



UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORE-CARD REPORT 2008/09

A Comparative Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations



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Acknowledgement

The Local Government Councils Score-card Initiative (LGCSCI) is a 10-year project implemented by ACODE with a goal of improving the quality of public service delivery by building the demand-side of governance and accountability. The initiative achieves this goal by undertaking and publishing local government councils' score-cards and robust outreach programmes that target citizens and build the capacity of local government political leaders. The initiative was launched in 2009 by conducting an initial assessment of the performance of 10 local government councils for FY2008/09.

This briefing paper has been prepared based on the 10 district Score-Card reports produced from the first assessment of the LGCSCI. The Score-Card assessments were conducted using a methodology developed by ACODE and guided by an Expert Task Group. The assessment that produced the district reports was undertaken by a team of dedicated researchers from local partner organizations.

The authors are indebted to the members of the Expert Task Group and the district research teams for their dedication and commitment in meeting very tight deadlines. Without their efforts and the production of the district reports, this briefing paper would not have been possible. In addition, we acknowledge the support provided to the research teams by key Local Government officials including the clerks to council and the district planning officials who provided valuable information and validated information that was used in the district Score-Card reports and this briefing paper. Admittedly, without the cooperation of the district chairperson, speakers and councillors, this exercise would not have been successful. We therefore extend our appreciation to all the district leaders that provided support in one way or the other.

The LGCSCI is supported by the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) and through core funding support to ACODE by the Think Tank Initiative (TTI). The financial support of these funding agencies and the individual contributing development partners is acknowledged. ACODE also acknowledges the support and partnership of the Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA) which provided very useful information and data that was invaluable in validating fieldwork information.

Finally, the authors have taken care to present the information from the assessment as accurately as possible. We therefore take full responsibility for any errors or omissions.

Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)

List of Accronyms

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
LCI	Local Council One
LCV	Local Council Five
LGCSC	Local Government Councils Score Card
LGCSCI	Local Government Councils Score Card Initiative
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NPPAs	National Priority Programme Areas
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USE	Universal Secondary Education

1. Introduction

The launching of the decentralization process in 1991 represented a new era in the democratization project of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) as it sought to establish a system of government where citizens took full responsibility for managing their own affairs. The deepening of decentralization and local democracy was epitomized in the 1995 Constitution which articulated core constitutional principles that underpinned the local government system upon which decentralization is based.

With the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1995, a legal foundation had been created establishing local government structures vested with political, executive, legislative and planning powers to ensure effective local governance and the delivery of public services. Fifteen years on after the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, the decentralization system has more or less failed. The local government system has been severely undermined through systematic erosion of local government powers. The commitment to create a strong local revenue base did not materialize as local governments increasingly rely on central government fiscal transfers. The quality of public services continues to deteriorate in spite of two decades of sustained economic growth. Most importantly, the citizens appear disengaged from government more than ever before.

In 2009, ACODE launched the Local Government Councils Score-Card with the goal of strengthening citizens' demand for effectiveness and accountability in the delivery of public services. This policy briefing paper therefore represents a compressed summary of the findings from the first assessment of the local government councils in Uganda. The first assessment covered the following 10 districts: Amuria, Amuru, Hoima, Kampala, Kamuli, Luwero, Mbale, Moroto, Nebbi and Ntungamo.

Among other things, the 2008/09 local government councils score-card report reveals an apparent paradox between score-card performance and the quality of service delivery at the local level. In essence, district councils and council organs that scored good points such as Kampala City Council had depressing public service delivery records.

The report concludes that the performance of local government councils is severely undermined by a wide range of exogenous factors including: (i) a public service delivery system based on strong local governments that no longer exist; (ii) a distorted budget architecture that is biased towards the consumption sectors of the economy and heavily controlled by the central government; (iii) a rural economic policy based


on welfarism, tax relief and administrative engineering that has effectively disengaged citizens from government; and (iv) a power relations structure at the district level that blurs the lines of accountability with regard to political responsibility, executive authority and fiscal control.

1.1 The Local Government Councils Score-Card

The Local Government Councils Score-Card (LGCSC) is an independent assessment tool with a specific methodology and indicators to assess the performance of local government councils in Uganda. It was initiated in 2009 under the Local Government Councils Score-Card Initiative (LGCSCI) of the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE). The LGCSC is a set of parameters and associated indicators designed to do two interrelated things: First, it empirically assesses the extent to which local government council organs and councilors are performing their responsibilities as stipulated in the Local Government Act. Secondly, it examines whether there is a direct correlation between good or bad score-card performance of a local government council and the quality of service delivery in the respective district.

The parameters in the score-card are based on the core statutory roles and responsibilities of the local government councils as indicated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Key Elements of the Local Government Councils Performance Score-Card




Source: Tumushabe, G., et al (2010).

