereas none of the councillors whose highest level of education was primary scored in the highest range of (75-100 per cent) of the overall performance, 13 per cent of their counterparts with university education and above managed to score in this range. These preliminary statistics reveal that the education level of the district councillors is somehow critical in determining their performance that is; as the councillor's education level improves, it results into better performance in council. Further details are presented in figure 4.

Figure 4: Education Level of Councillors and Performance



Further, the relation between the level of education and performance of

⁹ See Section 35, 77, and 82 of the Local Governments Act CAP 243 (1997).

a district councillor was estimated by conducting a regression analysis. Conducting a bivariate regression analysis revealed that there was a strong association between education and the overall performance of the district councillor at 95 per cent confidence levels. Councillors with Tertiary education ($p=0.009$) and those with university education ($p=0.013$) proved to be strongly associated with better overall performance. When a bivariate regression analysis was conducted to estimate the association between education and performance on legislation, it was observed that at 95 per cent confidence levels ($p=0.011$), councillors with a bachelors' degree were 11.3 per cent more likely to perform better on legislation as compared to those whose level of education was primary school level. However, there was no observed association between education and the performance of councillors in contact with the electorate. The data revealed that education was strongly associated with councillors' participation in lower local government council meetings. Also, councillors whose level of education was of a tertiary and university level were more likely to perform better than those whose level of education was primary by 4 per cent respectively on monitoring service delivery. This implied that councillors holding Secondary, Tertiary and University education levels were more likely to perform better in attending and participating in lower local government meetings respectively by 1 per cent than their counterparts whose highest level of education was primary school attainment.

A multivariable regression analysis revealed that overall, whereas education tended to be overridden by other factors, education remained strongly associated with the performance of the district councillors at a 90 per cent confidence level ($p=0.076$). A councillor with at least a tertiary level of education was 5.6 per cent more likely to perform better overall compared to his counterpart whose highest level of education was primary school level. This implied that whereas education is critical in impacting the councillors' knowledge and articulation of policy issues, having tertiary education had proven to be sufficient enough to enable them to execute their mandate ably. Further analysis considering individual performance parameters established that controlling for other factors, councillors whose highest level of education was tertiary were 1.3 per cent more likely to perform better regarding participation in lower local government meetings as compared to their counterparts whose highest level of education was primary. This is significant at 95 per cent with a p -value of 0.028. These findings are consistent with those of (Nicholas & Naomi, 2015) who found that leaders with more formal education produce better outcomes in some aspects of leadership. The authors noted that more educated leaders might be better at moving proposals through the legislative processes and that they are more adept at policy processes and consequently spurring

development.¹⁰ Similarly, Besley et al, found that highly educated leaders are better citizens and are more likely to act for the benefit of the public interest (Besley, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2011).

Thus, the above established a strong relationship between education and the performance of elected leaders. The results have shown that at least, a tertiary level (Diploma) is sufficient enough for the councillors to ably execute their mandate in local councils.

4.2 Gender and Performance.

Gender is a social and cultural construct, which distinguishes differences in the attributes of men and women, girls and boys, and accordingly refers to the roles and responsibilities of men and women (UNICEF, 2017). These differences in attributes of men and women have been found to influence the participation of men and women in social aspects of life such as politics. Coffe and Bolzendah have noted that women are more likely to participate in voting, signing petitions, and boycotting products while men are more likely to become party members and take up leadership positions than women (Coffe & Bolzendah, 2010).


There are four major reasons that account for the differences in performance between men and women. First, when broad societal gender inequalities exist, they could be reflected in politicians' background qualifications (e.g., education, wealth, experience). Differential qualifications by gender, on average, could translate to gaps in politician performance (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2010). Second, electoral institutions designating different pathways to political office for men and women might be consequential by attracting male and female politicians with different characteristics to run for office or by changing their incentives once elected (Anzia & Berry, 2011). Affirmative action policies, in particular, may contribute to gender gaps in performance if they result in an elected class of women politicians that is, on average, less qualified than male politicians (Henenderez et al, 2018). Third, gender-based differences in partisanship and constituency competitiveness may affect relative performance. In many low-income countries, where parties tend to be non-programmatic, women politicians are disproportionately concentrated among the ranks of dominant ruling parties, which are advantaged in resources to groom women in a party women's wing (Hogg, 2009). Fourth, while in office, women may be marginalized by political networks due to gender bias, stigmatization, and tokenism (Tamale, 1999) yet politicians must work collaboratively to design and pass legislation (Henenderez et al, 2018). Because of the patriarchal notion that men belong in the public sphere and women in the private sphere

10 See (Nicholas & Noam, 2015). What Good Is a College Degree? Education and Leader Quality Reconsidered, 2015.

(Tamale, 1999) relates that “the biggest obstacle for women’s legislative performance lies in the men’s club character of parliament, which often treats women as intruders.” Men’s contributions may not be based on their substance, but they are perceived as inherently legitimate while women’s contributions are perceived as inherently fallible (Ahikire, 2003).