The theory of change underlying the LGCSC is that by providing local government councils’ performance related information to the public, citizens will be able to demand for better quality services. The demand for performance and accountability on the part of local political leaders would trigger a horizontal and vertical spiral of demand for accountability from the local to the national levels. Horizontal accountability means that local political leaders would put pressure on local government service delivery departments and private service providers to ensure the delivery of good quality services. Vertical accountability means that local political leaders would ally with citizens to demand for greater accountability and transparency in the allocation and utilization of public resources.

1.2 Background and Rationale for the Local Government Councils Score-Card

The Local Government Councils Score-Card seeks to address the number one policy problem confronting policy makers and development practitioners in Uganda: why the quality of public service delivery in Uganda has not improved tremendously in spite of a sustained record of economic growth¹ and increased investments by government and development partners in the areas of education, roads and health as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: National Budget Allocations FYs 2001/02 – 2008/09



Source: Authors’ Calculations Based on MFPED; Approved Revenue and Expenditures for various years.

¹ Gross Domestic Product growth of 7.2% between 1997/98-2000/0, 6.8% between 2000/01 – 2003/04 and 8% between 2004/05-2007/08.

The local government system is founded on the decentralization policy which was adopted at the beginning of the 1990s. The local government system was entrenched in the 1995 constitution and followed by a series of reforms epitomized in the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1997. At a general level, it can be said that the series of policy and institutional reforms have yielded positive process outcomes especially by creating a system of local governance where citizens elect their leaders from the local to the district level. However, in tangible terms, the system has produced mixed results with measured progress in selected public service areas but general widespread failures in public service delivery outcomes.

The underlying rationale of the decentralization policy as articulated in the 1995 constitution is that effective governance is achieved when functions and powers are devolved to the people at appropriate levels. However, there have been apparent widespread failures evidenced through the malfunctioning of the public service delivery infrastructure, persistent levels of rural poverty and absence of effective accountability between citizens and their leaders both at the local and national level. This malfunctioning is often blamed on the problem of “weakness of and corruption in” local governments. Consequently, the standard policy response to this problem is to implement a series of supply-side interventions including supply-side monitoring of local government by a host of national agencies and institutions.

Based on the findings of the 2008/09 local government Score-Card report,² it is argued that the diagnosis that blames the failure in the public service delivery system on the “weaknesses” of the local government is a wrong diagnosis of the policy problem. On the contrary, the problem of poor quality public service delivery is a function of systemic policy failures that undermine accountability systems upon which local governance is premised. The continuous affront on the powers of local governments, a distorted budget architecture that creates a substantial imbalance of power between the central government and local governments, and a rural development policy that has disengaged citizens from government are the fundamental policy issues that account for the current failures in the public service delivery system. Consequently, it is argued that concentrating interventions on the supply-side financing and monitoring of performance of local governments is the wrong policy prescription. On the contrary, what is needed are interventions that reconstruct and give confidence to local governments to plan and execute locally developed medium and long-term development programmes while building the accountability relationships between citizens and leaders at all levels.

² Tumushabe, G., et al. (2010). Uganda Local Government Councils Score-Card Report 2008/09: A Comparative Analysis of Findings and Recommendations for Action. ACODE Policy Research Series No. 32. ACODE. Kampala.

2. The 2008/09 Score-Card: Summary of Findings

This briefing paper presents a compressed summary of the findings and analysis of the first LGCSC assessment conducted in 10 districts and published in the main synthesis report.³ The 10 districts⁴ which are spread evenly across the country were selected through criteria that sought to achieve a regional balance in the sample, balance old and new districts, include districts that were considered marginalized by geopolitical circumstances, or the inclusion of districts that were perceived as models in terms of performance. Kampala District Council was particularly included in this first assessment by virtue of its metropolitan status. The following organs of the district councils were assessed and scored: district councils; individual district councilors; the district chairpersons; and the district council speakers. All the organs were scored on performance of their core responsibilities with scores ranging from 0 up to 100 points.


2.1 District Councils

District Councils are vested with executive, legislative and planning powers in the district. The councils were therefore assessed on the performance of 4 core responsibilities or functions: local legislation and legislative functions, accountability, planning and budgeting, and service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). Six out of the assessed 10 District Councils exhibited good performance scoring over 70 points with Luwero District Council emerging the best with 86 points. The districts generally scored well on the following issues: accountability; planning and budgeting; and service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). Of the four districts that scored below 70 points, Kamuli scored the lowest points with 56 points out of a total of 100 points. This poor performance is attributed to poor accountability, planning and budgeting. Figure 3 below presents a summary of the performance of the 10 district councils.

³ Ibid

⁴ Amuria, Amuru, Hoima, Kampala, Kamuli, Luwero, Mbale, Moroto, Nebbi and Ntungamo

Figure 3: Comparative Performance of Local Government Councils




Source: Local Government Councils Score-Card Assessment, 2008/09

2.2 District Councilors

The responsibilities of the district councilors are set out in the third schedule part 2 of the Local Government Act. Consequently, individual district councilors were assessed on five performance parameters: i) performance of legislative responsibilities; ii) evidence of contact with the electorate; iii) participation in communal and development activities in the respective constituency; iv) participation in lower local government councils by way of attendance at meetings or providing guidance and leadership; and v) engagement in service delivery on national priority programmes.