As earlier pointed out, male councillors constitute a slightly higher number compared to women. This points to male dominance in local government councils even when 30 per cent of the seats in local government are reserved for “women council representatives” and with leverage to compete favourably with males in the rest of the constituencies. In terms of performance, there is a lot of evidence in the literature that male political leaders perform better than their female counterparts. In the Local Government Council assessment for FY 2018/2019, it was reported that; “on average, male councillors performed better than their female counterparts” (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020). The descriptive results show that male councillors are likely to perform much better than their female counterparts. Observing the extreme margins of the performance scale, it is revealed that 21 per cent of women councillors scored in the range of 0 - 25 per cent compared to only 17 per cent of their male counterparts. Similarly, only 6 per cent of women councillors scored in the range of 76 per cent and above compared to 11 per cent registered by their male counterparts as shown in figure 5.

Figure 5: Gender of Councillor and Overall Performance



The regression analysis controlling for other factors shows that being a male councillor is strongly and positively associated with good performance ($p=0.000$) at 95 per cent confidence levels. The difference in overall

performance between male and female councillors is found to be statistically significant when subjected to a t-test ($p=0.000$). Considering overall performance, regression results show that male councillors are 5.14 per cent more likely to perform better than female councillors. This is consistent with the findings of Tamale and Ahikire, which revealed that factors such as high societal gender inequality tend to show gender gaps disfavoring women politicians in terms of the overall performance compared to their male counterparts (Tamale, 1999; Ahikire, 2003)

Considering specific performance parameters, consistent male dominance over females is observed. Controlling for other factors, the analysis revealed that male councillors were 1.64 per cent, 2.46 per cent more likely to perform better in the legislative role and monitoring service delivery respectively. The results also showed that at 90 per cent, gender is strongly associated with contact with the electorate ($p=0.079$) and participation in lower local government council meetings at 90 per cent confidence levels ($p=0.09$). The male councillors were more likely to perform better than their female counterparts by 0.7 per cent and 0.5 per cent on contact with the electorate and participating in LLG council meetings respectively. (See more details in Annex, Table 3). These findings are consistent with those of Ana Garcia, Guy Grossman, and Kristin Michelitch (2018) who found gender differences in the performance of political leaders. They reported that women political leaders perform better in independent roles like contacts with electorates while men perform better in more collaborative roles like plenary and committee that require collaboration with other politicians. Indeed, as they reported, the biggest gender gaps exist in roles that require the most form of collaboration with other politicians. However, these did not consider the different circumstances and gender dynamics that the political leaders have to contend with as a result of their gender.

The gender disparities in performance can partly be explained by the fact that despite the presence of women as elected leaders in local government councils, several factors affect their effectiveness, and these included:

- a. The majority of the women elected on affirmative action have more than one sub-county that they represent. This affects their effectiveness given that they are not well facilitated (Bainomugisha, A., et al, 2020).
- b. Illiteracy levels among women in Uganda are higher than those of men. Illiteracy affects the confidence of women and ultimately their electorate because they shy away from speaking in council (Aritua, 2021).

The analysis revealed that overall, male councillors are more likely to perform better than their female counterparts. The results further demonstrated that gender is strongly associated with performance across all the performance

parameters for councillors. This analysis suggests the need to identify the specific challenges for women leaders at the local government level and provide tailor-made solutions for closing the performance gaps associated with gender.

4.3 Political Party Affiliation and Performance


Political parties are vital political institutions for the functioning of modern democracy. They are essential for the Organisation of the modern democratic polity and are crucial for the expression and manifestation of political pluralism. The central role played by political parties in the democratisation process can not be underestimated. They are mobilisation platforms for leaders who want to assume leadership roles, provide alternative policies, and have been credited for redefining government agenda among other functions (Makara, 2009). Similarly, political parties are essential for accountability and oversight, operate as vehicles for articulation and aggregation of diverse social interests, and influence government agenda, policies, and public actions; causing governments to act more transparently and accountable by proposing alternative policy agendas (Otile, 2021).

According to the Political Parties and Organisations Act, 2005 (Amended), a political party is defined as “a political organisation the objects of which include the influencing of the political process or sponsoring a political agenda, whether or not it also seeks to sponsor or offer a platform to a candidate for election to a political office or to participate in the governance of Uganda at any level.” In a liberal democracy, political parties perform the function of integrating individuals and groups in society into the political system (Demir, 2000).