All in all, 229 out of a total of 247 councilors were assessed representing 92.7 percent of all the councilors in the 10 districts. At least 7.3 percent of councilors were not assessed due to various reasons including the fact that some councilors were newly elected and did not fall within the assessment period, others were absent, while others were sick. The general performance of councilors was generally fair with the majority obtaining points ranging from 40 to 69 as indicated in Figure 4. Overall, good performance was registered with regard to the legislative functions of the councilors while poor performance was mainly recorded on the issue of participation in lower local government councils and contact with the electorate. The best performing female councilor was Florence Namayanja Mukasa (93 points) from Kampala City Council while the best performing male councilor was Erasmus Musisi (88 points) from Luwero District Council. Moroto District councilors recorded the poorest performance with ten of them scoring below 20 points as indicated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Average Scores of councilors disaggregated by gender and district

Source: *Local Government Councils Score-Card Assessment 2008/09.*

2.3 Gender Analysis of Performance of Councilors

All the ten district councils are male dominated with the exception of Kampala whose composition of women is slightly more than that of men. There were apparent gender-based performance differences with male councilors performing better than female councilors although the reverse is true in Kampala City Council (64.8 points: 61.4 points) and Ntungamo district (61.1 points: 60.6 points).

2.4 Performance of Councilors for Special Interest Groups


The councilors for special interest groups of youth and people with disabilities (PWDs) generally scored low points across the ten districts compared to other councilors. The apparent explanation for the poor performance is that these councilors generally exhibited very limited knowledge of their roles and how they could mobilize their constituencies since those constituencies are not specifically defined. They are also the only councilors who have the entire district as their constituency but receive no logistical support to service this constituency.

2.5 Performance of District Chairpersons

The district chairpersons were assessed on five Score-Card parameters covering: i) political leadership, ii) legislative roles, iii) contact with the electorate, iv) participation in communal and development activities and v) monitoring of service delivery on

national priority programme areas. The average score for all the 10 district council chairpersons was 76 points as indicated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Comparative Performance of District Council Chairpersons




Source: Local Government Councils Score-Card Assessment 2008/09.

Generally, chairpersons performed well on all the Score-Card parameters with the exception of the legislative roles and contact with the electorate where 4 of the chairpersons scored below the average points for all chairpersons on these Score-Cards. Chairman John Wycliffe Karazzarwe of Ntungamo District was the overall best chairperson scoring 95 points out of a total score of 100 points.

2.6 Performance of District Council Speakers

District council speakers were assessed on all the parameters used to assess councilors although an additional parameter regarding presiding over and preservation of order in the councils was added on their Score-Card. The average performance of speakers was 62%. Out of the ten speakers, five (5) performed above their average mark while the other five (5) performed below average as indicated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Comparative Performance of Speakers from the 10 Districts



Source: *Monitoring and Measuring the Performance of District Local Government Councils and Councilors in Uganda Score-Card.*

Speaker Dennis Singahakye was the best performing speaker with a score of 95 points out of a total score of 100 points. The only female speaker in the sample came second obtaining 79 points of a total score of 100 points.

2.7 Factors Affecting Performance of Political Leaders

The scores of individual councilors, chairpersons or speakers were generally affected by a number of factors. These include:

- Lack of adequate knowledge about the roles of councils and councilors.
- Poor documentation and record keeping that makes traceability of councilors’ performance difficult.
- Low levels of academic qualifications for some councilors; and
- The problem of non-resident councilors.

These factors cut across all the 10 districts in addition to district specific problems such as widespread corruption, conflict between the political and civil service leadership, and cliquism.

3. Conclusions from the 2008/09 Assessment: Factors Affecting Public Service Delivery and Accountability

3.1 Relationship between Score-Card Performance and the Quality of Service Delivery

The most striking conclusion from the assessment is that there is no direct correlation between Score-Card performance and the quality of service delivery in the districts. For example, it was mind boggling that the Chairperson of Kampala City Council was the second best performing chairperson scoring 85 out of a total score of 100 points. Kampala City Council as a whole also obtained an impressive score of 84 out of 100 points. This is in spite of the fact that the public services in Kampala City Council ranging from the city road network, to public schools, drainage system, garbage disposal and general cleanliness and hygiene are in a deplorable state. This paradox stems from the fact that the responsibilities of local government councils are mainly related to processes and procedures. For example, councils can formulate local ordinances, debate and adopt motions or conduct service delivery monitoring visits but these actions may not necessarily have a direct bearing on service delivery outcomes.

It is therefore apparent that there is a crucial methodological question that needs to be addressed to ensure that the Score-Card draws a linkage between Score-Card performance and the quality of delivery of public services.