For purposes of this analysis of political party affiliation, Councillors were grouped into two categories: Those affiliated to political parties and the Independents (those who do not belong to any political party). As earlier reported in the summary statistics section, Uganda’s local governments have already embraced multiparty dispensation. Following the descriptive bivariate analysis, statistics revealed no significant difference in the overall performance of the councillors by affiliation to a political party. From Figure 6, it is observed that whereas 17 per cent of the independent councillors scored the lowest range (0-25 per cent) from the overall performance, 19 per cent of those attached to a political party scored in this range. Similarly, considering the highest score range (75-100 per cent), we observe that 9 per cent of councillors from each category (Independents and those attached to political parties) scored in this range, hence confirming that there is no significant difference. These observations, therefore, attest to the fact that being attached to a political party did not seem to have

much implication or impact on the individual performance of the elected councillors in district councils.

Figure 6: Political Party Affiliation of Councillors and Performance



Further, a regression analysis of the association of the political party affiliation with elected political leaders' performance was conducted. First, the variable of the political party is regressed against performance to establish whether there is any direct relationship. Independent councillors were made the base and thus a bivariate model of councillors belonging to a political party was run against the performance of the independents.

The findings reveal that there was not any statistical association between belonging to any political party with the overall performance at the 95 per cent confidence level ($p=0.96$). The variable for political party affiliation was further controlled for other social determinants to try and establish whether when combined with other social determinants, there will be any significant impact on the performance of the district councillors. The results established that there was no association between political party affiliations with the performance of the district councillors. This is consistent across other functional parameters assessed. This implies that the performance of the district councillors is in no way being influenced by affiliation to any political party. It also points to a weak multi-party system at the local government level. The question this analysis poses is whether political parties are functional and relevant in the businesses of the district local governments. Ssemakula (2021)¹¹ delves into the functionality of multipartyism in local governments and concludes that

¹¹ See https://www.acode-u.org/vol/article/issue3_A3.pdf

the interaction between political parties and the day-to-day operations of local governments and local administrative units is largely non-existent. He argues that despite local government councils being modelled on the national parliament, the structure and practices – leader of opposition and leadership of accountability committees – that facilitate the functionality of multipartyism at the national level is non-existent at the local government council level.


4.4 Electoral Terms Served/Experience and Performance

This relates to the number of electoral terms that a councillor has spent in council and their performance. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, political leaders are supposed to hold office for five years before they are subjected to another election. There is, however no limit to the number of five-year terms that an individual can serve (Republic of Uganda, 1995). There is very scanty literature on the relationship between longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience and their performance. Indeed, most scholars have noted that long terms of service are detrimental. Fredrik Bynander and Paul't Hart for instance noted that; “regardless of how good or powerful a leader may be; they all have limited “sell by” date. They get out of tune with times and anaesthetised by their power” (Fredrik & Paul't, 2006). Bainomugisha A., et. al. (2020) on the other hand found that the more terms leaders serve, the better the performance. In the findings of the scorecard assessment, it was noted that; “councillors who had served five or more electoral terms in council, performed better than those in any of the other categories with an average score of 55 points.”

Performance can be enhanced through training, orientation and sensitization in a general sense but also through targeted technical assistance (MoLG, 2013). It is the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government to orient and induct newly elected members of councils. However, this has not been the case in recent years as most councils were not inducted into their roles and duties thus affecting their performance. A close look at the relationship between performance and the number of electoral terms served shows a positive relationship. It was observed from the descriptive statistics that councillors who are serving their first term perform slightly lower compared to those serving their second or more terms in council. In particular, 20 per cent of the councillors who were serving their first term in council scored in the range of 0-25 per cent, which percentage is highest compared to the other categories. Similarly, 8 per cent of the councillors serving their first term in office managed to score 76 per cent and above, the same as those serving their second term and not as much for those serving a third term (17 per cent), and those serving a fourth term (11 per cent) respectively as

shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Electoral Terms Served/Experience by Councillors and Performance




The regression analysis reveals that considering terms served in council, the more the number of terms served, the more the likelihood for better performance in the legislative role. The results reveal that as councillors' terms in council increase, overall performance increases by 0.35 per cent, and performance on legislation also increases by 0.24 per cent. However, other performance parameters such as monitoring service delivery, contact with the electorate, and participating in the lower local government meetings show no significant relationship with electoral terms served/experience. Other authors found out that the more terms local council leaders have served, the better their performance. In the findings of the scorecard assessment, they reported that; "councillors who had served five or more electoral terms of office in council, performed better than those in any of the other categories with an average score of 55 points" (Bainomugisha A., et al., 2020). These results imply that councillors' performance improves as they accumulate experience in executing their role/mandate.