3.2 Decentralized Service Delivery within a weakened Decentralization System

The current public service delivery system is founded on a strong system of local governments built around the devolution model of decentralization as stipulated under article 178-189 of the Constitution. The model envisages strong local governments with requisite executive, legislative and planning powers and responsibilities. The model also envisages local governments that have a strong revenue base that allows

them autonomy and authority to direct planning and implementation of public service programmes. However, central government has progressively recentralized the powers and responsibilities of local governments thereby gradually changing the decentralization model from devolution to delegation.


Over the last decade, central government has assumed the power to appoint Chief Administrative Officers (2005), appointment of the district contract committees (2006), payment of salaries and allowances for district council chairpersons, speakers and councilors (2005), and payment of allowances for LCI chairpersons (2010). Ironically, the rollback of the decentralization process and the erosion of powers of local government councils have been effected by central government with the acquiescence of district local councilors. Consequently, while the decentralization policy landscape has changed, central government, development partners and even local government leaders continue to design and implement service delivery programmes based on a distorted policy framework. The policy shift from devolution to delegation not only shifts the primary responsibility of service delivery to the central government but also fundamentally changes the accountability relationships between citizens and government.

3.3

A distorted National Budget Architecture

The current failures in the current public service delivery system are also a result of distorted national budget architecture. The national budget is biased against effective public service delivery in a number of ways. First, there is a disproportionate allocation of national budget resources towards consumptive sectors rather than the productive sectors of the economy that have the potential to boost household production and the growth of business enterprises. For example, as shown in Figure 7, 75 percent of the national budget for 2010/11 will be spent on only five sectors: roads and transport, defense and security, education, health, and public administration and public sector management. Only 25 percent of the budget will be spent on all the other sectors including the rural economic sectors: agriculture, environment and natural resources, and trade and tourism.

Figure 7: National Budget allocations FY 2010/11.



Source: Adapted from Lukwago, D (2010) “Where do our budget shillings go?” ACODE Policy Info Sheet No. 8, 2010. ACODE, Kampala.

Secondly, the way resources are allocated between the central government and the local governments does not reflect their mandates. As shown in Table 1, a large portion of the national budget is allocated to Central Government programmes rather than Local Government programmes where actual service delivery takes place.

Table 1: Comparative allocation of the national budget between central and local governments (excluding arrears & non VAT taxes), FY 2006/07 – 2010/11


Sector/ Vote	2006/07 app. budget	2007/08 app. budget	2008/09 app. budget	2009/10 app. budget	2010/11 proj. budget
Total Centre	67%	66%	67%	69%	71%
Total Local Government Programme	22%	23%	21%	20%	19%
Statutory Interest Payments	6%	6%	6%	5%	4%
Statutory excluding Interest Payments	5%	5%	5%	6%	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MFPEd: Approved Estimates of Revenue & Expenditure for the respective years.

For instance, for the 2010/11 financial year, 71 percent of the budget is projected to be spent as central government resources while only 19 percent will be spent by local governments. While it is tempting to argue that even part of the central government budget is spent on service delivery at the local level, this budget architecture undermines local ownership and hence distorts the systems of responsibility and accountability in the cases of failure and abuse.


Thirdly, local governments have a significantly diminished local revenue base as all sources of revenue have either been centralized or abolished as in the case of Graduated Tax. Consequently, the major financing mechanism for local service delivery is through a complex system of sectoral conditional grants with no room for flexibility to suit the localized planning priorities of the particular local government. Figures 8 and 9 show the glaring disparity between local revenues and central government transfers. With the exception of Kampala, all the districts assessed can hardly raise any local revenue.

Figure 8: Comparative analysis of Government Releases and Local Revenue in the 10 Districts



Source: *Monitoring and Measuring the Performance of District Local Government Councils and Councilors in Uganda Score-Card, 2010.*

Figure 9: Local Revenue as a percentage of the total district budget for FY 2008/2009



Source: *Monitoring and Measuring the Performance of District Local Government Councils and Councilors in Uganda Score-Card, 2010.*

Central Government also pays the LCV Chairperson, the district councilors, the Chief Administrative Officer and the LCI chairpersons. This budget architecture has served as breeding ground for the emergence of a patron-client relationship between central government and local political leaders that clearly undermines any form of accountability between citizens and local leaders. The local government leaders are mainly accountable to the central government and have no apparent motivation to address the breakdown in public service delivery at the local level.

3.4

A Rural Economic Policy that Disengages Citizens from Government

Over the last decade, government has pursued rural economic policy driven by three interrelated policy strategies: welfarism, tax relief and administrative engineering. First, central government and the international development community found convergence in implementing welfare programmes such as Universal Primary Education (UPE), Universal Secondary Education (USE) and other forms of welfare interventions. Secondly, tax relief interventions such as the abolition of graduated tax, market dues and other forms of direct taxes became standard policy responses to deepening rural and urban poverty. Thirdly, discontent among local political elite has been addressed through systematic “administrative engineering” characterized by creation of new district units and other forms of administrative institutions. On account of global and national development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these may seem fairly legitimate interventions.