4.5 Geographical Location of the Constituency and Performance

Geographical location here refers to urban and rural constituencies as described by the National Urban Policy (MLHUD, 2017). The results showed that there were no significant differences between the performance of councillors who represent the urban and rural constituencies. The data revealed that councillors who represented urban-based constituencies were slightly more likely to perform better than those who represented the

rural-based constituencies where 9 per cent of councillors who represented rural-based constituencies scored between 76 - 100 per cent compared to 10 per cent of councillors who represented urban constituencies. Regarding the poor performance (0 – 25 per cent), results show that 20 per cent of councillors who represented rural constituencies (Sub-counties) scored in that range while 14 per cent of their urban counterparts scored in the same range as shown in figure 8.

Figure 8: Geographical Location of Constituency and Performance




The regression analysis, however, reveals that the above statistics are not significant. The findings reveal that there is no association between the geographical locations of the constituency with the overall performance at all. Looking at other performance per parameter, it was established that councillors representing urban constituencies are more likely to perform better on the function of contact with the electorate by one per cent as compared to their counterparts representing rural constituencies. This could partly be explained by the fact that councillors representing urban areas reside within and establish their offices within their constituencies. Most councillors representing rural constituencies, however, have been found to shift from their rural areas and reside in urban areas thereby making it hard to keep closer contact with their electorate. Regarding the parameter of participating in lower local government meetings, there is no strong association between the geographical location of the constituency at 95 per cent but rather at 90 per cent. The results also show that councillors representing urban constituencies are less likely to attend lower local government meetings by 0.5 per cent compared to their

counterparts representing the rural constituencies. In practice, the Urban councils are viewed as self-accounting and semi-autonomous from the district councils. This has created a grey area in terms of supervisory and accountability relationships. Councillors from Urban councils are considered inconsequential in the urban councils they represent given that districts councils do not make any investments in these constituencies which explains the results above.

4.6 Councillor Category and Performance

Under the Local Governments Act, 1997 (as amended), there are provisions for inclusion of different marginalised groups including youth, Persons With Disabilities (PWDs), older persons, women, and workers in the district councils. It is, therefore, paramount to assess how these perform compared to the councillors who are directly elected. The results revealed that on average, the directly elected councillors perform relatively better compared to those on affirmative action. Within the range of scores, 16 per cent of the directly elected councillors scored between 0-25 per cent whereas relatively higher proportions of the affirmative action groups such as the older persons, PWDs, youth, and workers as shown in Figure 9. Whereas, 11 per cent of the directly elected councillors managed to obtain scores between 75-100 per cent, it was a relatively smaller proportion of the other groups that managed to obtain scores within that range. The results revealed that 1.6 per cent of the older persons, 3.5 per cent of the PWDs, 2 per cent of the youths, and none of the workers scored within this range as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Overall Performance by Category of Councillor



When the findings were controlled for other factors, it is revealed that the groups on affirmative action were less likely to perform better than their

directly elected counterparts. The results per councillor category are as follows:

Councillors Representing Older Persons

The results indicate that the relationship between councillors representing the older persons on affirmative actions and performance in the legislative role is negative and not significant. However, the relationship is negative and significant at 90 per cent confidence levels considering the performance in contact with the electorate. This implies that councillors representing the older persons are less likely to perform in contact with the electorate function compared to those who are directly elected into the council. Similar trends are observed in participation in lower local government meetings. The relationship is negative and significant at 99 per cent ($P < 0.01$). Results indicate that councillors representing the older persons are less likely to participate in lower local government meetings by nearly 4 per cent compared to the directly elected councillors. Also, it is revealed that councillors representing the older persons are less likely to monitor service delivery by 6.8 per cent compared to those who are directly elected and this is significant at 99 per cent. This can be attributed to the large geographical area (whole district) they represent coupled with limited facilitation to undertake this mandate/role.

Councillors Representing Persons with Disabilities (PWDs)

The analysis reveals that the relationship between PWDs councillors and performance in the legislative role and contact with the electorate is negative and not significant. However, the relationship is negative and significant at 99 per cent confidence levels considering the performance in participating in lower local government meetings and monitoring service delivery. It is revealed that PWD councillors are less likely to participate in lower local government meetings by 2.3 per cent compared to directly elected councillors and are less likely to monitor service delivery by 5.6 per cent compared to the directly elected councillors. This can be attributed to the limited mobility and logistical constraints to reaching LLG Councils and service delivery units in the entire district.

Councillors Representing the Youth

The analysis reveals that the relationship between Youth councillors on affirmative action and performance in the legislative role is negative and not significant. However, the relationship is negative and significant at 95 per cent confidence levels considering contact with the electorate. Youth Councillors on affirmative action are less likely to contact the electorate by 2 per cent compared to directly elected councillors. Similarly, it is revealed that the relationship is negative and significant 99 per cent confidence levels considering the performance in participating in lower local government

meetings and monitoring service delivery. It is revealed that Youth councillors are less likely to participate in lower local government meetings by 2.4 per cent compared to directly elected councillors and are less likely to monitor service delivery by 5.3 per cent compared to the directly elected councillors. This can be attributed to the large electoral area they represent coupled with limited facilitation to undertake this mandate/role.