These economic policy prescriptions create a clientele arrangement in which citizens lose their claim over government and begin to see every service provided by government as a favor rather than a right. Like has happened with UPE, NAADS and road projects, citizens are expected to be perpetually grateful to government for delivering public goods and any demands for accountability are considered unjustifiable ingratitude. Consequently, consistent deterioration in public service delivery is partly a product of this rural economic policy that undermines citizens’ ownership of government and accelerates a breakdown in accountability relationships between the citizens and the leaders.

3.5

Absence of Comprehensive Integrated Development Plans for Districts

The Local Government Act vests planning powers with the Local Government Councils. The district council is established as the district planning authority and charged with the responsibility of preparing a comprehensive and integrated development plan.⁵ However, the current practice is that districts are managed through

⁵ Local Government Act, 2000. Section 35

a 3-year rolling development plan which is in effect implemented as an annual work plan. Strategic medium and long-term planning is essential in setting development targets upon which progress can be measured. The absence of such development plans and appropriate development targets and performance benchmarks denies the constituencies that opportunity to measure the performance of local leaders based on clearly defined development targets and performance benchmarks. As a result, the efforts of district councils and councilors as evidenced through good Score-Card performance does not translate into tangible and quality service delivery at the local level.

3.6**Lack of a Clear Accountability Centre among District Leaders**

District local councils are constituted through an electoral process and should therefore be held politically accountable for the current malfunctioning of the public service delivery system. However, they do not raise any local revenue and therefore control no budget of their own. The district technical departments which in practice control the budget are the public service delivery organs of the local government. They fall under the direct leadership of the Chief Administrative Officer(CAO) whose fiscal accountability responsibilities primarily lie with the central government agencies that control the conditional grants. One of the presumably powerful offices at the local government level is the office of the Resident District Commissioner(RDC) who is appointed by the President and hence reports not to district councils but directly to the President.

Such is the nature of the power relations architecture at the local government level. The district council has political responsibility but controls no budget. The CAO has administrative responsibility but his paymaster is not the voter, rather the central government. The RDC has executive authority but is accountable to non-other than the President. The RDC's primary responsibility is that everything that works has been provided by the President and everything that does not work is clearly the inefficiency and corruption of local leaders trying to undermine the good intentions of the President. It is this narrative that needs to change but the current power and fiscal configuration at the local government level works in favor of that narrative.

4. Recommendations: Making District Councils Effective in Service Delivery

The Local Government Councils Score-Card has shown that even if councils perform the roles that are ascribed to them under the Local Government Act, their efforts are unlikely to translate into tangible improvements in service delivery. To achieve better service delivery outcomes, action must be taken to improve the performance of the councils themselves while addressing the structural policy constraints that account for the current breakdown of accountability relationship between citizens and government at all levels. The following recommended interventions address the immediate problems affecting the Score-Card performance of councils and their respective organs:

- Orientation and regular training of councilors on their roles as well as their accountability obligations to the citizens and voters.
- Training in documentation and record keeping.
- Setting minimum academic qualifications for councilors especially at the district level.
- Establish leadership awards for local government councils and local council leaders for exemplary performance based on empirical performance assessments such as the Local Government Councils Score-Card.

On the other hand, to address the apparent malfunctioning of the public service delivery system and the breakdown of accountability relationships between government, local governments and leaders, the following proposals are made:

- Changing the budget sectoral allocation architecture to ensure appropriate investments in service delivery sectors, create a mechanism where local governments have direct control over their budgets by dividing the national budget between them and central government, and introduction of some form of direct taxes as means of recreating the accountability relationship between citizens and government.
- Changing the central government-local government budget allocation architecture to ensure that requisite resources are provided to local governments commensurate to the devolved functions of service delivery.

- Developing medium and long-term comprehensive strategic district development plans -Provide technical support to local governments to enable them formulate medium and long-term development plans with performance targets on production, investments, private sector development and the delivery of quality social services.
- Building the demand-side citizens' infrastructure - Invest in building the demand-side infrastructure of civil society, citizens' groups and other civic agencies; and

Finally, it is important to recognize that this is the first in the series of assessments to be conducted over the next 10 years. The sample of districts included in this round of assessment was considerably small given the financial and human resources required for undertaking the assessments. However, the number of districts to be included in the assessment will be progressively increased over the course of the initiative. This assessment has also raised important methodological issues that will be addressed during the course of revising and updating the score-card methodology and indicators.