Councillors Representing the Workers

The analysis reveals that the relationship between Workers' councillors and performance in the legislative role is negative and significant at 95 per cent confidence levels. Workers' councillors are less likely to perform well in their legislative roles by 2.2 per cent compared to councils that are directly elected. Similarly, the relationship is negative and significant at 90 per cent confidence levels considering contact with the electorate. Workers' Councillors are less likely to contact the electorate by 2 per cent compared to directly elected councillors. Similarly, it is revealed that the relationship is negative and significant 99 per cent confidence levels considering the performance in participating in lower local government meetings and monitoring service delivery. It is revealed that Workers' councillors are less likely to participate in lower local government meetings by 4 per cent compared to directly elected councillors and are less likely to monitor service delivery by 9 per cent compared to the directly elected councillors. The negative and significant relationships in legislation can be explained by the lack of timely orientation and induction of this category of councillors given that they are new entrants of special interest group representatives in local councils. Similarly, the performance in participation in LLG and Monitoring service delivery can be explained by the large electoral area they represent coupled with limited facilitation to undertake this mandate/role.

Such results show that the electoral colleges of special interest groups within the local government structures were not yet utilized for the benefit of the entire district. This partly explains the poor performance of the special interest groups against those who are directly elected to the council. Similarly, given the parameters that were used to evaluate their performance, councillors representing groups on affirmative action represent a larger geographical area(whole district-all sub counties) compared to their directly elected counterparts (who represent one sub-county in a district) which further negatively affects their performance.

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

Local governments remain at the centre of public service delivery and fulfilment of the aspirations of the decentralisation policy in Uganda. As demonstrated in this analysis, effective local governments are essential in the delivery of quality services to the citizens. This however is partly possible if the leaders in the local government councils can execute their mandate/roles. This analysis has provided sufficient evidence that the effectiveness of local governments is dependent on the capacities of leaders elected to superintend the governance and service delivery affairs at local government levels.

The results of the analysis further revealed that key social factors that impede or enhance the capacities of district councillors to deliver on their mandate/roles are; education level, electoral terms served/experience, gender, geographical location of constituency, political party affiliation and category of councillor. The analysis has revealed that more educated councillors tend to perform slightly better than their counterparts who possess low levels of education. The education level of the district councillors is somehow critical in determining their performance that is; as the councillor's education level improves. Concerning gender, the findings also show that being a male councillor is strongly and positively associated with good performance ($p=0.000$) at 95 per cent confidence levels. The difference in overall performance between male and female councillors is found to be statistically significant when subjected to a t-test ($p=0.000$). Regarding political party affiliation, the analysis revealed that there was no statistical association between belonging to any political party with the overall performance at the 95 per cent confidence level ($p=0.96$). The results established that there was no association between political party affiliations with the performance of the district councillors.

The analysis also revealed that as councillors' terms in council increase, overall performance improves by 0.35 per cent, and performance on legislation also improves by 0.24 per cent. However, performance on other parameters such as monitoring service delivery, contact with the electorate, and participating in the lower local government meetings show no significant associations with longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience. Concerning the nature of the constituency one represents in council (rural or urban) the findings revealed that there was no association between the geographical locations of the constituency with the overall performance at all.

Concerning councillors on affirmative action (women, youth, older persons, PWDs, and workers), results have established that they are less likely to perform better than their directly elected counterparts. The results show that councillors representing the older persons are less likely to perform well by 14 per cent compared to councillors who are directly elected to local government councils. The results further show that councillors representing PWDs are 8.6 per cent less likely to perform better than councillors directly elected on overall performance. The results further revealed that youth councillors and workers' councillors are 10 per cent and 18 per cent respectively less likely to perform better than their counterparts who are directly elected to council.

Calls have been made severally for policy reforms to address some of the concerns, especially regarding the education qualification of elected leaders at local government levels and the facilitation of the elected local government leaders. This analysis reinforces such previous recommendations in other related studies. It is therefore imperative that bold and deliberate policy reforms be made to address the hindrances in the performance of elected leaders at the local government level that relate to social factors identified in this analysis that impede the performance of elected leaders at local government levels.

5.2 Recommendations

The recommendations presented below respond to the analysis of the influence of the social determinants (level of education, gender, political party affiliation, longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience, geographical location of the constituency, and councillor category) on the performance of councillors.