ANNEX:

Annex 1: Individual Performance of Councilors disaggregated by Gender

Amuria District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Eceru Moses Aga	Male	19	17	13	10	22	81
Otim Moses Omuron	Male	19	15	15	2	19	70
Tebenyang John	Male	17	15	8	2	25	67
Engoru Charles Echeme	Male	16	16	9	5	20	66
Ebiru Paul	Male	16	11	8	10	18	63
Ocheng Samuel Aroca	Male	13	10	10	1	25	59
Opio Michael	Male	14	5	8	0	20	47
Elobu Patrick Angolu	Male	18	0	7	2	14	41
Engemu Moses	Male	6	5	13	0	11	35
Eteku George William	Male	8	2	9	3	8	30
Average Score Male							55.9
Ilalu Irene	Female	15	10	10	0	16	51
Isamukere Florence	Female	12	7	8	0	21	48
Acam Hellen Beatrice	Female	14	0	8	2	23	47
Anango Jane Mary	Female	9	15	8	3	11	46
Apolot Rose	Female	11	5	3	0	22	41
Acen Rosemary	Female	17	0	8	0	15	40
Acuro Jane	Female	8	10	2	5	14	39
Asimo Jane	Female	8	10	6	2	11	37
Average Score Female							43.6

Amuru District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Olanya Gilbert	Male	17	20	8	6	26	77
Ayero Evelyn Oyugi	Male	11	12	8	2	13	46
Oloya Justine Lungajul	Male	12	6	15	0	11	44
Odongpiny Bazil P'KIYO	Male	11	3	8	0	16	38
Okello Patrick Oryema	Male	12	4	3	3	14	36
Kinyera Denis	Male	12	4	4	1	11	32
Average Score Male							45.5
Adong Getrude Odora	Female	6	3	8	2	16	35
Adong Margaret Ayugi	Female	12	3	3	2	12	32
Apiyo Catherine Oywa	Female	12	2	3	2	12	31
Akello Alice Ekanya	Female	12	3	3	2	10	30
Aceng christine Atanya	Female	5	3	3	0	12	23
Average Score Female							30.2

Hoima District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mugenyi Mulindambura	Male	21	10	10	5	12	58
Kakoraki Fred	Male	18	11	11	5	13	58
Kyamulesire Billy	Male	21	10	8	5	12	56
Muhindi Fred	Male	18	15	8	2	10	53
Byensi Alex Kabbusomba	Male	19	15	11	2	5	52
Bigabwenkya Tom Muhe	Male	17	11	5	2	13	48
Nyangabyaki Swaibu	Male	18	6	8	5	3	40
Kasanga B Lawrence	Male	15	5	9	5	2	36
Ayesiga Flossy	Male	15	5	8	0	3	31
Ali Tinkamanyire	Male	15	5	8	0	3	31
Kyahurwa William	Male	15	2	3	5	4	29
Kalyegira Azizi	Male	15	2	8	0	3	28
Kiiza Rugongeza Stanley	Male	15	2	4	2	5	28
Kadiru Kirungi	Male	12	2	8	1	4	27
Katusiime Richard	Male	14	2	3	2	2	23
Average Score Male							39.9
Nyangoma Alice	Female	18	5	11	2	10	46
Benadette Plan	Female	15	11	5	6	6	43
Nyangoma Mukoto Agnes	Female	15	10	5	5	7	42
Kusiima Dalson	Female	14	5	4	5	12	40
Grace Birungi	Female	16	5	9	1	4	35
Rwabugoma Cissy	Female	18	5	4	2	5	34
Rukanyanga Beatrice	Female	15	5	8	2	3	33
Biriboona Zaam	Female	13	5	8	0	3	29
Ashah Kabaramagi	Female	15	2	3	2	6	28
Average Score Female							36.7

Kampala District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Bona Jacob	Male	19	20	11	1	19	70
Daniel Kikomeko Ssali	Male	20	15	9	1	22	67
Badru Bakojja	Male	17	15	9	5	21	67
Apollo Mugume	Male	17	11	13	6	17	64
Asiimwe Godfrey	Male	15	15	3	10	19	62
Abdu Mayanja	Male	18	15	8	1	20	62
John Mary Sebuwufu	Male	17	15	5	6	18	61
Charles Lwanga	Male	17	15	8	0	20	60
Kiwanuka Mayambala	Male	17	15	8	1	19	60
Yona Musinguzi	Male	18	4	15	1	21	59
Bernard Luyiga	Male	17	12	8	1	19	57
Zachary Mbereza Mawula	Male	15	12	4	6	19	56
Edward Kibirige Muwanga	Male	18	12	3	0	20	53
Average Score Male							61.4
Florence Namayanja	Female	18	20	15	10	30	93
Doreen Nakaatya Nsamba	Female	21	11	11	10	23	76
Peninah Kabenge	Female	17	20	15	1	20	73
Madina Nsereko	Female	16	13	13	1	29	72
Lucy Mpanga	Female	18	15	8	5	19	65
Margaret Zawedde Kiryowa	Female	14	20	15	1	15	65
Nanyange Kibalama Dahlia	Female	15	16	8	1	22	62
Allen Kisige	Female	17	12	9	2	20	60
Joyce Odonga Acan	Female	17	12	11	0	17	57
Angella Kigonya	Female	13	7	9	6	19	54
Hadijja Nassanga	Female	17	5	8	2	19	51
Nampeera Anne Wakabi	Female	17	12	8	0	12	49
Average Score Female							64.8

Kamuli District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Galisansana Vincent	Male	21	6	9	3	28	67
Wakabi Julius	Male	17	6	11	3	19	56
Koremu Edward	Male	17	9	5	6	19	56
Ngobi Robert	Male	18	6	8	6	16	54
Ngobi Fred Basoga	Male	17	6	8	6	16	53
Mpalabule Charkes	Male	18	6	9	3	17	53
Kabale Moses	Male	12	9	8	6	17	52
Byarugaba David	Male	16	6	8	3	18	51
Gwolaba Aaron	Male	15	9	8	1	17	50
Mbogo David	Male	17	4	9	3	16	49
Kanaku Michael	Male	16	6	9	3	13	47
Martin P Kyuka	Male	11	6	13	1	13	44
Nadhomi Magoma	Male	11	6	8	3	16	44
Isabirye Richard Kigozi	Male	11	4	9	1	18	43
Balinaine Peter	Male	13	6	9	3	12	43
Kifubangabo	Male	15	2	8	0	17	42
Alazia Ssozi	Male	10	6	8	3	14	41
Kibogo Wilson	Male	14	6	9	2	9	40
Buyinza Moses	Male	15	4	8	1	9	37
Kategere Thomas	Male	17	0	8	0	2	27
Muzaale Magabi Martin	Male	9	0	8	0	5	22
Average Score Male							46.2
Hajat N. Watongola	Female	22	6	9	2	19	58
Bamutaza Norah	Female	16	9	9	3	16	53
Kagoya Mariam	Female	12	6	9	6	18	51
Kabenge Rose	Female	11	6	8	6	16	47
Kizito Sarah	Female	13	6	8	0	16	43
Betty Kalema	Female	13	6	8	2	13	42
Katalo Faridah	Female	7	10	5	5	9	36
Aisha Kanaku	Female	11	2	8	0	7	28
Average Score Female							44.8

Luwero District

Name	Gender	Legistla- tive Role	Contact with Elec- torate	Participa- tion in communal activities	Participa- tion in LLGs	Service deliv- ery on NPPAs	Total
Musisi Erasmus	Male	20	17	15	10	26	88
Musoke Omar Maalo	Male	22	17	11	10	25	85
Sheik Muhammed Kadala	Male	20	20	13	10	22	85
Tebasingwa Shaban Mukiibi	Male	15	20	13	10	26	84
Sempa Stephen	Male	16	10	15	10	26	77
Bwabye Richards	Male	20	17	10	10	20	77
Jonathan Kasule	Male	19	13	11	10	16	69
Mulindwa Rogers	Male	17	16	10	10	15	68
Luboyera Kyagaba	Male	17	17	3	10	16	63
Mbaali Jjunju	Male	17	16	1	10	16	60
Makumbi Swalleh	Male	16	10	9	10	7	52
Engineer Kaweesa John	Male	15	7	10	7	9	48
Kasule Abdul	Male	15	13	5	2	11	46
Mulwana Samuel	Male	15	9	4	3	10	41
Average Score Male							67.4
Rehema Kaaya	Female	15	13	10	10	17	65
Hellen Ndawula	Female	15	13	10	10	11	59
Nalubega Carol	Female	15	12	5	10	14	56
Namulindwa Joy	Female	17	9	8	5	16	55
Nakazzi Liliika	Female	15	9	4	6	19	53
Mirembe Joyce	Female	10	17	11	0	12	50
Kayaha Aisha Shamim	Female	15	9	9	2	12	47
Ndagire Aisha	Female	15	9	5	3	15	47
Nalubega Deborah	Female	16	9	8	0	13	46
Namanja Proscovia	Female	15	9	5	3	11	43
Katende Rosette	Female	7	9	3	3	13	35
Average Score Female							50.5

Mbale District

Name	Gender	Legistla- tive Role	Contact with Electo- rate	Partici- pation in com- munal activities	Partici- pation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mohammed Mafabi	Male	23	6	9	6	19	63
Mubajje Abdu Zak	Male	14	6	8	3	19	50
Musungu Michael	Male	13	6	9	6	16	50
Magomu Hussein Kahandi	Male	11	6	9	3	19	48
Nagwere Jonathan	Male	15	6	9	6	12	48
Wandwasi Robert	Male	18	5	9	1	14	47
Mabanja Nasuru	Male	15	6	4	3	15	43
Wasike Joseph	Male	13	4	8	1	16	42
Nabende Absolom	Male	10	6	5	3	16	40
Muliro Wanga Karim	Male	9	6	8	3	14	40
Kisolo Michael	Male	14	0	8	0	16	38
Mataki Solomon	Male	18	2	8	0	10	38
Khisa Kulusumu	Male	8	5	3	3	15	34
Nambuya L Massa	Male	7	5	3	3	15	33
Waboga Ali	Male	18	0	0	0	10	28
Menya Balonde	Male	7	4	3	3	9	26
Waniale Charles	Male	15	2	3	0	5	25
Average Score Male							40.8
Wandeba Christine	Female	12	17	9	3	16	57
Makuma M Annet	Female	19	6	9	3	16	53
Buyi Elizabeth	Female	8	2	8	2	15	35
Nadunga Robinah Kutosi	Female	13	5	9	0	6	33
Wandyetye Rose	Female	5	5	9	3	10	32
Nabaya Rose	Female	11	4	9	0	7	31
Manita Margaret	Female	13	0	3	0	10	26
Npumbe Rebecca	Female	13	2	0	1	5	21
Average Score Female							36