Demographic Characteristics (Education and Gender)

- i. With regard to the level of education, the Ministry of Local Government should amend section 116 of the Local Governments Act to introduce the minimum education qualifications for elected political leaders in local governments. Cumulative statistics from a series of the local government councils' scorecard assessment reports revealed evidence of the strong relationship between education qualification and the performance of district councillors. Given their oversight roles and supervisory functions, education qualification does not only enhance their ability to internalise the council's planning and budgetary tools, work plans, and implementation reports but also boosts their confidence in fulfilling their supervisory roles over the usually highly qualified technical teams in the local governments. The analysis

recommends that a minimum education level for councillors at the district level should be the Tertiary or its equivalent.

- ii. Concerning gender, the Ministry of Local Government should design tailor-made capacity-building training interventions for elected women local government leaders. Evidence from the local government scorecard assessments has pointed to the fact that while the numbers of women in local governments may have increased, their performance on legislation and participation in lower local governments has stagnated. This has been reinforced by the fact that over the years, policy and legal interventions aimed at increasing the visibility of women on the political front have largely focused on increasing the numbers, very little focus, if any, has been directed at harnessing the quality of the women who are in local governments leadership. There is, therefore, a need for the Ministry of Local Government to design policy, legal and administrative interventions that focus on enhancing the performance of women in local governments.
- iii. There is a need to rethink the application of affirmative action policies intended to boost the participation of women and special interest groups within local governments. The analysis has revealed that despite the well-intentioned affirmative action policies, the level of participation of women and other special interest groups in areas of legislation, participation in lower local governments, and monitoring has been dismal. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Ministry of Local Government to liaise with the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development to further deepen the application of affirmative action in Local Governments.

Geographical Location of Constituency

- iv. There is a need for the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development to emphasise the upward-downward accountability relationships and obligations between the higher and lower local governments particularly the districts and the lower urban councils.

Political Party Affiliation

- v. There is a need for the MoLG to enhance the functionality of multi-party politics in Local Governments. The analysis has shown that there is no association between political party affiliations with the performance of the district councillors. This implies that political parties have no impact whatsoever in shaping the behaviour of the councillors and their performance. Therefore, there is a need to promote a multi-party

system in the district councils. The Standard Rules of Procedure for Local Government Councils in Uganda should be revised to provide for detailed operationalisation of multipartyism in local councils.

Councillor Category

- vi. The MoLG should provide a circular for local governments to consider mileage-based logistical support for special interest group councillors to fulfil their mandate/roles. The analysis has revealed that the nature and size of a councillor's constituency significantly affect their performance. Some councillors especially representatives of groups on affirmative action (Youth, PWDs, Workers, and older persons) have relatively large electoral areas (whole district), yet it is evident that they receive the same facilitation as the directly elected representatives who have smaller electoral areas (one sub-county). Furthermore, some directly elected councillors represent sub-counties that are exceptionally large and hard to reach, yet they receive similar facilitation to conduct monitoring. It is therefore important that local government councils adopt a mileage-based approach to facilitate councillors to effectively perform their monitoring mandate/role.
- vii. Reactivate Councils for Special Interest Groups at the lower local government level. The results have revealed that whereas the category of the district councillor is strongly associated with performance, it has been revealed that being a member of affirmative action is significant and negatively associated with good performance. One of the reasons for such poor performance is the fact that the structures for the affirmative action groups at local government levels are dormant and non-functional. Secondly, these affirmative action group councillors represent larger electoral areas compared to the directly elected councillors thus performing poorly on the parameters such as monitoring service delivery, contact with the electorate, and attending lower local government council meetings. There is, therefore, a need to reactivate the councils of the special interest groups at local government levels. The district councils should ensure that councils for youth, PWDs, women, workers, and older persons are facilitated to regularly meet and engage higher councils on their needs and other issues of importance.

Electoral Terms Served/Experience

- viii. The Ministry of Local Government should prioritise orientation and continuous training for councillors on their roles and responsibilities/mandate. The better performance of councillors that have stayed in council for more than two terms indicates that better performance is

associated with longevity in council/electoral terms served/experience. However, due to the high turnover of councillors in every election cycle, councils are dominated by fresh and inexperienced leaders who need training.

REFERENCES

- Ahikire, J. (2003). Gender Equity and Local Democracy in Contemporary Uganda: Addressing the Challenge of Women's Political Effectiveness in Local Government. Centre for Basic Research Working Paper, Issue 58.
- Aritua, P. (2021, February). Elections for Local Government Leaders: Gender and Women Participation and its Implications for Service Delivery. The Local Governance Briefer(No.3), pp. 1-3.
- Bainomugisha, A., Mbabazi, J., Muhwezi, W. W., Bogere, G., Phoebe, A., Eugene, G. S., . . . Richard, A. (2020). *The Local Government Councils Scorecard FY 2018/19: The Next Big Steps, Consolidating Gains of Decentralisation and Repositioning the Local Government Sector in Uganda* (Vols. ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No. 96, 2020). Kampala: ACODE.
- Bainomugisha, A., Lillian, M. T., Muhwezi, W. W., Kiran, C., Eugene, G. S., George, B., . . . Naomi, A. (2017). *Local Government Councils Scorecard Assessment 2016/2017: Civic Engagement, Activating the Potentials of Local Governance in Uganda* (Vols. ACODE Policy Research Series No. 83, 2017). Kampala: ACODE.
- Bashaasha, B., Mangheni, M. N., & Ephraim, N. (2011). *Decentralization and rural service delivery in Uganda*. International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Besley, T., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2011). Do Educated Leaders Matter? *The Economic Journal*.
- Braga, M., & Scervini, F. (2017). The performance of politicians: The effect of gender quotas. *European Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 46, issue C, 1-14.
- Coffe, H., & Bolzendah, C. (2010). Same Game, Different Rules? Gender Differences in Political Participation. *US National Library of Medicine National Institute of Health*, 318–333.
- Crook, R., & Manor, J. (1998). *Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia: Participation, Accountability, and Performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- David Adedia, A. A. (2016). Ordinary Least Squares and Robust Estimators in Linear Regression: Impacts of Outliers, Error and Response Contaminations. *British Journal of Mathematics & Computer Science*, 13(4): 1-11, 2016, Article no.BJMCS.22876.

- Demir, H. (2000). The Role And Treatment Of Political Parties In Liberal Democracies With Reference To The United Kingdom, Turkey And The European Convention On Human Rights. LEEDS: THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS.
- Fredrik, B., & Paul't, H. (2006). When Power Changes Hands: The Psychology of Leadership Successions in Democracies. *JSTOR*, vol. 27, no. 5, 707–730.
- Garcia-Hernandez, A., Grossman, G., & Michelitch, K. (2018). Gender, Networks, and Politician Performance: Evidence from 50 Ugandan Sub-national Governments with Women's Reserved Seats. Centre for Study of Democratic Institutions, Vanderbilt University.
- la: UPPC.
- Ilhan, O. (2001, Winter). The Role of Education in Economic Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *Journal of Rural Development and Administration*, Volume XXXIII, No. 1. Retrieved November 20, 2020
- ISER. (2018). *Citizen Participation in Local Government Service Delivery Processes in Uganda*. Initiative for Social and Economic Rights.
- Iversen, T., & Rosenbluth, F. (2010). Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality. *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 34:3, 286-289. [doi:10.1080/1554477X.2013.805107](https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2013.805107)
- Kakuba, J. S. (2010). Multi-party Politics Dynamics in Uganda. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 4(3), 109-114.
- Makara, S. (2009). *Decentralisation and Urban Governance in Uganda*. Johannesburg, South Africa: University of the Witwatersrand.
- Makara, S. (2009). The Challenge of Building Strong Political Parties for Democratic Governance in Uganda: Does multiparty politics have a future? *Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est / The East African Review*, 43-80.
- Mawhood, P. (2002). Local Government in the Third World. In C. John Wiley, *African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers, and Accountability*. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).
- Mushemeza, E. D. (2019). *Decentralisation in Uganda: Trends, Achievements, Challenges and Proposals for Consolidation*. ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No.93, Kampala.
- MoLG. (2013). *National Local Government Capacity Building Policy (NLGCBP)*. Kampala: Ministry of Local Government - Republic of Uganda .

- Norm, K., & Ashiagbor, S. (2011). *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspective*. Wahington DC: National Democratic Institute.
- Otile, O. M. (2021). *Functionality of multiparty politics in Local Councils*. Retrieved from Daily Monitor: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/functionality-of-multiparty-politics-in-local-councils--3331698?view=htmlamp>
- Roberts, K. M. (2018). Decentralisation in Uganda: Prospects for Improved Service Delivery. *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXIII, (No. 4), 83–95.
- MLHUD. (2017). *The Uganda National Urban Policy*. Kampala: Ministry Lands Housing and Urban Development.
- Republic of Uganda. (1995). *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*, Kampala: UPPC.
- Republic of Uganda. (1997). *Electoral Commission Act, CAP 140*. Kampala: UPPC.
- Republic of Uganda. (1997). *The Local Governments Act, CAP 243*.
- Republic of Uganda. (2005). *The Political Parties and Organisations Act*. Kampala: UPPC.
- Republic of Uganda. (2005). *Parliamentary Election Act*. Kampa
- Ssemakula, E. G. (2021). *Navigating Multiparty Politics in Local Governments in Uganda*. Kampala: ACODE.
- Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). *Using Multivariate Statistics* (5 ed.). Pearson Education.
- Tamale, S. (1999). *When Hens Begin to Crow: Gender and Parliamentary Politics in Uganda*. Oxfordshire, England, UK: Routledge.
- ULGA. (2020). *An Analysis of the Six Objectives of Decentralisation in Uganda*. Kampala: Uganda Local Governments Association
- UNDP. (1999). *Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions*.
- UNICEF. (2017). *Gender Equality: Glossary of Terms and Concepts*.
- World Bank. (2019). *Public Sector Governance*. Washington DC: World Bank.