Moroto District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Sagal George	Male	20	5	9	5	6	45
Moses Lorwa Loku	Male	21	1	8	5	6	41
Lomise Swaibu	Male	16	0	5	4	10	35
Longole Zakayo	Male	18	7	5	2	1	33
Iriama Calisto	Male	15	1	8	0	9	33
Atoh Peter Longok	Male	17	0	0	2	0	19
Lochungare Andrew	Male	10	0	4	0	5	19
Loput Mathew	Male	14	3	1	0	0	18
Napeyok Paska Lobur	Male	12	0	2	2	1	17
Longora John Ekamaripus	Male	5	0	4	1	3	13
Average Score Male							27.3
Lina Logetei	Female	8	2	1	5	0	16
Adero Rose	Female	13	1	10	0	5	29
Angella Linol	Female	14	2	3	2	1	22
Anna Grace Sabith	Female	5	1	0	5	7	18
Betty Lotimong Naree	Female	9	0	2	6	0	17
Magdalene Teko	Female	11	0	0	2	0	13
Friama Cissy	Female	6	0	4	0	0	10
Average Score Female							17.9

Nebbi District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Ongei Alfred	Male	20	10	4	10	28	72
Warom Charles	Male	17	10	8	5	22	62
Tingo Boniface	Male	18	7	3	10	23	61
Kakura Emmy	Male	15	10	7	1	26	59
Ocibre Gabriel	Male	18	7	5	5	23	58
Abedo Sam	Male	15	10	3	2	25	55
Othembi Briosis	Male	17	5	4	0	27	53
Yoacel Joseph	Male	17	3	7	2	22	51
Orieda Richard	Male	19	5	4	2	18	48
Ongei Francis	Male	20	5	3	2	18	48
Onyutha Sam	Male	15	7	3	0	22	47
Okumu Kwonga Andrew	Male	20	5	3	2	17	47
Combe Muchek	Male	13	5	3	5	17	43
Wathum Lawrence	Male	15	5	3	0	18	41
Nimungu Fred	Male	18	0	3	2	17	40
Wabitho Hillary	Male	17	0	3	5	15	40
Oyiki Jovan Jax	Male	18	0	3	2	15	38
Ogaba Charles	Male	10	5	3	2	17	37
Average Score Male							50
Odong Florence	Female	15	7	3	6	27	58
Odongtho Doreen	Female	17	6	5	2	27	57
Okori Jesca	Female	15	15	3	2	22	57
Ida Fuambe	Female	20	5	8	2	17	52
Angeiko Rosemary	Female	15	3	3	5	24	50
Kumaketch Jackie	Female	15	5	3	2	23	48
Binega B Proasca	Female	14	7	3	5	19	48
Ongetho Mary	Female	20	5	3	2	18	48
Nimungu Claire D	Female	12	5	8	0	15	40
Acen Dorine	Female	12	0	3	5	17	37
Ruth Fualiera	Female	15	0	3	0	18	36
Azazu Gloria	Female	10	1	3	2	15	31
Angala Celestina	Female	13	0	3	5	10	31
Amoditho Rose	Female	10	0	3	2	15	30
Average Score Female							44.5

Ntungamo District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mugenyi Wilberforce	Male	21	20	9	10	23	83
Jacob Kafureka	Male	17	13	10	10	20	70
Byaruhanga Anthony	Male	17	17	7	6	22	69
Mugabi Sam K	Male	18	12	11	6	20	67
Twinomugisha Grace	Male	18	17	7	6	17	65
Baturaki Urban	Male	18	5	10	10	20	63
Atuhairi Elijah	Male	20	7	10	6	20	63
Rutagonya Vicent	Male	17	12	12	2	18	61
Buteera Dan	Male	18	4	7	6	25	60
Kahangire Ismail	Male	17	13	7	5	16	58
Bashaija Baguma	Male	17	9	10	2	16	54
Eng. Emmy Habyara	Male	19	4	4	10	16	53
Twebuze Alex	Male	19	7	4	2	19	51
Muhwezi Obadia	Male	17	0	0	6	8	31
Average Score Male							60.6
Mbabazi Shakila	Female	16	17	10	10	19	72
Maria Goretti	Female	15	17	5	10	24	71
Haji Jafari Kauki	Female	19	11	8	10	20	68
Hajjati Aisha Myheki	Female	15	17	6	10	19	67
Musiime Peace	Female	18	13	8	7	18	64
Tumusiime Jolly	Female	17	7	10	10	17	61
Ketty Kapasi	Female	17	8	10	6	16	57
Kembabazi Alice	Female	12	9	8	6	21	56
Kyofuna Justie	Female	12	1	3	5	13	34
Average Score Female							61.1

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