ANNEXES

Annexe 1: Regression Analysis for Councillors

VARIABLES	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
	Overall Performance	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in LLG Meetings	Monitoring Service Delivery
Category of Councillor (Direct Councillors – Base)					
Women	1248	0.154	0.497	0.528	0.603
	(1.893)	(0.584)	(0.56)	(0.388)	(1.098)
Older Persons	-13.95***	-0.979	-2.004*	-3.688***	-6.850***
	(2.908)	(0.884)	(1.027)	(0.368)	(1.856)
PWDs	-8.568***	-0.331	-0.39	-2.388***	-5.629***
	(2.748)	(0.896)	(0.937)	(0.468)	(1.706)
Youth	-9.868***	-0.0727	-2.020**	-2.390***	-5.304***
	(2.804)	(0.83)	(0.839)	(0.449)	(1.57)
Workers	-18.06***	-2.260**	-1.956*	-4.376***	-9.092***
	(2.93)	(1.152)	(1.081)	(0.29)	(1.51)
Geographical Location (Rural – Base)					
Urban	-0.387	0.226	0.962**	-0.500*	-1.088
	(1.397)	(0.447)	(0.417)	(0.278)	(0.811)
Political Party Affiliation (Independents – Base)					
Member of a Political Party	183	-0.142	0.448	0.00493	1.184
	(2.368)	(0.678)	(0.69)	(0.443)	(1.263)
Education Levels (Primary – Base)					
Secondary Education	0.269	-0.357	-0.494	0.736	-0.142
	(3.079)	(1.064)	(1.023)	(0.607)	(1.742)
Tertiary Education	5.658*	0.748	0.302	1.335**	2.81
	(3.099)	(1.07)	(1.024)	(0.605)	(1.76)
University Education and above	4.508	1.501	-0.137	0.919	2.008

VARIABLES	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
	Overall Performance	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in LLG Meetings	Monitoring Service Delivery
	(3.249)	(1.1)	(1.063)	(0.62)	(1.833)
Terms (Electoral Terms Served/ Experience	0.351**	0.243***	0.0950*	0.0135	0.0249
	(0.169)	(0.0535)	(0.0484)	(0.0324)	(0.103)
Gender (Females – Base)					
Male	5.141***	1.648***	0.708*	0.468*	2.457***
	(1.352)	(0.43)	(0.411)	(0.259)	(0.775)
Constant	40.19***	11.43***	11.66***	3.288***	14.04***
	(3.754)	(1.23)	(1.18)	(0.73)	(2.081)
Observations	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170
R-squared	0.076	0.041	0.026	0.091	0.061
Robust standard errors in parentheses					
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					

Annexe 2: District Councillor Scorecard

Name: _____

Political Party _____ Sub-County _____

District _____ Level of Education _____

Gender _____ Committee _____ Terms served _____ Date of Interview _____

Time of Interview _____

1. LEGISLATIVE ROLE	(25)	Comments and Observations
i. Participation in Plenary	8	
ii. Participation in Committees	8	
iii. Moved a Motion for Approval as Resolution of Council	5	
iv. Provided Special Skills/Knowledge to the Council or Committees.	4	
2. CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE	(20)	
i. Official Meetings with Electorate	8	
ii. Office or coordinating centre in the constituency	12	
3. PARTICIPATION IN LOWER LOCAL GOVERNMENT	(10)	
i. Attendance in sub-county Council sittings	10	
4. MONITORING SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMME AREAS	(45)	
i. Monitoring Health Service Delivery	7	
ii. Monitoring Education Services	7	
iii. Monitoring Agricultural Projects	7	
iv. Monitoring Water Services	7	
v. Monitoring Road Works	7	
vi. Monitoring Functional Adult Literacy	5	
vii. Monitoring Environment and Natural Resources Protection	5	
TOTAL	100	

ABOUT ACODE

The Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) is an independent public policy research and advocacy think tank based in Uganda. ACODE's work focuses on four programme areas: Economic Governance; Environment and Natural Resources Governance; Democracy, Peace and Security; Science, Technology and Innovation. For the last eight consecutive years, ACODE has been ranked as the best think tank in Uganda and one of the top 100 think tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa and globally in the Global Think Tanks Index Report published by the University of Pennsylvania Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP).



Contact

Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment
(ACODE)

Plot 96 Kanjokya Street, Kamwokya

P O. Box 29386, Kampala

Tel: +256 312 812 150, Email: acode@acode-u.org

Website: <http://www.acode-u.org>

With support from

